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Abstract

This research focuses on the relative advantages and disadvantages of using price-based
and quantity-based controls for electricity markets. It also presents a detailed analysis of
one specific approach to quantity based controls: the SmartAC program implemented in
Stockton, California. Finally, the research forecasts electricity demand under various
climate scenarios, and estimates potential cost savings that could result from a direct
quantity control program over the next 50 years in each scenario.

The traditional approach to dealing with the problem of peak demand for electricity is to
invest in a large stock of excess capital that is rarely used, thereby greatly increasing
production costs. Because this approach has proved so expensive, there has been a focus
on identifying alternative approaches for dealing with peak demand problems.

This research focuses on two approaches: price based approaches, such as real time
pricing, and quantity based approaches, whereby the utility directly controls at least some
elements of electricity used by consumers. This research suggests that well-designed
policies for reducing peak demand might include both price and qua_n tity controls.

In theory, sufficiently high peak prices occurring during periods of peak demand and/ or

low supply can cause the quantity of electricity demanded to decline until demand is in
balance with system capacity, potentially reducing the total amount of generation capacity
needed to meet demand and helping meet electricity demand at the lowest cost. However,
consumers need to be well informed about real-time prices for the pricing strategy to
work as well as theory suggests. While this might be an appropriate assumption for large
industrial and commercial users who have potentially large economic incentives, there is

not yet enough research on whether households will fully understand and respond to realtime prices.
Thus, while real-time pricing can be an effective tool for addressing the peak load
problems, pricing approaches are not well suited to ensure system reliability. This
research shows that direct quantity controls are better suited for avoiding catastrophic
failure that results when demand exceeds supply capacity.
Real-time pricing has many advantages, but consumer response to real-time prices is not
reliable enough to protect against catastrophic system failure. The reason is the
distinction between higher (but well-behaved) increases in marginal supply costs versus
system failure. Peak demand problems do not develop smoothly and gradually. Instead,
peak demand problems are characterized by infrequent but serious crises whose timing is
largely unpredictable. It is the potential for system failure that requires rapid temporary
changes, and it is here that pricing measures appear to subject some severe practical
limitations. Real-time pricing cannot guarantee a sufficient demand reduction to avoid
system failure. The price elasticity for electricity demand is largely unknown, particularly
at extreme temperatures. A one-time high hourly p#ce may not be able to produce the
necessary reduction in demand quickly or predictably enough to avoid catastrophe. This
suggests one major advantage of direct quantity controls: if the control is effective and
can be deployed quickly, regulators can be assured of avoiding system catastrophe. For
these reasons, the ideal peak demand policy might contain a mixture of tools, with realtime pricing and direct load controls to reduce peak demand and maintain system
reliability under different climate change scenarios.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
This study evaluates the impact of a direct load control policy intended to reduce peak
demand for electricity by limiting residential consumers' demand for electricity for air
conditioning during critical peak hours under different future climate change scenarios. In
order to put the research in context, the study first provides background on the electricity
industry, including the technology for producing and delivering power, the history of
policy and regulation directed toward it, and recent experience with restructuring in the
United States. The study then presents the unique attributes of electricity that create
problems for those charged with supplying power, particularly the problems of balancing
supply and demand in real time, which is essential to maintaining reliability. With this
background, a major objective of this study is to assess the relative advantages and
disadvantages of using real time prices for electricity to balance supply and demand, as
compared to using direct load controls. The study also the study examines how electricity
demand for cooling will change as global climate change warms the planet and the role
for current strategies to manage peak demand.
The rapid growth of peak demand in recent decades has brought peak demand to the fore
in discussions on electricity and energy policy. Although the emphasis on addressing peak
demand is fairly recent, the issues are as old as the electricity utility system itself. First, the
necessity for real time production and the large divergence between peak and off-peak
demand create the need for considerable excess capacity, much of which is idle for a large
fraction of the time. For example, in 2006, the highest peak load year on record in New
England, 15% of all generation capacity ran 0.9% of the time or less, and 25% of all
capacity ran 2.9% of the time or less. This combined with high costs and long lead times
1

for capacity expansion means that it is very expensive to meet peak load without some
form of demand management that smoothes consumption over time. Another issue is
that modern society is highly dependent on reliable electricity supply. Thus, there is, in
essence, a political mandate to meet demand virtually 100% of the time. These issues
combine to make the connection between system peak demand and system reliability an
important driver of public policy in the electric utility sector.
Electricity demand varies minute-to-minute. Cost considerations necessitate that base
load power generation uses technologies that have low operating costs and high capital
costs because the plants are highly efficient. In contrast, since peak load generation
capacity operates only a small fraction of the time, cost considerations dictate the use of
technologies with lower capital costs and higher operating costs. Hence, the cost of
electricity production varies considerably over time. However, the highly variable nature
of the marginal cost of generating electricity is not reflected in the flat retail electricity
prices paid by end users. Therefore, in order to balance supply and demand in real time,
generators must produce sufficient electricity to meet customer demand at each point in
time at a fixed retail price. As demand increases so does the likelihood of a system outage,
which is highest during peak times 1. As a result, utilities must build capacity to supply
electricity for the most extreme peak loads, which may only occur for one or two weeks
of the year.

An analogy with another form of infrastructure helps highlight this problem. Building
sufficient electrical generation capacity to serve peak demand is akin to expanding a
1

The electric utility sector has traditionally focused on peak demand because the likelihood of system
outages (often measured by the "loss of load probability" or LOLP) is by far greatest at peak
times(Koomey & Brown, 2002) .

2

highway to 10 lanes each way in order to accommodate rush hour traffic without
congestion. While this alleviates congestion during the morning and afternoon rush, the
rest of day those 20 lanes will be sparsely populated with vehicles. The costs for building
such a highway are prohibtively high and do not make sense when the need for all 20
lanes is only for a few hours a day. Peak demand problems on highways are handled by
having highly congested roads during rush hours, when traffic greatly exceeds the
highway's carrying capacity. This is not done with electricity because the electrical system
would fail on a regular basis if demand exceeded system capacity and this is viewed as
unacceptable by society at large. Generators must build the infrastructure, regardless of
cost, in order to meet peak demand, leading to higher than necessary wholesale and retail
electricity prices and bills
In this traditional model there is no way of ensuring reliability except by building capacity

that is rarely used, and building such large amounts of excess capacity has been very
costly. A more cost effective approach to reliability and meeting peak load would be to
involve customers in the decision-making. If customers were faced directly with a choice
between paying the full costs of building new capacity that would only run a few hours
per year, versus the alternative of shifting a fraction of their consumption to off-peak
hours, perhaps many customers would choose to reduce their peak use. The relative costs
of building new capacity versus reducing peak demand emphasize this point. Using the
capital cost of a simple cycle gas turbine as the basis of the cost for peaking capacity,
Spees (2008) estimates that the price of peaking capacity is $94/kW year annually. Thus,
the capital cost associated with a generator that runs exactly 1 hour per year is
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$93,720/MWh2 . By contrast, a survey of utilities finds that the cost of coincident peak
load reductions ranges from $18 to $25/kW year- less than one fourth of the $94/kW
year it costs to build new capacity. Clearly, reducing peak demand could potentially be a
much cheaper means of meeting peak demand than building more capacity.
This topic is of particular importance in the face of climate change. Hotter temperatures
and extended heat waves will lead to more frequent and harder-to-predict peaks3• Many
systems are already beginning to feel the strain of rising temperatures, causing policy
makers at all levels of government to start examining policies aimed at reducing peak
demand and increasing the resiliancy of the grid. Thus, there is considerable potential
benefit to implementing demand management strategies to reduce episodic peak demand.

There are two general categories of policies that can be used to reduce peak demand:
price-based policy and quantity-based policy. Price-based policies focus on charging
customers for electricity based on contemporaneous competitive wholesale market prices
that reflect marginal supply costs. The resulting price elasticity exhibited by customers
when responding to changes in real-time marginal supply costs would reduce electricity
demand during peak hours and increase demand during off-peak hours. With quantitybased policies, the utility directly controls the amount of electricity that is used by the
household, business, or factory during peak periods. In one approach, consumers are paid
incentives to join a program under which the utility controls appliances within the home,

2

By contrast, a base load generator operating all the time would be a capital intensive coal plant with
a lower operating cost than a peaking gas generator. The per unit cost of this generator is
$26.06/MWh.
3
The chaotic nature of weather makes it unpredictable beyond a few days. A major limiting factor to
the predictability of weather beyond several days is a fundamental dynamical property of the
atmosphere. Hence, changes in the properties of the atmosphere could potentially make it harder to
predict the weather.
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most commonly air conditioners. Quantity-based policies are a more direct tool for
reducing peak demand, offering customers incentive payments to reduce their electricity
consumption during peak periods.
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides
background on the electricity industry, including the technology for producing and
delivering power, the history of policy and regulation regarding electricity markets, and
some recent experience with restructuring of electricty markets in the U.S. Chapter 2 also
explains the significance of peak demand in the electric power industry. Chapter 3 reviews
two different types of policy tools used to reduce peak demand: real-time pricing and
direct quantity controls. Chapter 3 also introduces the SmartAC™ program- a direct
control program that limits the amount of electricity demanded by participating consumer
air conditioning systems. Chapter 4 is a review of the economic literature on how pricebased policies are used to manage peak demand, and then compares the relative efficiency
of using price-based versus quantity-based policies for reducing peak demand. Chapter 5
and 6 focus on the analysis of the quantity-based SmartAC™ program for reducing peak
demand. Chapter 5 illustrates several of the issues arid challenges associated with this type
of analysis. Chapter 6 reports the results on estimating the impact that the SmartAC
program had on peak demand in 2007, and presents projections for how effective this
type of direct control policy might be under various climate change scenarios. Finally,
Chapter 7 presents policy recommendations, suggestions for areas of future research, and
conclusions.
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Chapter 2. Understanding the Structure of the Electricity Industry
In order to put this research in context, this chapter provides background on the
electricity industry, including the technology for producing and delivering power, the
history of policy and regulation directed toward it, and recent experience with
restructuring in the United States. This chapter concludes that the long lead times
associated with building new capacity, the lack of price response in the face of timevarying costs, the large differences between peak demand and average demand, and the
necessity for real-time delivery of electricity all make the connection between system
reliability and peak demand an important driver of public policy in the electricity sector.
This chapter also concludes climate change will exacerbate the peak demand problem.

2.1 Brief History of the Electricity Industry
For most of its history, the electricity industry was characterized by utilities operating as
regulated geographic monopolies. These utilities were vertically-integrated, meaning that
the same company owned and operated all of the infrastructure necessary for electricity
generation, long-distance transmission, and final distribution and sale to end-users. The
industry was regulated by federal and state governments; the former generally controlling
the "wholesale" side and the latter controlling the "retail" side. Wholesale refers to the
generation and transmission of electricity, while retail refers to the sale of electricity to
residential, commercial, and industrial end users. Operating under monopoly conditions
meant that only one electricity provider was available in most states or regions. This
arrangement avoided the costly duplication of transmission wires and power plants, and
for the privilege of being the sole provider of electricity, the utility submitted itself to the
6

oversight of the state Public Utilities Commission (PUC), which set retail electricity prices
at a level that allowed the utility to earn a limited profit. Subject to rate-of-return
regulation, the utilities charged their retail customers average-cost rates that included the
return on the utilities' investments in generation, transmission, and distribution
infrastructure4 •

Competition on the wholesale side of the industry began as an unintended by-product of
the 1978 Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA), passed to promote alternative
sources of energy by requiring utilities to purchase electricity from a limited set of
approved generators. Despite flawed implementation, PURPA showed that the grid could
work with non-utility generators. Congress enacted the Energy Policy Act in 1992 to
open access to the transmission system to any independent power producer wishing to
compete in the wholesale market. Four years later, the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) issued its Orders 888 and 889, the first of many enabling
regulations toward this end. Order 888 also required "functional unbundling" of
wholesale power prices, requiring utilities to separate the rates for generation,
transmission, and ancillary services5•

4

The process works a little differently for publicly owned electric companies, such as municipal
utilities and rural cooperatives. Because municipal utilities {"munis") are owned by the local
government in the area they serve, and cooperatives are owned by the customers themselves, they
may have less incentive than investor-owned utilities to take undue advantage of their monopoly
position. Accordingly, in most states, publicly owned utilities and cooperatives set their own prices.
5
Ancillary services are the power-related functions necessary to keep the grid working and reliable.
Examples include maintaining central control over generators to adjust power instantaneously to deal
with momentary power surges and reductions in demand; adjusting generation to adapt to
predictable hour-to-hour and daily variation in demand; and providing power in response to
unexpected generator or transmission system failure. Ancillary services have traditionally been
supplied by vertically integrated utilities with the cost included in the price of electricity.
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Today, most restructured electricity markets follow a generic model. This model is
characterized by a competitive wholesale electricity market in which sellers (generators)
and buyers (utilities) transact by making supply and demand bids. An Independent
System Operator (ISO) oversees the wholesale electricity market by managing the highvoltage transmission owned by newly created regulated transmission and distribution
(f&D) companies, which descend from the formerly integrated utilities. In turn, the
distribution utilities resell electricity to final users.

2.2 Characteristics of Electricity
Electricity is an unusual commodity in many respects. One is that the power produced by
a particular generator does not necessarily go to that generator's customers. More
precisely, if a generator sells N kilowatts of power to its customers, it is merely
committing to inject N kilowatts of electricity into the overall electricity system at the
same time that its customers are pulling N kilowatts from the grid. It is as if Starbucks
sold M cups of coffee by dumping that volume of coffee into a common vat mixed with
coffee from every other coffee shop, out of which its customers had the right to pour M
cups. As a consequence, the distinction between the grid and the power pooled within it
can become blurry. If coffee were sold as in the Starbucks scenario, one might well
expect that the owner of the vat- the grid- might find itself becoming involved with the
wholesale purchase and retail sale of the coffee within it. This blurriness could be
especially pronounced when it comes to ensuring a reliable supply of electricity. This
section discusses the characteristics of electricity that affect the structure of wholesale
electricity markets.
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Perhaps the most crucial feature that distinguishes electricity from other commodities is
the need to keep supply equal to demand on virtually a minute-by-minute basis. For most
other commodities, buyers can wait if the item is not on the shelf or if the telephone line
is busy. Sellers sometimes may have to backorder a "hot" item or keep inventory around
a little longer when items do not sell as fast as expected. Both of these can be costly and
inconvenient, to be sure, but they are not catastrophic in the way that a mismatch
between electricity demand and supply can be. If more electricity is demanded than
generated, brownouts or blackouts follow. If more electricity is supplied than used, the
heat from the extra energy can damage transmission and distribution lines.

Keeping electricity supply just equal to demand, by varying either production or use, is
called load balancing. Two properties of electricity exacerbate the problem of keeping
loads balanced. First, the cost of storing electricity in substantial quantities is prohibitive.
With most commodities, if a seller thinks that demand could be stronger than expected,
he can keep an inventory of the commodity available of the shelves or in a warehouse.
This tactic is not available for suppliers of electricity. Batteries are too expensive to store
much power for most users, and at least up to now, generation on-site is prohibitively
costly for all but large industrial users or commercial facilities that cogenerate electricity as
a by-product of energy available from other production processes or space heating
systems. Hence, when users want electricity, the generators have to be producing it at that
moment, and the transmission and distribution systems have to be able to deliver it.

The second problem is that load imbalances can take down the entire grid or entire
regions with the grid, not just those who are customers of a particular distribution utility
that happens not to have procured enough to meet their demands. The power procured
9

by everyone essentially becomes part of a common pool from which all users draw. If
what is there does not suffice, all customers on that grid lose, even if the cause of the
insufficient supply is a failure to produce by one generator or unanticipated demand from
just one utility's customers.

In short, the inability to store large amounts of electricity means that supply must

constantly be kept equal to demand. The systemwide nature of the effect means that the
costs of failing to keep loads in balance are borne by everyone on a grid and not just the
utility that happens to be out of balance. Accordingly, utilities are responsible for
anticipating customer demand and procuring sufficient power to cover demand, as
necessary to maintain the appropriate balance.

2.3 Wholesale Market Structure
In order to perform well, markets need to be structured around the key elements of the

commodity being sold. In this case, the need to maintain a constant balance of supply and
demand, coupled with customers' highly variable demand, requires that power systems
are characterized by a range of generating technologies in terms of their capital and
operating costs. These range from highly capital-intensive baseload plants that are
designed to run continuously at low operating costs, to peaker plants that are relatively
inexpensive to build and can start up quickly in order to meet peak demand, but generally
have high fuel costs during the relatively few hours per year that they operate. Therefore,
generator decisions (which plants to run and for how long) are made based on marginal
operating costs, which are dominated by fuel costs. Plants are generally dispatched to
serve electricity demand based on marginal costs based on what is called "merit order,"
10

i.e. plants with the lowest marginal costs run first. That way, the least expensive plants
run the most, minimizing production costs and, thus, minimizing total electricity costs.
Variations in energy demand result in different combinations of power plants, and
therefore, different production costs. When demand is low, only low-cost plants operate.
When demand is high, such as during summer peaks, almost all available generation is
needed, and therefore production costs are high.

Because retail power demand varies considerably during the course of the day and year,
the system has to be sized to meet demand during peak periods as well as on average.
This means that if all generating plants are needed to meet peak needs, some of those
plants will sit idle during off-periods. Thus, generation companies select highly efficient
power plants with the lowest marginal costs, including capital and operating costs, to run
at full capacity all of the time. These are called base load plants. Baseload plants tend to
be nuclear, coal-fired, or big hydroelectric power plants because they are cheaper to run
for prolonged periods and are expensive to start up and shut down (cycled).
Generators that are only used to meet occasional peak demand are called peaking plants.
Peaking plants might be compared to a beachfront hotel. During the sumer the hotel is
booked solid and needs every room it has available to rent. During the rest of the year
most of the rooms are empty; however, the hotel still has to pay its fixed costs (mortgage,
taxes, etc.) to have those rooms available when they are needed in the summer. The hotel
charges based on paying its fixed costs on the whole hotel even if most of the rooms are
empty most of the year. In the same way, generation companies must charge to cover the
capital costs they require to meet peak electricity demand. Power plants used to meet
peak loads do not need to run for many hours over the course of the year, generally fewer
11

than 200 to 400 hours per year (between 3 and 5 % of the time). As a result, generation
companies prefer to spend less on plant construction and use plants that can be cycled.
This means the plants have to use fuels with high heat content and associated higher cost,
typically natural gas or oil. Combustion turbines are comparatively easy to cycle, so they
are often the plant of choice for peak demand.
Since demand for power varies as a function of time, rising and falling each day- being
greater during weekdays than on weekends and rising during summer and winter due to
air conditioning and heating usage- generators use different combinations of power plants

to meet demand. This means that the marginal cost of supplying power is highly variable.
The retail prices that customers pay for electricity, however, rarely change.
The tables and figures below show that peaking plants add costs in two ways. First,
because they are inefficient and burn high-heat fuels, peaking plants have high operating
costs, meaning that the marginal cost of supplying electricity is very high during peak
events. Second, even though the capital cost of building peaking plants is relatively low,
because they run so few hours per year, they have high capital cost per unit of electricity
actually produced. For example, .a typical New E ngland peaking plan, designed in the
1960s or 1970s and running on oil costs approximately $250 to produce 1 MWh of
electricity. Newer natural gas base load plants cost about $74 to produce the same amout
of electricity (see Figure 2-3). Thus, the older peaking plants use about 88% more fuel
than newer base load plants (see Figure 4) (Philipson & Willis, 1999) . Figures 2-4 (a) and
(b) shows data from the ISO-New E ngland Marginal Emissions Analysis. For the New
England region, carbon dioxide emissions (COi) during day-time peak hours (8am to
1Opm) are 20% higher than during off-peak hours. Nitrogen oxide emissions are about
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30% higher during peak hours and sulfur dioxide emissions are just over 20% higher
during peak hours (Independent System Operator- New England, 2008)6. This is most
likely because the additional generation that is brought on line to meet the higher demand
during peak periods has higher emissions rates. These typically are older resources with
lower thermal efficiency.

Table 2-1 presents the estimated capital costs of constructing new power plants based on
different generation technologies and Figure 2-1 presents price trends of coal, natural gas,
and oil. As indicated above, because generators' operating costs are largely driven by the
price of fuel, plants that burn natural gas or oil have higher marginal supply costs than
coal-fired plants. Based on Table 2-1, gas turbines have the lowest capital costs and the
shortest construction times. In comparison, photovoltaic, fuel cell, and solar generators
are ten times more expensive than a peaking gas generator.

Though the fuel source is clean, cheap, and renewable, most renewable generation
technologies are expensive compared to power plants burning fossil fuels 7 • Based on
Table 2-1, advanced open cycle gas turbines have the lowest capital costs and the shortest
construction times. In comparison, photovoltaic, fuel cell, and solar generators are ten
times more expensive than a peaking gas generator. Among renewable generation
technologies, wind generators are the least expensive. One reason renewable generators
are not cost-competitive with traditional generators is their low capacity factors. The
capacity factor is one measure of the productivity of a power plant (see Table 2-2). The
6

Emissions rate (lbs/MWh)=Calculated total emissions in time period from marginal fossil units/Total
MWh in time period from marginal fossil units.
7
The costs of building and operating traditional fossil-fuel burning power plants generally do not
include the social costs associated with electricity generation, such as increased air pollution,
increased greenhouse gas emissions, or climate change.
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capacity factor compares the plant's actual production over a given time period with the
amount of power the plant could have produced if it had been running at full capacity for
the same amount of time. Because traditional power plants run on fuel, a baseload plant

will normally run much of the time unless it is idled by equipment problems or for
maintenance. A capacity factor of 80% is typical for conventional baseload plants. A wind
turbine, however, is "fueled" by wind, which blows steadily at times and irregularly at
other times. Although modern utility-scale wind turbines typically operate 65% to 90% of
the time, the wind is usually not blowing strong enough for the turbine to spin at full
capacity. Therefore, a capacity factor of 25% to 40% is common. This makes the per unit
cost of electricity much higher than it would be if the wind turbine operated at full
capacity all of the time. Most of the generating technologies mentioned here are not cost
competitive at this time, except perhaps in niche applications such as in developing
nations where there is inadequate infrastructure in place for traditional generation. Windpowered generation is gaining a foothold in the U.S., however the financial feasibility of
wind projects is largely dependent on federal and state tax credits, net metering laws, and
the forecasted price of wholesale electricity.
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Table 2-1. Estimated capital cost of constructing a power plant by type of
technology
Generating Type

Gas turbine, pre 1990
Gas-steam, 2010
Combined cycle, pre 1990
Internal combustion, pre
1990
Gas-steam, pre 1990
Internal combustion, 2010
Coal-steam, pre 1990
Gas turbine, 2010
Combined cycle, 2010
Coal-steam, 2010
Micro gas turbine, 2010
Fuel cell, 2010
Nuclear, 2010
Fuel cell, 1998
Nuclear, pre-1990
Hydroelectric
Wind, best conditions,
2010
Solar thermal, 2010
Photovoltaic, fixed, 2010
Photovoltaic, tracking,
2010

Heat Rate
(BT U/kWh)

Relative
O &M

600
500

Capital
Cost
~$/k~
350
400

12,000
9,700

1.00
0.88

50
100

400
400

10,500
13,800

1.15
0.80

2.2
8.6

500
0.05
450
50
150
500
0.05
0.05
800
0.05
5
350
0.5

425
425
450
450
450
475
500
600
800
900
1,000
1,400
1,800

10,300
12,000
10,900
11,200
9,300
9,200
12,000
11,000
11,000
12,500
11,500
n/a
n/a

1.00
0.50
1.01
0.85
0.93
0.90
1.50
1.66
1.20
2.00
1.25
0.25
0.80

2.4
5.0
2.5
2.3
1.9
< 1.9
4.7
5.2
2.5
11.0
3.0
2.0
7.3

150
0.005
0.005

1,900
2,500
2,500

n/a
n/a
n/a

1.33
0.80
1.15

4.0
9.2
9.2

Typical
Size

~~

Source: (Philipson & Willis, 1999)
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Figure 2-1. Estimated capital cost of constructing a power plant by type of
technology Source: (Philipson & Willis, 1999)

Table 2-2. Capacity factor by generation technology
Technology

Capacity Factor

Gas turbine combined cycle

80-90%

Nuclear

90%

Average U.S. coal plant

68%

Biomass

68%

Geothermal

90%

Hydroelectric

44%

Wind

30%

Solar

20%
Source: (Energy Information Administration, 2007)
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Figure 2-3. Average energy consumed by combined cycle power plants to
produce 1 kWh of electricity Source: (Philipson & Willis, 1999)
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2.4 Minimizing Costs through Economic Dispatch
The practice of meeting demand by sequentially activating technologies with the lowest
marginal operating costs is called "economic dispatch." Economic dispatch benefits
electricity customers in a number of ways. By systematically seeking the lowest cost of
energy production consistent with electricity demand, economic dispatch reduces total
electricity costs. To minimize costs, economic dispatch typically increases the use of the
more efficient generation units, which can lead to better fuel utilization, lower fuel useage,
and lower greenhouse gas emissions than would result from a less efficient generation

mix. In principle, retail customers will benefit if the savings are passed through in lower
retail rates. Economic dispatch methods are also flexible enough to incorporate policy
goals such as promoting fuel diversity or respecting demand reductions as well as supply
resources.

Economic dispatch principles and operation are the same in both vertically-integrated
utilities and deregulated wholesale markets. In wholesale power markets, generators offer
blocks of electricity for various time periods at prices that reflect their marginal operating
costs. System operators match s:upply bids to demand forecasts, determining which
generators to dispatch, and setting hourly wholesale market prices as the highest supply
bid accepted (all of the accepted bids are paid the market clearing price). If the auction is
competitive, the market-clearing price is equal to the short-run marginal cost of the most
expensive generator dispatched.

Figure 2-5 illustrates the uniform-price aution, in which the price bid by the marginal
utility is awarded to all successful bidders. The solid line in the figure is the additional
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(marginal) cost of generation per MW, while the dashed line is the average total cost,
including fixed costs, of generating each MW. The three cost levels represent baseload,
shoulder, and peaking units. The vertical line is the number of MW demanded during a
particular period, as estimated by the ISO. In a competitive market, all generators would
bid their marginal cost for each unit and the market clearing price would be P. Since the
market-clearing price is paid to all generators in a uniform price auction the total amount
paid to generators per hour would be price multiplied by the number of MW. At times of
high demand, such as shown in the figure, the auction pays baseload generation a price
that can be several times higher than the marginal supply cost for that plant. For example,
during peak periods, baseload power that costs perhaps $30 per MWh would be paid
$500 per MWh. However, in a competitive market, the highest cost peaking units are
never paid more than their marginal cost and so they never recover their fixed costs. As a
result, investors are often unwilling to build new peaking plants. This is one reason why
wholesale electricity markets are not perfectly competitive.
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Demand

$/MWh
Peak
: -- - - -- - - - - Average Cost
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Base load

0

15,660

21,000 26,000
Quantity (!vfW)

Figure 2-5. Wholesale market structure

Table 2-3 is another illustration .of a uniform price auction where all successful bidders
get paid the clearing price. Here, a set of bids has been sorted by cost from highest to
lowest, against a need for 22,057 MW. The market clearing prices is $0.23/kWh, which all
successful bidders are paid. Operators of "must run" power plants and any others that
will take whatever price they can get simply bid zero.
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Table 2-3. Uniform price auction stack, England-Wales Poolco

Bid number 31

5001v1W at $0.243/k\\'11

Bid number 6

6001\11\\T at $0.238/k\Vh

Bid number 3

1110 M\V at $0.234/k\Vh

Bid number 28

5001vl\V at $0.232/k\Vh

Bid number 1

2100 M\V at $0.230/k\Vh

Bid number 43

1210 :tvl\V at $0.219/k\Vh

Bid mm1ber 5

1500 M\V at $0 .214/kwh

Bid number 23

1430 M\Vat $0.211/k\Vh

Bid mm1ber 27

3200 Ivl\V at $0.209/k\Vh

Bid number l3

1380 1\1\V at $0.204/k\Vh

Bid number 19

1430 M\V at $0.20/k\Vh

Bid number 22

200 MW at $0.20/kWh

Bid number 9

3500 M\Vat $0.14 4/kWh

Bid number 2

41001v1\V at $0.00/k\Vh

Bid number?

2500 l\'IVl at $0.00/k\Vh

22.057 M\V

Bids taken

Source: (Philipson & Willis, 1999)

Many factors influence economic dispatch in practice. These include transmission
limitations, reliability concerns, fuel constraints, and environmental regulations. For
example, congestion often arises when restrictions prevent the least expensive supply of
energy from serving demand in a particular area. This might happen if transmission lines
do not have enough capacity to carry all of the electricity needed to meet demand in a
22

particular location. The locational marginal price (LMP) reflects the cost of supplying
more expensive electricity to that location, providing a market-based method for pricing
electricity that cannot be served by the lowest-cost generator. Because economic dispatch
requires a balance between economic efficiency, reliability, and other factors, it is best
thought of as a constrained cost-minimization process.
It is useful to divide economic dispatch into two separate stages: day-ahead commitment

and real-time dispatch. Day-ahead planning means scheduling power plants for each hour
of the next day's dispatch based on load forecasts for the next day. The planner selects
generating units to be dispatched the next day based on each plants' generation capacity,
efficiency, operating costs, variable costs of environmental compliance, start-up costs,
and ramp-rate (how quickly the generator can be brought on line). Real-time dispatch
occurs in real time and is performed by the regional transmission operator (RTO) or
independent system operation (ISO). The regulator monitors the hourly dispatch
schedule, load, generation, and interchange (imports and exports) to ensure the balance of
supply and demand. Often, the regulator must modify the merit order to account for grid
conditions and operational reliability needs. In real time, many of the adjustments to
least-cost dispatch are to prepare for, or respond to, contingencies that affect grid
reliability.

2.5 The Significance of Peak Demand
Peak demand issues came to the fore at the beginning of the decade because of the
California electricity crisis of 2000 and 2001. Uncertainties surrounding the reliability of
electric power systems in restructured markets is one of the latest reasons for such
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retail electricity rates rarely reflect the daily or hourly changes in the wholesale price, in
part due to the widespread lack of advanced metering technology capable of charging
customers for their electricity use in real-time, and an associated lack of end-use device
technologies capable of tracking and responding to such time-varying price signals. Even
when metering technologies are capable of monitoring such price signals, sometimes bills
are delivered on a monthly basis, thus sidestepping the most powerful potential effect of
real-time prices, the immediate behavioral feedback.

System planners are not only concerned with meeting the system peak demand, but also
with local and regional peak demands that may result in outages due to local transmission,
distribution, and generation constraints (in fact, local outages are far more common than
system outages). Beyond system reliability, there are additional reasons why peak demand
is an important public policy issue. Peak demand raises environmental concerns because
the system's highest marginal cost plants operate during peak hours and these plants are
often the most inefficient, and thus produce more greenhouse gas emissions per unit of
electricity produced than baseload plants. Many peaking plants are fired by natural gas or
fuel oil, raising issues of fuel security (for oil) and diversity /price stability (for natural gas).
Facility siting is another concern. As the magnitude of peak demand increases, the size of
the electricity system must also grow, leading to more generators, transmission, and
distribution lines. There is growing resistence (and growing competition from other uses)
to using scarce land resources for siting this infrastructure.
A major concern, at least for economists, with peak demand is economic efficiency. In
the traditional situation of unresponsive demand, the only way to ensure reliability is to
build capacity that will rarely be used. The process of building large amounts of excess

25

capacity has been very costly. Consider the following set of figures, which illustrate the
peak load problem. Figure 2-6 shows power use chronologically for every hour in 2006.
Figure 2-7 shows those hourly loads rank ordered from the lowest load hour to the
highest load hour (peak) for all 8,760 hours in the year. In 2006, the highest peak load
year on record in ISO-New England (ISO-NE), 15% of all capacity ran 0.7% of the time
or less, 20% of capacity ran 0.97% of the time or less, and 25% of all capacity ran 3.0% of
the time or less. Figure 2-8 shows how much capacity is needed just to serve peak load.
In the figure, the peak load hours are highlighted and the width of the textured bands
indicates the number of MW that can be considered peak hours: the bands' widths show
the quantity of capacity that must exist just to serve demand during peak hours. The last
band from the left indicates the amount of capacity built just to serve the top 30 hours
(corresponding to a capacity factor of 0.34%); the combination of all of the bands
indicates the amount of capacity that exists to serve the top 500 hours (corresponding to
a capacity factor of 5.7%). Figure 2-9 compares peak load growth and average annual
load growth in New England.
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Figures 2-10 and 2-11 demonstrate that electricity supply costs increase when the
intensity of electricity demand (peaks and hourly loads) increases. T he total electric bill
increases during high demand preiods because both electricity usage is higher and the
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wholesale price of electricity increases. This is demonstrated by the fact that New
England's 10% highest 2006 hourly loads were 14% of annual electricity consumption,
but 19% of energy costs (estimated energy costs are based on a weighted average of real
time and day-ahead prices). Conversely, the lowest 10% of 2006 hourly loads were 8% of
annual energy use, but only 6% of 2006 costs.Table 2-4 demonstrates that the magnitude
of demand clearly affects wholesale electricity price.
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Table 2-4. 2006 New England hourly load deciles 8

Top 10%

Bottom 10%

9

14%

12%

$

73.54

8

12%

11%

$

67.87

7

11%

11 %

$

64.90

6

10%

10%

$

64.15

5

9%

10%

$

61.34

4

8%

9%

$

56.42

3

7%

8%

$

51.68

2

6%

8%

$

46.08

4%

7%

$

40.35

Source: (Independent Service Operator- New England, 2006)

8

.

These data are based on ISO day ahead and real-time data for the ISO-NE Control Area, so standard
offer prices and customers with independent bilateral contracts will not have the same energy costs or
price signals. However, all generators have access to comparable market information and fuel costs so
over the long run standard offer and bilateral contract prices are likely to approximate the ISO market
prices. The ISO New England 2006 Annual Market Report indicated that the 51% of loads were served
by bilateral contracts, 45% by the day-ahead market, and 4% by the real time market.
The formula for calculating hourly costs is:
Day-Ahead Price x Day-Ahead Demand+ Real-Time Price x Demand Differential=Cost
The price per MWh is calculated by dividing the cost to serve the hour by the real-time
demand:
Cost/Real-time Demand=Price per MWh
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If load curves could be flattened (through load management or responses to time-varying
prices) then a more efficient use of capital could result. In addition, when the system is
close to peak, small increases in demand can lead to large increases in marginal costs per
kWh because of the inelasticity of supply at that time.

2.6 The California Electricity Crisis
Concerns about peak demand can be seen more broadly as a need to ensure that supply
and demand remain in balance at any instant. The California power crisis in 2000 and
2001 illustrates the magnitude of the problems that can arise when markets are not wellstructured. In 1998, California began a process to open retail electricity markets to
competitive suppliers. During the transition from regulated to competitive retail markets,
regulators capped retail electricity rates to protect customers from high prices. At this
time, regulators also created the California ISO (CA ISO) to oversee the transmission
system and an independent power exchange, the PX, where wholesale electricity would
be traded. Retail restructuring was going reasonably well until the early summer of 2000
when wholesale electricity prices began to skyrocket as a result of a combination of
factors. Generation capacity had not kept pace with demand, which had increased 11 %
since the 1990s. And, the problem of inadequate capacity was exacerbated by drought
conditions in the West, which diminished hydroelectric production to less than 75% of
1999 levels. Furthermore, the price of natural gas, which was becoming more commonly
used, tripled. Wholesale prices began to spike to levels nearly 10 times those reached in
the previous two years.
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While wholesale prices skyrocketed, retail electricity prices were kept low through price
caps. Low retail rates provided no incentives for customers to curtail or shift their
demand to off-peak or lower-cost hours. Thus, utilities were forced to purchase wholesale
power at prices that were five times the capped retail rate in order to meet demand. To
illustrate, at one point the average wholesale price was $.0126/kWh compared to the limit
of $0.054 that Pacific Gas & Electric was allow to charge its retail customers. Unable to
cover their costs, California's three large utilities (Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E), San
Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E), and Southern California Edison (SCE)) began to
declare bankruptcy. Fearing they would not get paid, independent power producers
refused to deliver electricity and rolling blackouts ensued. In the end, PG&E and
SDG&E were left $13 billion in debt, Governor Gray Davis declared a state of
emergency, and the state itself began to buy power on behalf of the utilities. It was
estimated that a one-day blackout cost $100 million in losses for California businesses.

The California crisis drew national attention not only to the problem of peak demand, but
also to the potential for wholesale market manipulation. Independent generators
unilaterally had the ability and incentive to exercise inarket power and withhold output in
order to raise wholesale prices. Enron-a leading player in the California energy markets
and controlling 3,500 MW of electricity (enough for more than 2.6 million homes)-was
eventually convicted of intentionally shutting down generators and withholding supply in
order to manipulate energy prices.

The California crisis brought renewed attention to the problem of peak demand and the
disconnection between highly variable wholesale prices and static retail rates. In the
opinion of many, the worst effects of the energy crisis could have been alleviated if
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customers had access to real-time prices that provided incentives for customers to shift
their electricity use to off-peak periods. In fact, the International Energy Agency
estimated that a 5% decrease in peak demand would have reduced peak wholesale prices
by as much as 50% (Harrington, 2003) .The crisis underscored the notion that wellfunctioning electricity markets must include mechanisms to handle peak load problems
and showed that reducing peak demand can improve system reliability, avoid costly fuel
expenditures, reduce capital expenditures on generating capacity, and reduce generators'
ability to exercise market power.

2. 7 Drivers of Peak Demand
Weather tends to be the most important driver of peak demand. In warmer regions of the
U.S. air conditioning loads drive peak demand on the hottest summer afternoons. For
colder regions, peak demand is in the winter and is driven by the demand for electric
heating on the coldest mornings of the year. For example, planners at ISO-NE report
that between 40 and 50% of peak summer demand is due to air conditioning load; during
2006 which had the highest peak on record, the system peak was more than 50% greater
than the average system load. P~ak loads are largely determined by temperature and the
highest peaks loads often coincide with the hottest days of the year. Figures 2-12 and 2-13
illustrate the relationship between temperature and electricity demand. In New England,
system peak almost always occurs during the summer months.
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The figures above illustrate peak demand is growing relative to base demand. Much of
this growth can be attributed to the rise in central air conditioning. Twenty years ago only
about one-quarter of U.S. homes had central air conditioning; by 2005 it was up to 62%,
and 89% of new homes completed in 2006 had central air (U.S. Census Bureau). Figure
2-14 illustrates how the proportion of homes with air conditioning, either a central system
or a window unit, is growing in three different metropolitan areas on the East Coast.
From 1998 to 2007, the proportion of homes with any kind of air conditioning grew
from 64% to 82% in Boston, MA and from 70% to 82% in Hartford, CT. Washington
D.C. and its suburbs in Virginia and Maryland have almost 100% residential air
conditioning saturation. A 2-zoned central air conditioner in a large residence (about
3,500 square feet) uses about 1.5 kW when operating- approximately the same amount of
electricity as 15 100 watt light bulbs, a hair dryer, 2 microwaves, 4 large desktop PCs, 2
refrigerators, and a 1.5 horsepower well pump motor all taken together (Philipson &
Willis, 1999) . As a result, on a handful of hot days each summer, these regions use
enormous amounts of electricity for cooling.
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Figure 2-15 shows that air conditioning has the second largest share of household
electricity use behind kitchen appliances and Figure 2-16 shows that air conditioning
makes up just over half of all electricity consumption by heating, ventiliation, and air
conditioning equipment in the U.S. To compare, electricity consumption by HVAC
equipment in 2001 was 356 billion kWh, electricity consumption by all kitchen appliances
was 305 billion kWh, and electricity consumption by all household electronics was 82
billion kwh.

2.8 Climate Change and Peak Demand
Climate change-induced temperature increases may exacerbate existing peak demand
problems. The first issue is that rising summer temperatures and more frequent extremeheat events are likely to increase air conditioner ownership and use, leading to
increasingly peaky summer demand and raising the risk of power shortages during heat
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waves. The peaks are likely to be greater in magnitude and frequency, cutting into existing
capacity margins. Also, as the unpredictability of yearly climate patterns increases, peak
demand will be harder to anticipate. For example, if California had to meet its future
electricity demand with the generation resources it has available today, given rising
temperature forecasts there is the potential for peak electricity demand to exceed supply
by as much as 17%. The number of extreme heat days for some parts of California are
predicted to increase by four fold by the end of the century.
Though demand continues to grow, new development of traditional generation options
are becoming increasingly limited- many coal plants have been deferred or cancelled in
the drive to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuel combustion9 • Furthermore,
changes in precipitation levels and changes in the patterns and timing of snowmelt would
alter the amount of electricity that hydroelectric facilities could generate, particularly in
the late spring and summer months when demand is the highest. In regions that depend
on hydropower generation, this could have a significant impact. For example,
hydropower generation currently contributes about 15% of California's in-state electricity
production, with a range from 9 to 30%, due to variations in climatic conditions. Two
recent studies project losses in annual hydropower generation on the order of 10 to 30%
by the end of this century if precipitation levels in California decline (Cayan et al., 2008).
The value of hydroelectric power will also fall as more precipitation in California falls as
9

In 2007, the construction of at least 59 proposed coal-fired power plants was cancelled (Sierra Club,
2009) . In particular, Texas utility TXU's cancellation of 8 coal-fired power plants made headlines
nationwide. As part of a $45 billion buyout, TXU settled a series of lawsuits with the Environmental
Defense Fund and the Natural Resources Defense Council and agreed to cancel 8 of its planned 11 new
Texas power plants, as well as several new coal-fired plants in Pennsylvania and Virginia, back federal
legislation to create a cap & trade system regulating carbon dioxide emissions, and double spending
on energy efficiency. In return, EDF and NRDC agreed not to campaign against the remaining 3 power
plants. In March 2007, TXU announced its official withdrawal of the air permit applications for the 8
cancelled plants.
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rain instead of snow. Snow plays an important role in equalizing water flows, since
virtually all precipitation in California falls in the winter. Big stonns drop a lot of snow
and rain; the snow in the mountains stays frozen until spring, when it melts slowly over
the spring and early summer. This helps equalize stream flows over time and avoids
major river flood events during storms, which would otherwise overflow all dams, and
release large amounts of water to the ocean in uncontrolled flood events (Philipson &
Willis, 1999). As even without decreased precipitation, warming will result in less efficient
patterns of water flow into reservoirs, and thus less opportunity for generating
hydroelectric power.
2.9 Conclusion
Electricity planners and regulators have traditionally focused on peak demand because the
likelihood of system outages is by far the greatest at peak times, but society is rightly
concerned about peak demand for other reasons as well, including economic efficiency,
environmental impacts, and fuel security and diversity
This chapter concludes that the long lead times associated with building new capacity, the
lack of price response in the face of time-varying costs, the large difference between peak
demand and average demand, and the necessity for real-time delivery of electricity all
make the connection between system reliability and peak demand an important driver of
public policy in the electricity sector. The California energy crisis illustrates that the
combination of limited generation capacity, very inelastic demand, impediments to
flexible pricing, and an inability to store electricity was a recipe for soaring marginal
supply costs and rolling blackouts.
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This chapter also concludes that weather is an important driver of peak demand and that
one important pathway through which climate change is likely to affect the electric power
system is growth in cooling demand.
Peak load management programs are one way to balance electricity supply and demand,
reduce the strain on the electric system, and limit the use of the more expensive and least
efficient power plants. The following chapter introduces peak demand management
strategies, including time-varying price signals and quantity controls for reducing peak
demand.
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Chapter 3. Strategies for Reducing Peak Demand
This chapter explains two strategies for reducing peak demand: time-varying prices and
direct control. This chapter explains that time-varying prices can reduce peak demand by
giving customers incentives to shift some of their peak electricity consumption to offpeak hours by charging higher prices during peak hours. Also, this chapter explains that
distribution utilities can use direct control strategies to reduce peak demand by providing
subsidies to their customers for investments intended to reduce their peak electricity
consumption.
As discussed in Chapter 2, considerable cost savings are possible if peak demand for
electricity can be reallocated to off-peak periods. At least in theory, an incentive-based
approach might accomplish this by having prices that vary temporally to reflect the realtime marginal costs of electricity production. Peak demand management policies are
different from policies that encourage broad energy conservation or improved efficiency.
Policies that fall under the latter category tend to focus on reducing overall energy
demand, while those in the former category focus on smoothing demand over time. Both
are important parts of energy conservation efforts. There are two approaches used to
reallocate demand from peak to off-peak periods. One way to facilitate peak demand
reductions is to offer customers time-varying prices that charge customers a higher price
for electricity consumed during peak periods and a lower price for electricity during offpeak periods. Another approach is to pay customers an incentive in exchange for direct
control over the customers' appliances. Then, the utility directly controls the amount of
electricity that is used by the household or business during peak periods. This chapter will
describe both approaches.
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3.1 Real-time pricing
Currently, consumers are able to make informed choices about when to use their cell
phones; most plans offer a certain number of minutes to use during peak hours and
unlimited off-peak usage-plans with more peak minutes are more expensive. Customers
can choose a plan based on their willingness to pay for the option to talk during peak
hours. Although electricity prices fluctuate just as much over the course of a day, the vast
majority of customers are not on billing plans that charge different prices for using
electricity during different times of the day. If customers' bills reflected the costs of
electricity at different times, they would have an incentive to make more informed
decisions about when and how they use electricity throughout the day. This is known as
real-time pricing (RTP). The fundamental idea behind RTP is to provide accurate price
signals to customers that convey the true cost of supplying electricity. Since electricity
cannot be stored economically, and it has to be consumed immediately, and since
generation plants of varying efficiency are used to meet peak demand, the cost of power
varies by time-of-day and day-of-year. If clear price signals were conveyed to customers,
they could decide whether to continue buying powe·r at higher prices or reduce their
demand during peak hours. This promotes economic efficiency in the consumption of
electricity. It can also lead to substantial savings in the aggregate for society, making RTP
an important public policy issue.

Figure 3-1 illustrates a traditional peak demand scenario. At a particular point in time, the
retail price for electricity is PR At this price, customers demand the quantity of electricity
Qo Because electricity supply and demand have to be balanced in real-time and because
electricity cannot be economically stored, to meet peak demand generators must run the
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most expensive and least efficient power plants. The generators used to serve peak
demand, referred to as "peaking plants", have relatively low capital costs and high
variable costs. But, because peaking plants run for only a fraction of the hours in the year,
the capital cost per operating hour is high. The marginal cost of supplying electricity rises
to Pw as demand increases to Q0 , but PR is fixed so customers have no incentive to
reallocate their demand from peak to off-peak hours as marginal supply costs rise. The
result is costly investments in generating infrastructure that sits idle during all but a few
hours each year and expenditure on high-cost fuel to meet peak demand.

Supply

Peak Demand

Price

= D.fargirn1l Cost

Pw
\ 'iX11ole.sale Cost

Price Insensitive Demand

\

Fixed Rern:il Price

Qd

Quantity (k\V)

Figure 3-1. Impact of fixed retail rates on peak demand

RTPs can mitigate peak load problems by giving customers incentives to shift their
electricity demand from peak to off-peak periods. Figure 3-2 illustrates the same peak
demand scenario as Figure 3-1 . Only here, the customer faces RTPs, which change in
response to wholesale market conditions. As PR rises to reflect the increasing cost of
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response to wholesale market conditions. As PR rises to reflect the increasing cost of
supplying electricity to meet peak demand, customers demand less electricity at the higher
price. Instead of demanding the amount of electricity Q0 , peak demand is only Q0 '. As a
result, the system does not need as much peaking capacity or costly fuel to serve peak
demand.
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Quantity (k\\~

Reduction in Peak Demand

Figure 3-2. Impact of RTP on Peak Demand

Figure 3-3 illustrates the increase in social welfare associated with reallocating demand
from peak to off peak. Reallocating demand from peak to off peak improves system
reliability, facilitates reductions in capital investments in capacity, and helps avoid costly
fuel expenditures. Shifting demand from peak to off peak increases consumer surplus,
which is the amount by which customers benefit from buying electricity at a price that is
less than they would be willing to pay.
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Figure 3-3. Reallocating demand from peak to off-peak

How much will be saved by RTP depends on two things: first, how much demand
customers will shift from peak to off peak and second, how much generation investment
and fuel expenditure can be offset by this demand reduction. The first item itself depends
on two things: how rapidly utilities and regulators move to install new pricing designs that
provide RTPs to customers and how sensitive customers' demand is to the price signals.

3.1.1 Advanced Metering Infrastructure
A prerequisite to the provision of RTP is the installation of advanced metering
infrastructure (AMI). In a recent report on AMI, the Federal Energy Regulatory
Comissions (FERC) presented the hardware and total capital cost information in Table 546

1 updated here for inflation and annualized over 20 years using an 8% cost of capital
(Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 2006b). Before annualizing, average AMI costs
range from $100 to $200 for just the meter, and between $200 to $300 including
installation, communications, and infrastructure costs. Table 3-1 indicates that installing
AMI costs between $15 to $27 per meter annually in hardware costs or $26 to $32
annually in total capital costs. In addition to enabling RTP, AMI has operational benefits
that save utilities money such as avoided meter reading costs, faster outage detection,
improved customer service, better management of customer connects and disconnects,
and improved distribution management. For example, in Northern and Central
California, Pacific Gas & Electric Company estimates that 89% of its AMI investment of
approximately $1,500 million can be recovered through operational benefits (Faruqui et
al., 2007) . An important issue in determining the actual cost of AMI to a given utility is
whether the utility as recently installed automated meter reading technology (AMR). AMR
allows for drive-by meter-reading but does not have full two-way capabilities for
communicating price and reliability signals from the utility to the customer. If the utility
has not yet installed AMR, then the cost of switc~g directly to AMI is not that
significant ($100-$200 per meter). But, if the utility has recently installed AMR then the
cost is much higher ($300-$500 per meter). In that case, it might be easier for the utility to
phase in AMI during new construction or when existing meters are replaced for other
reasons.
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Table 3-1. Hardware costs and total capital costs for AMI systems (2007 dollars)

=

Total
Capital
Costs
(millions)

Annualized
Hardware
Costs per
Meter

Annualized
Capital
Costs per
Meter

Year

Meter
(millions)

Total
Cost
(millions)

DLC

1996

0.6

$159

$26.79

Virginia
Power

1997

0.5

$114

$25.81

JEA

2001

0.7

PPL

2002

1.3

$259

$370

$20.29

$28.98

Bangor
Hydro

2004

0.1

$17

$33

$15.29

$30.58

TXU

2005

0.3

$40

$81

$16.40

$32.54

PG&E

2005

9.8

$1,536

$2,828

$15.96

$29.39

SDG&E

2006

2.3

$411

$679

$18.16

$30.06

UtiJitylO

$25.55

$352

Source: (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 2006a)

According to the FERC report, AMI currently reaches 6% of electric meters in the U.S.
Certain states, such as Pennsylvania and Wisconsin have AMI penetration rates in excess
of 40%. AMI penetration rates are in the double-digits in 8 states (Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, 2006a)-. Most utilities with AMI, however, do not offer RTP.
Utilities, along with state public utility commissions, are uncertain whether customers

will respond to price signals and some are also afraid of customer backlash to potentially
volatile price signals.

10

Utility full names are Duquesne Light Company(DLC), (Dominion) Virginia Power, Jacksonville Electric
Authority (JEA), Pennsylvania Power and Light (PPL), Bangor Hydro Electric Company, Texas Utilities
(TXU), Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E), and San Diego Gas and Electric (SDG&E).
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3.1.2 Potential for Reducing Peak Demand
Since the 1970s there have been many research efforts to determine small residential and
commercial customers' sensitivity to changes in electricity prices (Barbose, Goldman, &
Neenan, 2004; Faruqui & Sergiei, 2009; Goldman, Barbose, & Neenan, 2006;
McDonough & Kraus, 2007) . There has been a good deal of skepticism that small
customers, who constitute the majority of electricity users, will respond to RTPs by
reducing their demand during peaks. Recent research, however, shows that even if
customer demand is not very sensitive to changes in price, surprisingly large peak load
reductions can be achieved. For example, at elasticity equal to -0.1 and -0.2, peak demand
can be reduced by 10.4% and 15.1%, respectively. The magnitude of these peak load
reductions translates into dollar savings of $15-$43 billion (based on the 2006 capital
costs of gas and coal generation) (Spees, 2008).
To illustrate this computation, consider the value of a 5% reduction in peak demand. The
first benefit is the reduction in the need to install peaking generation capacity. This is a
long run benefit and consists of the sum of avoided capacity and energy costs. It can be
estimated based on the capacity cost of a simple cycle combustion turbine. The second
benefit is the avoided energy costs that are associated with the reduced peak load. Third
is the reduction in transmission and distribution (T&D) capacity. This is also a long run
benefit, but is harder to quantify and is very dependent on local distribution constraints.
If transmission lines carry power beyond their designed capacity, they can overheat and

fail. A 5% reduction in U.S. peak demand of 757,056 MW amounts to 37,853 MW of
peak demand (Faruqui et al., 2007). The amount of peaking capacity that is needed to
tneet this peak demand can be computed by allowing for a reserve reliability margin of
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15% and T&D line losses of7.1% (Spees, 2008). This equates to 47,013 MW, or roughly
625 combustion turbines

11

.

Opinions on determining the value of the avoided cost of

peaking capacity range from low to high. Using a conservative value of the avoided cost
of capacity of $52/kW-year, the total value of avoided capacity costs is $2.4 billion per
year (Faruqui et al., 2007). Using a higher value of the avoided cost of peaking capacity of
$94/ kW-year (Spees, 2008), the total value of avoided capacity costs is $4.4 billion per
year.
Using the relationship that was observed between annual capacity and energy benefits in a
recent analysis of the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland ISO (PJM), the annual value of
avoided energy costs is estimated at $300 million (Faruqui et al., 2007).

In addition, there would be a reduction in T&D capacity needs. As noted earlier, T&D
needs are location-dependent and much harder to estimate. Still, they are unlikely to be
zero and a conservative estimate puts them at 10% of the savings in generation capacity
and energy costs (Faruqui et al., 2007). Using this estimate, the range of potential savings
in T&D costs from a 5% reduction in peak demand is $240 million and $440 million per
year.

Using the conservative value of avoided peaking capacity, adding the three components
yields long-run benefits of $3 billion per year, as shown in Figure 3-4. Over a 20 year time
horizon, these represent a discounted present value of $35 billion (assuming an 8%
discount rate).

11

.

These turbines generally come in sizes ranging from 50 to 100 MW (Faruqui, Hledik, Newell, &
Pfeifenberger, 2007) .

so

T&D

Figure 3-4. Annual long run benefits of a 5% reduction in peak demand

These long run benefits from shifting demand from peak to off peak can be viewed as an
efficiency gain because they involve real savings in total resource costs on average over
time. In theory, there should also be an immediate reduction in the wholesale market
price for energy and capacity because of the reduction in demand. In areas that are
capacity constrained, the short run benefits could be larger than the long run benefits.
These price-mitigation benefits would persist only temporarily until generation capacity
adjusts to the new lower peak demand.
The benefits of reducing peak load can be compared to the cost of installed the enabling
AMI. Assuming an approximate cost of $200 per meter (Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, 2006b), and assuming that AMI replaces the remaining 94% of the 138.4
million meters in the U.S., an investment of $27 billion will be necessary. If 50% to 80%
of these costs are recovered through operational benefits, the remaining cost of the AMI
is between $5.4 billion and $13 billion. Therefore, the net costs of AMI that would need
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to be recovered through savings from peak demand reductions are 15% to 3 7% of the

$35 billion in long run savings. If, however, most of the peak demand reductions come
from a small number of customers, most of the benefits can be achieved by placing only
a small number of customers on AMI at a much reduced cost. Recent research indicates
that most of the peak demand reductions come from the very largest 20% of customers
on RTP (Spees, 2008). This means that AMI cost is justified for industrial, commercial,
and a fraction of the largest residential customers. With large industrial customers, the
administrators of a demand-management program can examine a large quantity of energy
use all under one roof, rather than incurring the costs of interacting with many small
residential customers in order to have affected the same total load.
There are additional benefits to RTP that are not captured above. These include more
competitive energy and capacity markets, reduced price volatility, improved system
reliability resulting in fewer outages, and fewer GHG emissions during peaks. For
example, the average emissions rates in the U.S from natural gas-fired generation are:
1135 lbs/MWh of carbon dioxide, 0.1 lbs/MWh of sulfur dioxide, and 1.7 lbs/MWh of
nitrogen oxides (United States Environmental Prott;ction Agency, 2007a) Therefore, a
37,853 MW reduction in peak demand avoids approximately 21,481 tons of carbon
dioxide emissions, 3,785 lbs of sulfur dioxide, and 64,350 lbs of nitrogen oxides.

3.1.3 Barriers to the Adoption of RTP
There are several barriers to the adoption of RTP. Chief among them is the
entrenchment of average cost pricing. Historically, the role of state regulators has been to
design electricity prices based on allowable cost revocery and on allocating those costs
fairly across customer classes. Despite the potential for saving $35 billion by reallocating
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peak demand to off-peak, the economic efficiency of rate design, in the sense of setting
price equal to marginal supply costs, has typically been given low priority. There is
resistence from regulators and consumer advocates to exposing customers to unstable
prices. Recent research shows, however, that even if customers have no means of
knowing or responding to the RTP, over the course of the year the low off-peak rates
balance out the extremely high peak rates. Even customers with high coincident peak
demand would not have a large change in average price (Spees, 2008) . This indicates that
regulators should not worry about the effect of RTP on poor or unresponsive customers.
Just as consumers have learned to respond to the volatile prices of gasoline, airline tickets,
and other commodities, they can learn to respond to electricity prices. The largest
difference is that customers purchase electricity every hour of the year and therefore
some customers will want to automate their response to changing prices. Futher, for the
customers that place a high value on price stability, utilities could provide any
combination of hedges or flat rates; these rates would charge a premium above the RTP
rate reflecting the higher cost of service.
Interestingly, a move toward time-varying rates might get the push that it needs from the
automobile industry. The transportation sector is responsible for 124 million of the 346
MMTC0 2e generated annually in New England, or 35% of total greenhouse gas
emissions (Environment Northeast, 2006). Plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) and
electric vehicles (EVs) such as GM's Chevy Volt have the potential to reduce GHG
emissions from the transportation sector, reduce the nation's dependence on oil imports,
and improve air quality because PHEVs are far more efficient than internal combustion
engine vehicles. For example, if PHEVs comprise 50% of New England's light duty
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vehicle fleet by 2050, regional GHG emissions will be reduced by 11 to 15 million tons of

C02e, a reduction of 8%-12%. There is an abundant supply of off peak generation and
transmission capacity to supply electricity for transportation- recent research shows that if
60% of the U.S. light duty vehicle fleet was electrified, it would use 7%-8% of gridsupplied electricity in 2050. A lower, off peak electricity price will encourage PHEV
drivers to charge their cars during off peak hours and the additional off peak demand will
smooth utilities load profiles. This will lead to a more efficient use of generation and
transmission capacity and lower the average cost of supplying electricity. PHEVs can also
be used to enable intermittent renewable resources, which often provide the most power
during off peak periods
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•

3.2 Introduction to the PG&E SmartAC Program™
This section will use a case study to help explain direct control strategies for reducing
peak demand. Direct control strategies work by limiting consumers' electricity
consumption during peak hours. This section will describe the SmartAC™ program in
order to illustrate how this strategy works. This research also analyzes the past and future
effectiveness of the SmartAC program in reducing peak demand under different climate
change scenarios. Thus, this section also provides background on the SmartAC program
that is important for understanding the analysis in Chapter 6 of this research.

12
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ere 1s growing interest and momentum in a concept known as "vehicle-to-grid" or V2G. V2G
describes a system in which power can be sold to the grid by an PHEV that is connected to the grid
when it is not in use for transportation. Alternatively, when the car batteries need to be fully charged,
the flow can be reversed and electricity can be drawn from the grid to charge the battery. Since most
vehicles are parked 95% of the time, their batteries could be used to let electricity flow from the car to
the power lines and back. Better Place is one such company that is proposing to provide this service.
Better Place's is also proposing to provide utility companies with energy demand management
capabilities that can minimize charging requirements during peak electricity consumption hours by
leveraging connectivity with the car and known user profiles.
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Ideally, all customers would have the opportunity to purchase energy at prices reflective
of real-time marginal supply costs. In the absence of RTPs, some utilities and ISOs offer
customers payments for allowing household air conditioners to be retrofitted with a
device that allows remote control by the utility during periods of peak electricity demand.
PG&E's SmartAC Program is an active demand management program designed to
reduce peak demand by limiting the amount of electricity used for air conditioning. The
utility does this by installing programmable thermostats on participating customers'
central air conditioners. When the energy situation becomes critical, PG&E sends a signal
to incrementally raise the temperature setting on the thermostat. This reduces the power
required by air conditioners, helping to reduce the overall drain on the power system.

The SmartAC Program first began enlisting customers in the spring of 2007. At the end
of August, 2007 the program had approximately 8,800 participants and by January, 2008
26,000 participants were enrolled. The target is to have 400,000 customers enrolled by
2010. The vast majority of participants are residential customers from San Joaquin
County, specifically from Stockton, CA and its surrounding areas.
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Map 3-1. Location of Stockton, CA Source: (City of Stockton,)
Stockton is located 45 miles east of San Francisco and south of Sacramento. Stockton is
notoriously hot in the summer, partly because the Coastal Range mountains block the
cool ocean breezes from cooling the city. Stockton is the fourth largest inland city in
California (behind Sacramento, Fresno, and Bakersfield) with an immediate population of
290,000 and 690,000 in the metropolitan surrounding area.
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pG&E recruits residential and small commercial(< 200 kW) customers13 with central air
conditioning14 for the program. PG&E explains that on hot summer days, when
hundreds of thousands of air conditioners are used, demand for electricity is at its highest
and approaching system capacity. By reducing the power air conditioners require, the
program reduces the risk of a power outage. The program also advertises other benefits
for customers who participate- participants are given a one-time incentive payment of $25
for participating. In addition, all system customers benefit from reduced air pollution and
smog, improved system reliability from reduced pressure on power plants during critical
peak demand hours, and avoided expenditures on expensive peak period electricity.
Participants are guarenteed that the program will only operate during system peak periods
between 10 am and 6 pm, Monday through Friday (excluding holidays and weekends) on
those summer days when electricity demand threatens to exceed supply capacity. The
program operates no more than 100 hours per year and no more than 6 consecutive
13

The program does not allow customers on life support or medical baseline customers to participate.

14

All of the customers participating in the SmartAC™ program have central air conditioners. Central air
conditioners are split systems, the condenser and compressor are located in an outdoor unit while the
evaporator is mounted in the air handler unit. The air conditioner transports heat out of the home
using a refrigerant such as hydrofluorocarbons (HFCS). The compressor converts the refrigerant into a
high temperature, high pressure gas. As that gas flows through the condenser coil, it loses heat and
condenses into a high temperature, high pressure liquid. This liquid refrigerant travels through copper
tubing into the evaparator coil. There, the refrigerant expands. Its sudden expansion turns the
refrigerant into a low temeprature, low pressure gas. This gas then absorbs heat from the air
circulating in the duct work. The cooled air is then distributed back through the home or building.
Meanwhile, the heat absorbed by the refrigerant is carried back outside through copper tubing and
released into the outside air.
Air conditioners also dehumidify the air. As the warm air circulating through the ducts passes over the
evaporator coil, it is quickly cooled and can no longer hold as much moisture as it did at a higher
temperature. The excess moisture condenses on the outside of the coils and is carried away through a
drain, similar to what happens when moisture condenses on the outside of glass of ice water on a hot,
humid day.
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hours. Although most participants do not notice the temperature increase when the
SmartAC is activated (in a recent survey, only 6% reported a change in temperature
during activation), participants who do become uncomfortable during an event can optout of the day by going online to manage their SmartAC devices or by calling a toll-free
phone number. If a participant opts-out, the air conditioner operations and thermostat
settings will be returned to their pre-event condition.

3.3 How the SmartAC Program Works
The programmable thermostat control technology controls the central air conditioner,
which in turn controls the indoor temperature. When the utility activates the thermostats,
the thermostats increase the temperature to which the house is cooled. If the air
conditioner is in cooling mode when the temperature setting is raised, the air conditioner
may tum off until the house reaches the new temperature setting. If the air conditioner is
already off, it may remain off for a longer period so as to allow the inside temperature to
reach the higher temperature setting. The advantage of this approach is that it allows the
utility to control how much the inside temperature rises. No customer should experience
an indoor temperature increase greater than the thermostat setpoint. In theory, raising the
temperature settings on all participating air conditioners distributes the temperature
increase e~enly across the participating population regardless of house and air conditioner
characteristics.

Raising the temperature setting has an indirect effect on air conditioner energy use. How
a particular air conditioner responds to the increased temperature setting depends the
physical characteristics of the home, such as insulation, age, and square footage, that
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determine how quickly the home heats up. How much electricity the air conditioner uses
to

cool the home also depends on the characteristics of the air conditioner itself, mainly

its age, efficiency, and size. Usually, when SmartAC raises the temperature setting, the air
conditioner either shuts off or stays off until the indoor temperature reaches the new
setting. When the house reaches the new temperature setting the air condtioner begins
cooling again in order to maintain that temperature. Air conditioner usage is
fundamentally a function of the differential between the outside temperature and the
inside temperature, so increasing the temperature setpoint will reduce the amount of
energy needed relative to the cooler temperature setting.
When programmable thermostats were first deployed for peak demand management
programs, the most common control strategy was a single temperature setting increase of
three, four, or five degrees Fahrenheit. An increase of this sort has two important
implications for peak demand management. First, the demand reduction is greater
immediately following the temperature setting increase. During the initial period of
readjustment the majority of participating air conditioners shut off as the indoor
temperature slowly increases to the new setting. The peak demand reduction is large and
is maintained until the air conditioners reach the new temperature setting, at which point
the air conditioners begin cooling again. From a system perspective, this inability to
maintain a constant peak demand reduction can be a limitation. Second, a "block"
temperature increase such as this can cause customers to be hot and uncomfortable. As
described above, the majority of air conditioners shut off as the household temperature
rises to the new setting. For what could be a substantial period of time, the circulation

59

system does not blow cool air. From a customer comfort perspective, the block
temperature setting increase also has disadvantages.

Utilities have experimented with different strategies to overcome the limitations of the
block increase. Increasing the temperature setting by one or two degrees every hour or
every couple of hours should, in theory, mitigate the problematic aspects of the block
temperature setting increase. Instead of experiencing a large, immediate peak demand
reduction and resulting lack of cooling in one long period, the periods of temperature
equilibrium readjustment are shorter and spread out through the afternoon and evening.
The SmartAC program chose to use a gradual temperature change for all participating
customers during the summer of 2007; customers' temperature settings were raised 1°F at
the beginning of the first, third, and fifth hours of the system contingency. This strategy
is referred to here as the "gradual" strategy; PG&E also experimented with a "steep"
strategy in which the temperature setting increased 1°F per hour for each of the first four
hours of the system contingency. After the fourth house, the "steep" strategy stays at a
4°F increase for the duration of the emergency. All else being equal, the steep strategy
should provide a bigger peak demand reduction during the early hours of the system
emergency than the gradual strategy.

The discussion of the SmartAC™ program will be returned to in Chapter 6, which
analyzes the impact of thermostat re-set programs on reducing peak demand and explores
the potential for using such programs to reduce peak demand in a future characterized by
rising temperatures and climate change.

60

3.4 Conclusions
This chapter concludes that real-time prices and direct control strategies can reduce peak
demand. Real-time prices can give customers incentives to move some of their peak
electricity to off-peak hours by charging higher prices during peak periods. In the absence
of RTPs, some utilities provide subsidies to their electricity customers for investments
intended to reduce their peak electricity consumption, including payments for allowing a
household air conditioner to be retrofitted with a smart thermostat that allows the utility
to remotely limit the air conditioner's electricity consumption during periods of peak
demand.
This chapter demonstrated that the regulated price of electricity to customers, based on
average cost, is often below the marginal cost of producing electricity, particularly in peak
periods or when costs of pollution are not taken into account. The difference between
marginal cost and price means that customers have insufficient incentives to reallocate
consumption from peak periods to off-peak periods. All of the benefits of peak demand
management, including cost savings, reduced price volatility, improved system reliability,
more competitive markets, and fewer GHG emissions during peak hours, are large
enough to warrant attention by policymakers and regulators.

However, there are several barriers to the adoption of both RTP and direct control
programs. These barriers include regulatory policies and rate freezes, customers' and
policymakers' apprehensions about price volatility, and perceptions about the availability
and cost of enabling technologies. Unless these barriers are addressed, the full potential
of peak demand management will not be realized.
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Chapter 4. Literature Overview
This chapter will provide an overview of the economic literature pertaining to 2 issues
related to peak demand. The first issue covered in the economic literature is peak load
pricing. This chapter will provide an overview of how pricing methods evolved to
manage peak demand. The second issue covered in the literature is the relative efficiency
of price- and quantity-based methods for managing peak demand problems. This chapter
will provide an overview of the Weitzman framework for comparing the relative
efficiency of these methods and then apply the framework to problem of peak demand
for electricity. This chapter concludes that direct control methods are more efficient than
pricing methods for reducing peak demand for electricity, mainta.inirig reliability, and
avoiding catastrophic blackouts.
As discussed in Chapter 2, the crux of the peak demand problem is that there are high
fixed capital costs associated with increasing capacity, low marginal variable costs, and
highly variable demand. Further, because electricity cannot be economically stored and a
constant balance between supply and demand must .be maintained, electricity must be
generated at the moment it is demanded.
In this traditional situation, the only way to ensure reliability is to build sufficient capacity
to meet demand at all times, even though that capacity is rarely used. Consequently, there
is excessive capacity during low demand periods and there will still be rare instances when
capacity is exceeded inadequate capacity. The economic literature on peak load pricing
addresses situations such as this. Peak load pricing is commonly used by the
telecommunications industry, airlines, hotels, and theatre tickets to reallocate demand
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from peak to off peak periods by charging a higher price for peak demand and a lower
price for off peak demand, thereby providing incentives to smooth demand over time
with the goal of achieving more efficient capital utilization.
Peak load pricing has been studied extensively by economists ( M. Crew, Fernando, &
Kleindorfer, 1995), both in the context of regulated industries (telecommunications,
electric utilities) and unregulated sectors. This chapter summarizes key issues related to
peak load management and reviews the literature on peak load pricing. First, this chapter

will review the economic literature on peak load pricing. Second, this chapter will
examine the relative efficiency of using peak load pricing or direct demand management
to reduce peak electricity demand.

4.1 Peak Load Pricing
The economic literature on peak load pricing has focused primarily on the variations in
the marginal costs of generating electricity. Two fundamental types of economic analysis
can be distinguished in the literature. The most basic model of economic theory begins by
casting the characteristics of the electricity market into an abstract and highly simplified
form. The second type of econo.mic analysis found in the literature ill.valves engineeringeconomic models that are used by electric utilities to minimize their overall costs of
supplying power. Characteristically the literature on such models is grounded in a wealth
of detail about the complexities of real-world markets and power systems 15 .

.

~

See, for example, Berrie (1968); Kirchmayer (1958); Lindquist (1958); Little (1955); and Morlat
(1964).
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4.1.1 The Basic Model
The economic theory of peak load pricing originates in the seminal papers of Boiteux
(1949) and Steiner (1957). As applied to electricity, the Boiteux-Steiner model, in its basic
form, postulates that throughout the year there is a uniform demand for electricity in each
of two 12-hour periods, shown as day and night in Figure 4-1. A single generating
technology is available. The marginal operating cost of generating each kilowatt-hour of
electricity is equal to b. In addition, total capacity must be sufficient to meet peak
demand. The capital cost of capacity per kilowatt-hour is equal to c, or ~=c/ (12 x 365)
dollars per kilowatt for each hour of peak use (Mitchell, Manning, & Acton, 1978). Thus,
~

represents the marginal cost of peak generation capacity.

The levels of demand in each period are assumed to vary inversely with the price of
electricity in that period, and to be independent of the price in the other period16 . Thus,
there are two demand curves for the quantities of electricity demanded during the day
(12QD) and night (12QN) in Figure 4-2. In this model, the marginal costs per kWh of
output at night (off-peak) are the operational costs, b, since generating additional
electricity will require more fuel .but no additional capacity. In the peak period, however,
capacity is constrained and generating additional electricity will require building more
capacity, so that the peak period marginal cost is b+~ per kWh (Bergstrom & MacKieMason, 1991; Mitchell et al., 1978; Steiner, 1957; Turvey, 1968).

16Th.
is assumption is probably too strong. A well-known counter-example occurred in 1964 when
AT&T began lowering rates for long-distance phone calls after Sp.m. They found themselves deluged
With calls from people who formerly called during the day. The interdependence of demands can be
handled with an increase in mathematical complexity. This section will touch on this issue. See I
Pressman, "A Mathematical Formulation of the Peak Load Pricing Problem." Bell Journal of Economics,

1970.
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Figure 4-3. Marginal cost pricing
If a single price per kWh is charged in both periods, and the utility is allowed to recover

costs but not make excess profit, then- as shown in Figure 4-2- an average price p must
be set equal to the average cost per kWh, and customers will demand 12Q0 during the
day and 12QN at night1 7 •
If, however, prices are set equal to marginal costs in each period, the equilibrium

quantities of electricity supplied and demanded will be 12Q*0 and 12Q*N as shown in
Figure 4-3. In contrast to the single price case, the peak price is higher and less capacity is
needed to meet 12Q*0 . This market equilibrium is the optimal pricing solution in the

17

The value of the average price is found by solving the equation:
Total Revenue=Total costs:

pQD(p) + pQN(p) = (b+ /J)QD(p) +bQN(p) .
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following sense. Of all the possible pairs of day and night prices, the prices equal to
marginal costs maximize the difference between the value that consumers place on the
amount of electricity they use and the cost of its production. This difference is the
economic surplus that is realized by having electricity available to the community.
Marginal cost pricing ensures that in each period productive resources will be used to
supply electricity up to- but no further than- the point at which the value of the last unit
of electricity consumed is just equal to the cost of its supply.
The Boiteux-Steiner model is a simplification that does some violence to reality. Its virtue
is the clarity with which it links the design of the optimal rate structure- two periods with
separate prices, each equal to marginal costs- to the structure of the costs of production
and to the demand conditions facing the utility.
4.1.2 More General Models
The economic theory expressed in the Boiteux-Steiner model has been extended and
made more realistic in several directions. Papers have generalized the demand
assumptions to provide for any number of periods of varying lengths (Williamson, 1966) ,
and to accommodate variations ill demand within periods (Wenders, 1976). A number of
authors have addressed the potential complication of a "shifting peak," where higher
peak prices shift so much peak demand to the off peak period that the formerly off peak
period becomes the new peak (Bailey & White, 1974; Bergstrom & MacK.ie-Mason, 1991;
Berlin, Cicchetti, & Gillen, 1974; Hirshleifer, 1958; Mitchell et al., 1978)1 8 • And extensive
is "P

eak shifting" can especially be a problem at the boundaries of the peak and off-peak periods. For
example, if the price of cell phone calls is free after Spm, many people will wait until S:Olpm to make
calls, thereby overwhelming the system. Demand at S:Olpm could be much higher than demand
during the "peak" at 4:59pm. But, most people probably will not delay their calls until 2am. This
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efforts have been made to expand the analysis to encompass stochastic variations in
demand (Chao, 1983; M. A. Crew & Kleindorfer, 1978).
The Boiteux-Steiner model has also been generalized to include more realistic supply
conditions. As discussed earlier, generators minimize total costs by using a range of
generating technologies in terms of capital and operating costs to meet demand. Models
that incorporate this feature have been developed by Crew and Kleindorfer (197 6) and
Wenders (1976). By working with models that incorporate continuous production
coefficients, rather than fixed proportions of capital and fuel, Boiteux (1949) and Panzar
(1976) have incorporated the nonlinear response of generators to levels of demand.
Additional models address economies of scale (Mohring 1970) and storage (Gravelle
1976; Nguyen 1976).
As the theoretical economic models have grown more realistic, their normative
prescriptions have become increasingly detailed and are not easily summarized. The
optimal prices for each period incorporate considerations of expected shortages, the longrun substitution of capital for fuel, and constraints that ensure that revenues will cover
costs. In many of the more general models, the optimal prices require that the off-peak as
well as peak-period prices include some elements of capacity costs (Mitchell et al., 1978).

4.2 Deriving Peak and Off-Peak Prices
Bergstrom and Mac.Kie-Mason use simple analytics to derive the appropriate peak and
off-peak prices for a situation characterized by two periods, a fixed level of capacity, and

implies that demand is more continuously variable over time, not just simple on-peak vs. off-peak as in
the Boiteux-Steiner basic model. But, it also provides a lesson for charging off-peak prices that are
implemented as simple step functions.
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highly variable demand. In the off-peak period there is excess capacity, but in the peak
period the capacity constraint is binding. As demonstrated above, the marginal cost of
generating electricity in the off-peak period is only the marginal operating cost (fuel
costs). But, when the capacity constraint is binding in the peak period, the marginal cost
of generating electricity is the marginal cost of building new capacity plus the marginal
operating costs. Off-peak demand is a substitute for peak demand, and vice versa.
Similar to the illustration in section 4.1, marginal operating costs are equal to b and
marginal capacity costs are equal to

k=b+~.

PPand P0 denote the prices charged in the

peak and off-peak periods, respectively, and dp and d0 denote electricity consumption in
each period. Bergstrom and MacKie-Mason also assume that customers have a utility
function for electricity consumption of the form U (dp, d0 ). The utility function is
homothetic, twice differentiable, and strictly quasi-concave19 . The assumption of
homothetic separability makes the ratio of peak demand to off-peak demand a function
of the ratio of peak price to off-peak price.
Peak and off-peak demand are functions of the price in each period such that dp(PP ,P0 )
and d0 (P0 , Pp)· The marginal rate of substitution between peak and off-peak consumption
1s:

(4.2.1)

19

. .

A utility function that can be written as U(d)=g(h(d)) where g(·) is a monotonically increasing
function and h(d) is homogenous of degree one, twice differentiable, and strictly concave.
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On the assumptions of the utility function, given the prices Pr and P0 demand will be
determined by the same ratio of prices. That is, the demand function satisfies

(4.2.2)

This should also be true for any continuous utility function. The function x(e) can be
defined implicitly by MRS(x(e))= e so that x(e) is the ratio of peak demand and off-peak
demand corresponding to a price ratio of e=Prf P0 . Because peak demand is greater than
off-peak demand when the two periods are priced the same, x(P)>1. For any Q such that

x(e)

~1,

there is a unique set of equilibrium prices (P0 P0) and demands (dp, d0 ) that make

peak demand equal to capacity.

For example, assume that the electric utility is allowed a rate of return on capacity equal
to ck. Also assume that the utility function is specified as

(4.2.3)

Equation (4.2.3) implies that the customer values electricity consumed during the peak
period twice as much as electricity consumed off peak. If peak consumption is a perfect
substitute for off peak consumption and the price, p, is the same in both periods, then the
only demand for electricity will be during the peak period. This means that the entire cost
of capacity be paid by peak usage, so that p=ck. But, peak load pricing would equalize peak
and off-peak demand when Pr=2P0 . At these prices, the customer is indifferent between
peak and off-peak consumption and consumption in both periods will equal capacity. The
profit constraint is satisfied when Pr+P0 = ck. Since Pp=2P0 , it must be that with peak load
pricing Pr=2 ck/3, and P0 =

ck. ·

In this case, peak load prices are lower than the uniform
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price in both periods. Even though the intention of peak load pricing is to shift demand
from the peak period to the off-peak period, lower prices in both periods can lead to
higher overall demand for electricity.
In the above example, peak load pricing lowers prices in both periods, but this is not
always the case. Other utility functions lead to peak prices that are higher than the
uniform price. Consider the case of perfect complements, where at any price, the
customer always wants to consume exactly twice as much in the afternoon as in the
morning. Let

(4.2.4)

At any price, the customer chooses dp/ d0 =2. No matter what price is set, the utility can
utilize all of its capacity in the peak period and only half of its capacity in the off peak
period. Therefore, the profit constraint is satisfied for any pair of prices (P,,,P0 ) when

Pp+P0 / 2=

ck.

In this example, moving from uniform pricing to peak load pricing results

in an increase in the peak price and a decrease in the peak price.

4.2.1 Solving for Prices by Welfare Maximization
One can also solve for peak and off-peak prices using a welfare maximization problem
(Williamson, 1966). The appropriate objective function can be stated as

(4.2.5)

where
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jP;dQ are the respective areas under the demand curves
Co is the off peak operating cost and a function of Q(= h(Q1 ))

cp

is the on peak cost and has two components:

and

ci is the peak operating cost (=g(Q

2 ))

c; is the cost of capacity ( = k(Q

2 )).

Maximizing W leads to the following necessary conditions:

Where

h'(Q1) is the off peak marginal operating cost;
g'(Qi) is the peak marginal operating cost; and,
k'(Qi) is the peak marginal capacity cost.
Solving the first order conditions yields the following price solutions:

Pi= h'(Ql)
Pi = g '(Qi) + k '(Q2)
The price solution states that the off peak price of electricity is set equal to off peak
marginal operating costs and that peak price is set equal to peak marginal operating costs
plus peak marginal capacity costs20.

20

The argument has been made that it is neither appropriate nor equitable to assign all of the capacity
costs to the peak period. The thought is that the capacity costs of base load plants should be assigned
to all periods, the capacity costs of shoulder plants should be assigned to shoulder and peak periods,
and the capacity costs of peaking plants should be assigned to peak periods. This distribution of costs
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Figure 4-4. Peak Load Pricing and Social Welfare

Figure 4-4 depicts customers' off-peak and peak demand curves imposed on a single
supply curve. The different price and quantity pairs mapped out represent different
market circumstances. According to Figure 4-4, at a uniform price of P unifonn>during offpeak periods customers consume Q uOP at a total cost of CFuniform · Q uop)· Under the
uniform price, consumer surplus is equal to area (h) and producer surplus is equal to

would reflect the respective contribution of each plant to meeting demand. This argument falls apart,
however, when discussed in terms of opportunity cost. The opportunity cost of anything is the value of
what is given up when a resource is used for one purpose that precludes its use for other purposes.
Thus, the opportunity cost of using generating capacity that would otherwise be sitting idle is zero. If
off peak consumption is made to pay a price greater than zero for capacity costs, the result will be
under-consumption of off-peak electricity. In effect, off-peak users would be subsidizing peak users.
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(i+k). Thus, total social welfare equals (h+i+k) . If peak load pricing is used and the offpeak price is set at P Off-Peak' customers will consume Q* OP at a total cost of (POff-Peak·
Q*or).Under these conditions, welfare is measured by the sum of producer and consumer
surplus. Consumer surplus is the area under the off-peak demand curve and above the
price line Poff-Peak' indicated in Figure 4-4 by the box labeled i and the triangles h and j.
Producer surplus is the area in Figure 4-4 above the supply curve and below the price line
Poff-Peak' as indicated by (k+n). Welfare is the sum of the producer and consumer
surpluses, the area defined by (i+h+j+k+n) . Thus, the social loss from using a uniform
price instead of peak and off-peak prices is (j+n) . This is referred to as deadweight loss.

The uniform price also leads to inefficiencies in the peak period because the price is
below the marginal supply cost. Using electricity that costs more to produce than
customers' value for consuming it results in a deadweight loss to society equal to the area

(d + b). To see this, if customers are charged a single uniform price for both the peak and
off-peak period of P Uniform' during peak hours customers will consume Q uP at a total cost
of (P Uniform · Q up)· Consumer surplus is area (a

+ g + h) and there would be no consumer

surplus. If peak load pricing is used and the peak period price is set at Preak' customers

will consume Q *p at a total cost of (Preak ·Q *r)· The measure of welfare is again given by
the sum of consumer and producer surplus. Consumer surplus is the area to the left of
and above the peak demand curve and above PPeak' the area (a). Producer surplus is the
area above the supply curve, to the left of the peak demand curve, and below PPeak- the
area (h + g +I+ j + k + n + y). Again, welfare is the sum of producer and consumer
surplus, or the area defined by (a+ h + g +I+ j + k + n + y).
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4.3 Price vs. Quantity Controls for Reducing Peak Demand
This section will use the Weitzman framework to compare the relative efficiency of using
either price-based or quantity-based policies to maintain system reliability.
Maintaining system reliability is a public good that will be undersupplied in competitive
markets. To see why this is, consider the interconnected nature of the grid. A grid works
very well as a power distribution system because it allows sharing. If a power company
needs to take a power plant off line for maintenance, other parts of the grid can
compensate. This makes the grid redundant and reliable most of the time. However, there
can be times, particularly at peak demand, when the interconnected nature of the grid
makes the entire system vulnerable to collapse. For example, consider a hot summer
afternoon when the grid is operating close to its maximum capacity. If something
(lightening strikes, mechanical failures, sudden surges in demand, etc.) causes a power
plant to suddenly trip off line, the other plants connected to it have to spin up to meet
the demand. If all of the power plants were already operating near maximum capacity,
then the plants cannot handle the extra load. To prevent the plants from overloading and
failing, they will disconnect from the grid as well, and the overload will cascade through
the grid. In nearly every major blackout, the situation is the same. Thus, the probability of
such a failure occurring is a decreasing function of the amount of capacity physically
available to the system for dispatch and an increasing function of the demand on the
system. Whenever generation capacity is added or peak demand is reduced, the
probability of a system failure goes down. Since power outages impose widespread costs,
reducing the probability of a failure creates benefits that accrue largely to parties other
than the capacity-adder or demand-reducer. Thus, capacity additions create a classic
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positive extemality by improving the reliability of the system. Economic theory tells us
that the existence of this positive extemality suggests that peaking capacity and demand
reductions will, in equilibrium, be undersupplied by a competitive market. The magnitude
of this extemality depends on the product of the social cost of the outage and the
probability of an outage occurring.
The problem is exacerbated because the electricity delivery system is instantaneous and
uses "pull" rather than "push" technology, so that customers ultimately determine the
amount of electricity that travels through the wires, not the utility. The system is
vulnerable to catastrophic failure if customers "pull" more electricity than the system can
handle. Such failures impose widespread costs; any action that causes a reduction in the
likelihood of such failures creates a positive externality.
This situation is illustrated in Figure 4-5. The expected short-run peak demand situation
corresponds to the short-run demand curve labeled SRD1 • Thus, at quantity equal to Q *
and price equal to P*, the market is in both short-run and long-run equilibrium. If
demand increases, however, we move up the short-run demand curve. At some point, as
available capacity is fully utilized, this curve becomes vertical and further increases in
demand cannot be accommodated. As shown in the figure, this situation is far more likely
if the short-run demand curve is highly inelastic.
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Figure 4-5. Short run supply and demand
The recognition of reliability as an extemality problem leads to the question of whether
public policy should seek to affect the structure of electricity markets in such a way as to
"internalize" the extemality and thereby move the competitive equilibrium closer to the
socially optimal level of reliability. There is, of course, a large economic literature on
policies designed to internalize externalities, developed primarily in the context of the
negative externality created by environmental pollution. Some of the analysis from that
literature can be adapted to explore possible policy responses to the reliability extemality.
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The standard analysis of externalities says that the optimal level of the externalitygenerating activity can be determined by finding the point at which the marginal social
benefit associated with the externality is equated to the marginal cost of the activity that
produces the benefit. In the present context, this means that the marginal value of
electricity use (or, conversely, the value of reducing the probability of a system failure)
should be equated to the marginal cost of producing electricity. To make the discussion
concrete, and to allow for the analysis of both price- and quantity-based demand
reductions, this discussion is couched in terms of maintaining system reliability by
reducing peak demand.
The marginal cost of generating electricity for peak demand has two components:
marginal supply costs and the expected cost of a power failure, which is a decreasing
function of total capacity and increasing function of peak demand. Both marginal supply
costs and the expected costs of a failure increase rapidly as demand approaches maximum
system capacity. Supply costs increase because inefficient peaking plants that run on high
cost fuels are needed in order to generate enough electricity to serve peak demand. The
expected costs of a system failure increases as demand threatens to exceed supply
capability. In fact, one could argue that the probability of system failure goes to certainty
as demand approaches the maximum system capacity. The resulting marginal cost curve is
the sum of the two components and its slope is steeper than either curve taken alone.
Figure 4-6 is one representation of what the marginal cost of electricity supply might look
like, as a function of aggregate electricity demand.
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Figure 4-6. Marginal costs and benefits at peak demand
The marginal benefit (MB) curve represents the value of electricity use. Of course, the
value of electricity use is the value of not having an interruption so the marginal benefit
curve can also be interpreted as the value of reducing the probability of system failure. As
peak demand rises, the probability of a power outage of any magnitude rises as well. What
matters for this analysis is the marginal effect on expected benefits of decreasing peak
demand. This can be treated as a decreasing function of demand. That is, as peak demand
falls, interruptions become less likely and each successive decrement of peak demand has
less effect in terms of making them rarer still.

The socially optimal level of peak demand is where the marginal benefit is equal to the
marginal cost, indicated Q* in Figure 4-6. In contrast, if fixed retail rates are capped
below P* at PF, customers will demand electricity at a level equal to QF. This means that
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traditional fixed rate pricing structures result in a risk of a system failure that is greater
than the socially optimal level of risk.
In the simple situation described by Figure 4-6, regulators and policy makers can
unambiguously improve market efficiency by dealing with the reliability externality.
Further, they can, in this simple situation, do this using two equivalent policy instruments:
they can allow retail prices to adjust to reflect real-time or near real-time marginal supply
costs or they can directly manipulate customers' electricity use to maintain Q*. In theory,
these approaches are equivalent. When prices are used as planning tools, the basic
operating rules from the regulator implicitly specify that customers will maximize their
utility at the given prices. When direct demand management is used, the regulator
explicitly limits electricity demand at a certain level. From a strictly theoretical point of
view, the two methods are equivalent- no matter which method is fixed, there is always a
corresponding way to set the other which achieves the same results when implemented.

A number of factors make this theoretical equivalence between price-based and quantitybased policies breakdown. The most important is that neither of the curves in Figure 4-6
is known with certainty, even in .some average or expected value sense. System planners
need to determine the correct level of peak demand reductions on the basis of only very
vague information about both the marginal benefit and marginal cost functions. This
issue was addressed by Weitzman's (1974) seminal paper on the relative efficiency of
price and quantity based policies and has been analyzed in detail in the pollution control
context, where the issue is whether to tax pollution or impose regulations dictating
permissible pollution levels. The basic result is that setting the quantity (using direct
demand control, in this case) at its apparently optimal level will lead to smaller average
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errors than would setting prices equal to marginal supply costs, if the marginal benefits
are declining rapidly at the point where marginal benefits apparently equal marginal cost.

In other words, if there is a "threshold" above which the marginal benefit of demand
reductions is very low and below which the marginal benefit is very high, then the
optimum must be near this threshold, regardless of where the cost function turns out to
lie. Conversely, if the marginal benefit function is particularly flat in the region of the
optimum, the correct Q* depends a lot on where the marginal cost curve lies; by setting
price the planner will "track" movements in that function and will be more efficient than
the quantity approach on average.
The implication of this classic quantity vs. price issue in the present context warrants a
closer look. Figure 4-7 illustrates the case in which the exact location of the marginal cost
curve is unknown to the planner or regulator. This illustration, however, also assumes
that the location and shape of the marginal benefit curve are known with certainty. In this
case, the marginal cost curve could lie in 3 possible locations. The probability of each is
one-third and the height of MC 1 is equal to the average heights of MC2 and MC 3, making
MC1 the mean location for the actual marginal cost curve.
Given the possible outcomes for the marginal cost curve, and knowing the location of the
marginal benefits curve, the optimal level of peak demand is Q*. If the actual marginal
cost curve, MC, is equal to MC 1, then Q* can be maintained either through actively
limiting customer demand to Q* or by setting price equal to marginal cost so that price
equals P*. If the planner uses advanced technologies to directly maintain customer
demand at Q* and the actual marginal cost curve turns out to be MC2, the resulting level
of peak demand will be too low compared to the socially optimal level of peak demand,
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QQz· Triangle B is the measure of the resulting inefficiency. On the contrary, if the actual
marginal cost curve turns out to be MC3 , the resulting level of peak demand will be too
high compared to the socially optimal level, QQ1• The deadweight loss is illustrated by
triangle A.
The planner also has the choice to use a price-based policy and set price equal to the
marginal supply cost. The planner's best guess is that MC= MC 1• If the planner is wrong
and MC=MC2, the actual level of peak demand, Q*, will be lower than the optimal peak
demand, Qr2. Triangle D captures this inefficiency. Conversely, if MC=MC3, the actual
level of peak demand will be higher than the optimal, Qr y The inefficiency is measured
by area C.
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Figure 4-7. Relative efficiency of price- and quantity- based policies for peak
demand reduction with uncertain marginal cost·

Itis clear from Figure 4-7 that (C+D) is greater than (A+B). This implies that using a
quantity-based approach will lead to smaller average errors than setting price equal to
marginal cost if the marginal benefits are declining rapidly at the point where marginal
benefits apparently equals marginal cost. This representation of the marginal benefit
function suggests that there is a threshold above which the marginal benefit of peak
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demand reduction is very low and below which the marginal benefit is very high. Setting
Q* at this threshold minimizes losses due to uncertainty.

In general, the planner can decide whether it is better to use direct demand control
policies or set price equal to marginal supply costs based on the relative steepness of the
marginal benefit and marginal cost functions. As an example, consider the case where
MC=MCy This is illustrated in Figure 4-8. Holding the slope of the marginal cost curve

constant, the marginal benefit function gets flatter. As the marginal benefit function gets
more elastic, the optimal point where marginal cost equals marginal benefit shifts to the
left, closer to Qr3 and minimizing the deadweight loss resulting from the uncertainty. So,
if the slope of the marginal benefit function is expected to be flatter than the slope of the
marginal cost function, price controls are the more efficiency policy option for
maintaining system reliability.
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Figure 4-8. Relative efficiency of price-based policies for inelastic and elastic
marginal benefit functions

Intuition suggests that the case described by Figure 4-7 (the marginal benefits of reducing
peak demand are very high as demand approaches a reliability threshold) is an accurate
representation of real-life peak demand conditions. As discussed above in this section,
under normal demand conditions the grid is highly redundant and resilient to
disturbances. But, if the grid is operating under peak demand conditions and all of the
generators are running at 100% capacity, a single contingency can cascade through the
grid, causing rolling blackouts and brownouts. Consider the reported costs of system
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failure: a rolling blackout across Silicon Valley totaled $7 5 million in losses; in 2000, the
one-hour outage that hit the Chicago Board of Trade resulted in $20 trillion in trades
delayed; Sun Microsystems estimates that a blackout costs the company $1 million every
minute; the Northeast blackout of 2003 resulted in a $6 billion economic loss to the
region (U.S. Department of Energy Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability,
2009).
Proponents of real-time prices often claim that price-mechanisms offer considerable
efficiency gains over quantity-based controls for reducing peak demand and maintaining
system reliability. This may be true if the damages from peak demand occur gradually: a
slight increase in peak demand means slightly more damage. Under this assumption,
RTPs make sense. Rather than attempting to limit peak demand to a fixed target at any
cost, retail electricity prices should be adjusted to reflect real-time marginal supply costs
and the level of electricity consumption at any point in time will be determined by
customers' price elasticity of demand. This remains true as long as the damage from peak
demand is gradual. But, if one assumes that the damages from peak demand and the
associated risk of system failure rise dramatically beyond a particular threshold, intuition
suggests that it will make sense to adopt quantity-based controls that assure that demand

will not exceed a given margin of reliability. Extending Weitzman's analysis to account for
this threshold effect shows that to be the case as shown in Figure 4-7: if one assumes that
catastrophic damages occur once peak demand exceeds a specific threshold, one finds
that quantity controls are indeed desirable.
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4.4 Conclusion
The first part of Chapter 4 reviewed the economic literature on electricity pricing,
particularly peak load pricing. As developed by Boiteux and Steiner, the peak load pricing
model sets the price in the peak period equal to the sum of marginal capacity costs and
marginal operating costs and sets the price in the off-peak period equal to just the
marginal operating costs. Offering a lower price during off-peak hours creates an
incentive for customers to reallocate some of their electricity demand from the peak
period to the off-peak period. There is, however, one important drawback to using peak
load pricing as a peak demand reduction tool. That is, peak load pricing depends on
knowing when the off-peak and peak periods occur. Peak electricity demand, however,
can only be predicted by the forecasted weather and can only be anticipated on relatively
short notice. While peak load pricing is well-suited for smoothing demand for services or
commodities that follow regular patterns (cell phone plans, airline tickets, hotel
reservations), it may not be as effective in reducing episodic spikes in electricity demand.
The second part of Chapter 4 compared the relative efficiencies of using price-based or
quantity-based policies to reduce peak demand. Using Weitzman's framework for
comparing price-and quantity-based policies, the discussion showed that price-based
policies are preferred when the marginal benefits curve for peak demand reductions is
relatively flat, but as the marginal benefit curve becomes increasingly steep, it will
eventually tip the scales in favor of quantity-based policies. But, Weitzman's framework is
a simplification that does not capture the range of issues involved with quantity-based
policies. The next two chapters will examine these issues. Chapter 5 is designed to be an
introduction to the challenges facing the estimation of peak demand reductions from the
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use of quantity-based policies. Chapter 6 describes the methods used to estimate the peak
demand reductions achieved by the quantity-based SmartAC program and predict the
effectiveness of such a program under various climate change scenarios.
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Chapter 5. Introduction to Evaluating Peak Demand Reduction
Programs
This chapter describes the important challenges facing the use of quantity-based policies
for reducing peak electricity demand. The chapter concludes that there are several
analytical and theoretical challenges associated with estimating customers' baseline
electricity consumption. In the case where incentive payments are paid according to the
magnitude of the demand reductions, these challenges may result in overpaying
customers.
As discussed in Chapter 3, the SmartAC™ program reduces demand during peak periods
by limiting participating customers' demand for electricity for air conditioning. An
important issue for the SmartAC™ program, and others like it, is determining how much
peak demand is reduced. Knowing the magnitude of the demand reduction is important
to system planners who must be able to account for anticipated peak demand reductions
in supply procurement planning, and evaluate the cost-effectiveness of such programs. In

cases where incentive payments are paid according to the magnitude of the demand
reduction, accurate estimates are required to properl.Y compensate customers.

Determining the size of the demand reduction is a matter of subtracting a customer's
actual electricity consumption during peak hour when the customer's air conditioner
thermostat is subject to re-set by the utility from an estimate of what the customer would
have otherwise consumed if not for the utility intervention. The former measure is collected by
a data logger or meter on the air conditioner, but the latter measure must be estimated.
This estimate is referred to as the customer baseline. Conceptually, the customer baseline
is the quantity of electricity the customer would have used in the absence of any action
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taken the utility to reduce peak demand. It is important that the customer baseline is not
directly observable and must be estimated through one of several different statistical
methods. Most estimation methods can be categorized as either an average or a weatherbased regression model.

5.1 Methods for Estimating Customer Baselines
5.1.1 Averaging Method
An averaging method simply estimates the customer's baseline for a particular day and
time of day by calculating his average electricity consumption during each hour over the
previous 10 to 12 days. For example, the baseline for the hour ending at 1 pm is the
average over all the selected days of the demand on those days for the hour between 12
noon and 1pm. The choice of exactly which days and how many days to average over is
one significant issue with the averaging method. Most of the methods that use a version
of averaging use 10 or 11 business days prior to the "curtailment day," or the day that the
utility limited the customer's peak demand. Other common strategies include restricting
the averaging to the 10 days with the highest average demand out of the last 11 or the 5
days with the highest average out of the last 10. Eliminating the lower demand days
creates a baseline that reflects demand conditions that most approximate those conditions
when demand reductions are likely to occur-i.e., when it is hot and peak demand is high.

Often, an adjustment factor needs to be applied to the baseline estimate in order to
address systematic day-specific effects (other than temperature) that.may bias the baseline
estimate. Day-specific effects could include wind, humidity, or cloud-cover that is out of
the normal range. Non-weather related day-specific effects such as events in the news or
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holidays could also impact customers' electricity use. There are several approaches to this
"same-day" adjustment. The first is an additive adjustment- a constant is added to the
provisional baseline for each hour of the curtailment period. For a simple additive
adjustment, the constant is calculated as the difference between the actual electricity
demand and the provisional baseline estimate for some period prior to the curtailment.
The second approach is a scalar adjustment. The provisional baseline estimate for each
hour of the curtailment period is multiplied by a fixed scalar, which is calculated as the
ratio of the actual load to the provisional baseline for some period prior to the
curtailment. The final option is referred to as a weather-based adjustment. A model of
demand as a function of weather is fit to historical load data. The fitted model is used to
estimate demand a) for the weather conditions of the days included in the provisional
baseline estimate and, b) for the weather conditions of the curtailment day. The
difference or ratio of these two estimates is calculated and applied to the provisional
baseline as an additive or scalar adjustment.

5.1.2 Weather-Based Regression Model
Weather-based regression models are an alternative to averaging. Regression models are
used to develop a baseline demand curve based on dependent variables related to
weather, building operations, or other factors. In the context of calculating peak demand
reductions from customer baselines, the regression model uses electricity consumption
data for a particular customer (or even a particular appliance) and weather data specific to
the customer's location. The model estimates the relationship between electricity
consumption and the outside temperature using all available data except data from
curtailment days. The model is fit to those data and applied to the conditions during peak
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demand in order to estimate what that customer's demand would have been in the
absence of the demand reduction. In most cases, the model is fit separately for each
customer in order to control for differences in customers' homes, appliances, and
personal preferences.
In these models, each observation corresponds to a particular day and hour (or finer time

interval). The dependent variable is the customer's demand at that day and hour, and in
most applications, a different set of coefficients is estimated for each hour of the day. The
explanatory variables are typically weather variables and day-type indicators that
distinguish weekdays from weekends. This is somewhat different from contexts where a
model must yield reasonable results across a population of customers over a broad time
frame.
There are many different approaches to regression modeling that vary with respect to the
general method used (e.g. classical versus Bayesian), estimation algorithms (e.g. Ordinary
Least Squares, Generalized Least Squares, Maximum Likelihood Estimation), functional
specification (e.g. conditional demand analysis, change modeling, etc.), the use of control
groups (e.g. participants versus non-participants), and the variables that are explicitly
included in the model specification.

There are several differences among various specifications of weather-based regression
models. The first is the type of weather variable or variables included in the model.
Typically, temperature, degree-days, and/ or a temperature-humidity index (THI) are used,
although some modelers include additional weather terms such as precipitation, cloud
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clover, sunshine, and wind speed. Temperature and humidity are the dominant drivers of
cooling demand.
Cooling degree days (CDD) is a quantitative index designed to reflect the demand for
energy needed to cool a building. More specifically, the number of cooling degrees in a
day is defined as the difference between a chosen reference value and the daily average
temperature. The reference value, often referred to as the "base temperature", is generally
the lowest temperature below which no air conditioning is necessary. The value of 6S°F is
often taken as the base temperature because experience shows that at 65°F neither
heating nor cooling is generally required. Thus, if the daily average temperature for a
given day is 78°F and the base temperature is 65°F, this would be measured as 13 degree
days. However, cooling degree days can be calculated using any base temperature- the
most appropriate base temperature depends on the patterns and preferences of the
building's occupants. Cooling degree days can be added over periods of time to provide a
rough approximation of seasonal cooling requirements21 • In the course of a year, for
example, Key West, Florida has 4,383 cooling degree days whereas Anchorage, Alaska has
1 (National Climatic Data Center, 2009) . Thus, one can say that, for a given home of
similar structure and insulation, more than 4,000 times (roughly) the energy would be
required to cool that home in Key West than in Anchorage.

21

coo 1·ing degree days only offer a rough approximation of energy requirements for heating and

cooling because the relationship between energy demand and cooling degree days is not linear and
the cooling base matters a lot if one is trying to forecast electricity use. For example, with a base of 65
degrees, 10 days at 68 would probably imply very little air conditioning use. But one day.at 95
(=65+10*3) would imply a lot more air conditioning.
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If the building in question is consistently in cooling mode across the span of the data
used in the regression, degree-day variables offer no advantage over temperature
variables. However, if the data include milder conditions when cooling (or heating) is not
required, degree-day variables generally perform better. In effect, degree-days "count"
temperature only when it is high enough to require cooling.
The second difference among regression models is whether a fixed degree-day base is
used. If degree-day variables are used, the degree-day base may be fixed in advance or
determined by the regression. As mentioned above, the base temperature for a building is
the lowest temperature at which cooling is desired. Thus, the more accurate the base
temperature is, the more closely degree-days will be correlated with electricity demand. If
the base temperature used is too low, the model will tend to underestimate demand in hot
weather and overstate demand in cooler weather. If the base temperature used is too
high, the opposite occurs. The appropriate degree-day base varies considerably across
homes and other buildings, depending on the home's insulation, shading, and other
factors the affect the indoor temperature. A meaningful way to determine the best base
temperature for a given building is by analyzing cooling demand data in relation to
temperature data. Models that allow the degree-day base to vary across homes tend to
have lower systematic error, but also are more complex and more time-consuming to fit.
Also, these models are less well determined if data are limited, which means that a
relatively long history of electricity demand and weather data is necessary.

A third difference among models is whether lagged weather terms are included. Lag
temperature or degree-day terms are used to account for heat build-up over time in a
home. This is the effect of "thermal mass." One approach is to include the weighted
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average of degree-days for the past 48 hours, with the weights exponentially decreasing.
Simpler approaches put multiple temperature or degree-day variables into the model at
different lags. Lagging humidity is not highly meaningful because buildings do not trap
humidity in the way they trap heat.
A fourth difference is whether the explanatory variables are hourly or daily. Although the

estimated coefficients are almost always allowed to vary by hour of the day, the
explanatory variables may vary only daily. Because buildings store heat, the amount
electricity used for cooling does not respond instantaneously to the outside temperature,
but depends on the temperature over the course of the day. Lagged weather variables can
account for this effect, but modeling demand in a given hour as a function of the daily
average temperature can often work as well without the added complexity. In part, this
approach works because the variation in temperature over the course of the day is similar
from day to day. Thus, the 1Oam coefficients of daily average temperature tend to be
smaller than the 4pm coefficients. This is partly because there is less heat build-up in the
home by 1Oam and partly because the actual outdoor temperature for a given daily
average is lower than that at 4pm.

Common models estimate weather-sensitive electricity demand as a function of daily
temperature, hourly temperature, heating and cooling degree-days, heating and cooling
degree-hours, both degree-days and lagged degree-days, or a temperature-humidity index.
Table 5-1 summarizes some of the most prominent advantages and disadvantages of
various baseline methodology components.
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Table 5-1. Advantages and Disadvantages of Baseline Estimation Methods Based
on Qualitative Considerations
Advantages

Baseline Method
Average (any)

•

Disadvantages

Simple, easy to use
& understand, low

•

Tends to underestimate
baseline for weather-sensitive
demand

•

Also tends to underestimate
baseline for weather-sensitive
demand

•

Including cooler days in the
averaging calculation can
result in over-inflated
customer baselines.

•

More complex, harder to
understand, higher cost

•

If observations do not
include weather as hot as the
curtailment day, model
estimates may underestimate
baseline

•

Model estimates based on
limited data ~ght be
inaccurate

cost
Average (highest 5
out of 10 days)

Regression

•

•

•

Partial adjustment
for weathersensitive demand

Provides baseline
corresponding to
particular weather
conditions of
curtailment day
If a full season of
data is available,
regression will yield
accurate
coefficients

Source: (Goldberg & Agnew, 2003)

5.1.3 Theoretical Issues with the Use of Customer Baselines
Programs that pay consumers for demand reduction below some baseline face several
challenges that are inherent in defining the baseline. These challenges include moral
hazard, adverse selection, and the double-payment problem.
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Moral Hazard
Moral hazard occurs when the customer anticipates a peak demand "event." In one case
of moral hazard, the customer might intentionally increase his electricity consumption in
the hours leading up to the curtailment period in order to increase his baseline so as to
receive a higher payment. For example, a customer with an on-site generator might turn
off his generator temporarily to establish an artificially high level of consumption and
then turn the generator back on to collect incentive payments for what is otherwise
normal consumption behavior. In another case, a customer might pre-cool, or increase
cooling in the hours prior to the curtailment event in order to retain his comfort level
longer if air conditioning is being controlled during the curtailment. Other concerns, such
as adjusting manufacturing processes in anticipating of the curtailment event, are more
relevant to commercial and industrial customers. If gaming or pre-cooling occurs, savings
estimates based on the two hours prior to the curtailment event will be overstated
whereas anticipatory behavior by customers such as canceling production orders or
encouraging employees to go home early, could lead to under-estimating demand savings.

Adverse Selection
Adverse selection could result in payments for demand reductions that would have
occurred anyway, and which had nothing to do with the program incentives. The adverse
selection problem arises from asymmetrical information about a customer's true baseline.
Since the baseline is not directly observable to regulators, customers usually have better
information on their baseline consumption levels than the regulator and can use this
information to their advantage in their decision to participate in a demand reduction
program. Therefore, the program is likely to attract disproportionate participation from
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customers who anticipate lower consumption for reasons having nothing to do with the
incentives paid by the program to reduce demand. For example, at the commercial or
industrial level, if last year's or last season's consumption is used to estimate the customer
baseline, firms whose electricity usage has been reduced since that time have a greater
incentive to participate in the program.. Therefore, payments could be made for load
reductions that would have occurred anyway. At the same time, firms that are entering
their high demand season, or have grown rapidly since last year simply will not join the
program.

Double Pqyment Problem
The use of a baseline as the basis for demand reduction payments is susceptible to paying
excessive demand reduction incentives to customers (the double payment problem), and
cause customers to forego consumption whose value exceeds the cost of producing the
energy22• This can happen when the sum of the bill savings and the incentive payments,
which are computed relative to the estimated baseline, exceed the cost of producing the
electricity. Such excessive compensation for demand reductions causes inefficient price
formation in wholesale energy markets. That is, despite the availability of relatively
inexpensive energy in the wholesale market, excessive incentives may cause customers to

22

The double payment gives participants an incentive to defer consumption when the value of
consumption is greater than the LMP and/or to switch to alternative energy sources that cost more to
operate than the LMP. Such a program design, therefore, results in an inefficient market outcome and
an inefficient use of resources. For example, if the retail price of electricity is $80/MWh and the LMP is
$90/MWh, a customer who is paid the LMP to reduce consumption would be able to earn an
additional $20/MWh by using a $150/MWh on-site generator ($80 bill savings+ $90 payments-$150
generator=$20 net gain) to reduce its net metered consumption. Thus, the program compensation
design encourages the use of a more expensive $150/MWh resource even though a less expensive
$90/MWh resource in the wholesale market was available to serve the customer's demand.
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forego more valuable energy consumption or cause customers to substitute higher cost
sources of energy.
To see the double payment problem, consider a customer who usually consumes a
baseline quantity of electricity, BCL, at price Px. When the wholesale price Pis greater
than Px, the customer wants to consume a quantity less than his baseline, q. The demand
reduction is DR=x-q.

If the difference between what the customer would have consumed and his actual
consumption, DR, is called a "demand resource," it seems reasonable to say that the
customer should be paid the wholesale market price P for its "demand resource," just as
generators are paid for their supply resources. It also seems reasonable to say that no
customer should have to pay for something he does not consume. Taken together, those
statements imply that if q < x, the customer should pay P for the quantity, q, that he does
consume and should be paid P for the amount of the demand reduction, DR. Thus, the
net payment to the customer would be:

Net Payment to Customer = (P x DR)-(P x q).
Since q=x-DR, this can be rewritten as:
Net Payment to Customer = (P x DR) - P x (x-DR)
= 2PDR-Px.

This says that a customer who consumes less than its fixed BCL of x should buy x at the
market price and then be paid a price of 2P for selling back "demand resources."
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There are several solutions to the double-payment problem. First, economic demand
response programs can be eliminated in favor of real-time pricing programs. Second, a
customer could be required to purchase his baseline. If he does not consume all of the
electricity that he has paid for, he will be compensated for the unused energy. Lastly, the
simplest solution is to only pay customers the real-time price for electricity that they do
use.

5.2 Conclusions
This chapter described the important analytical and theoretical challenges facing baseline
approaches for estimating the impact of quantity-based policies that limit customer
demand during peak hours. This chapter concludes that the weather-based regression
method has several important advantages that make it preferred to the averaging method.
This chapter also describes the theoretical problems of moral hazard, adverse selection,
and the double-payment problem. This chapter concludes that in cases where incentive
payments are paid according to the magnitude of the demand reduction, these challenges
can result in overpaying customers.

Considering these challenges, it is important to remember that price-based policies, such
as real-time pricing, can reallocate electricity demand from peak periods to off-peak
periods without these challenges.

Both quantity-based and price-based policies are an essential element of California's
energy strategy, as articulated in the state's Energy Action Plan (EAP II), which directs
the state's investor owned utilities to subscribe at least 5% of system peak demand into
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either price-based or quantity-based control programs. Currently, both types of programs
are administered by California's 3 regulated investor-owned utilities: PG&E, SCE, and
SDG&E. The utilities generally offer their large commercial and industrial (C&I)
customers options to participate in both types of programs for reducing peak demand.
For example, PG&E offers a Critical Peak Pricing (CPP) program to its large C&I
customers that provides lower energy rates on non-peak days in exchange for higher rates
(up to five times the otherwise applicable rate) on peak days. Most of the programs
available to residential and smaller commercial customers, however, are quantity-based
programs23, such as the SmartAC program described in Chapter 3. Chapter 6 analyzes the
effectiveness of the quantity-based SmartAC program in reducing peak demand and
forecasts how such a program will help reduce peak demand under various climate
change scenarios.

23

Both price-based and quantity-based programs for residential and small commercial customers will
most likely grow as utilities' proposals for advanced metering infrastructure make their way through
the regulatory approval and implementation process.
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Chapter 6. Evaluating the Role of Residential Air Conditioning in Reducing Peak
Demand
6.1 Introduction
This chapt~r will evaluate the role that direct quantity control policies will have in
reducing peak demand in a future characterized by hotter summer temperatures and
climate change. Doing this will take 4 main steps:
1. Model the effect of temperature on electricity demand for air-conditioning.
2. Estimate the magnitude of peak demand reductions from the quantity-based
SmartAC™ program.
3. Forecast electricity demand for cooling over a range of possible climate change
scenanos.
4. Examine the role for air conditioner thermostat re-set programs in reducing peak
demand over a range of possible climate change scenarios.

The first step is carried out by modeling electricity demand from a particular air
conditioner as a non-linear function of the outside temperature and the time of day. The
second step involves determining how much PG&E reduced peak demand by raising the
cooling setpoint on participating customers' air conditioners during the summer of 2007.
This also takes several steps. The first step is to use the non-linear model mentioned
above to estimate the electricity demand for a particular air conditioner as a function of
the outside temperature and the time of day, based on historical demand and weather
data. Next, given specific peak demand-day conditions (daily average temperature, time of
day), the amount of electricity the customer would have consumed absent the utility
Intervention is estimated. Lastly, the amount of electricity the customer's air conditioner
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actually consumed is subtracted from the estimate of what it would have consumed but
for utility intervention. The difference is interpreted as the peak demand reduction.
The third and fourth main steps are to forecast future electricity demand for air
conditioning and potential demand reductions across a range of possible climate change
scenarios. Forecasting concerns extrapolating the findings from ex post evaluations to a
set of conditions that differ from those that have occurred in the past. Most climate
scientists agree that future climate conditions and patterns will be out of the range of
historical weather. The challenge here is that the functional relationship between energy
demand for cooling and temperature may differ under these extreme conditions from
what is was under the observed conditions. A related challenge is to address not only the
degree of uncertainty associated with the ex post evaluation parameters, which is largely
tied to the accuracy and statistical precision of model parameters, but also the uncertainty
associated with the climatic predictions that underlie the forecast. Everything is uncertain
in the future, and providing point estimates based on specific values for key variables can

significantly overstate the true confidence that underlies the estimates. To address this
uncertainty, this chapter will report ranges of forecas.t ed energy demand for air
conditioning across several possible climatic futures.

To aid the reader, this chapter is divided into two main parts, with several sections and
subsections within in part. Part I estimates peak demand reductions from the SmartAC
program during the summer of 2007 based on historical weather and electricity
consumption data. Part II forecasts future demand for electricity for cooling under
different climate change scenarios.
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The conclusion of the analysis is that direct load control programs that limit consumers'
demand for electricity for air conditioning during critical hours are effective in reducing
peak demand. This research also concludes that this type of direct control program has a
smaller impact on peak demand at extremely hot daily average temperatures. This means
that this type of direct control program will reduce peak demand more effectively if the
impact of climate change on daily average temperatures is moderate. Likewise, this
research concludes that this type of program may reduce peak demand more effectively in
regions of the country with moderate temperatures and low humidity, such as northern
California and the Pacific Northwest.

Part I. Estimating Peak Demand Reductions 2007
6.2 Electricity Consumption Data
This analysis uses two important sources of data. The first is the electricity consumption
of each participating air conditioner and the second is the daily average temperature in
Stockton, CA.

Data on each participating air conditioners' energy use was collected by data loggers
installed on the customers' air conditioners; the data loggers recorded each air
conditioner's energy use in either one-minute or fifteen-minute intervals. The data loggers
used were the HOBO Energy Logger Pro TM (for one-minute data) and the DENT

DATApro™ Data Logger (for fifteen-minute data). Both loggers used a current
transformer, installed around a single leg of an air conditioner, to monitor the voltage of
the electromagnetic field produced by an alternating current, and were programmed to
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convert that voltage reading into amps. Four different sized current transformers were
used for this study: 20, 70, 100, or 150 amp. The one-minute or fifteen-minute interval
data that was stored in the loggers included the date, time, and average amps during the
interval. The DATApro TM loggers, which recorded information on fifteen minute
intervals took instantaenous amp readings every minute and recorded the average of
those readings at the end of every fifteen minute interval. The HOBO data loggers
recorded amp readings every minute. During the data cleaning process, the one-minute
data was converted to a format consistent with that recorded by the fifteen-minute data
loggers; the average amps over fifteen minute intervals was calculated. Amps were
24

converted to kW using the measured voltage at each site. If the voltage could not be
measured, the average measured voltage (220v) calculated across all air conditioners was
substituted. There is little variation in voltage across all air conditioners.

The data loggers were installed on a sample of 300 air conditioners. The sample was
selected from the population of 2,917 participating customers at the start of the summer
of 2007. The sample design and sampling was done by Kema, Inc. and will only be
explained briefly here. The sample design had 6 strata, based on the type of controlling
device, tons of air conditioning per household, and whether multiple central air
conditioners were present in the home25 • The purpose of the stratification was to reflect
changes in the composition of the population of participating customers as the program
grows.

24

25

Watts=voltage x amps.
One ton of cooling is equal to 12,000 BTUs.
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It is also important to know how much the sample of customers uses their air
conditioners. There can be no demand reduction from an air conditioner that is not
operating because its electricity consumption is already zero. Air conditioners that are
used frequently are more likely to contribute to the peak demand reduction than air
conditioners that are rarely turned on. Figure 6-1 shows that 3% of the sample never
operates their air conditioner, 59% only use air conditioning on the hottest days of the
summer, and 15% use air conditioning every day of the summer. This sample make-up is
useful for evaluating the impact of the thermostat re-set because almost all of the sample
(96% to 97%) probably uses air conditioning on the very hottest days of the summer,
when peak demand is most likely to occur and demand reductions are the most valuable.

---

Don't know Not ilt aU
1%

----

3%

E veryday dul'ing

cooling season
15%

n=222

Figure 6-1. Reported air conditioning use among sample participants
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6.3 Weather Data
The second important data source for this analysis is weather data for the Stockton area.
PG&E provided KEMA, Inc. with observations of dry bulb temperature and relative
humidity in half-hour intervals for three weather stations in Stockton and its surrounding
areas for the period from January 1 through December 31, 2007.
The relevant temperature variable for this analysis is the daily average temperature. This is
because homes and other buildings heat up and cool down more slowly than the outside
temperature- thus, the daily average temperature captures the range of temperatures that
the home experiences over the course of the day and is a better gauge of how much
energy will be needed for cooling than the day's maximum temperature. The daily average
temperature is calculated as:

DAT= (Maximum Temperature+ Minimum Temperature)/2.
In addition, PG&E provided KEMA, Inc. with historical weather data for Stockton that
included observations of daily average temperature for the period from May 1 through
October 31 for the years 1983-2006. This allows a comparison between the summer of
2007 and the previous 23 years. These data establish percentile cut-offs to identify the
one, five, and ten percent hottest days across the 23 years. The first percentile contains
days with daily average temperature above 87.5°F, the fifth percentile contains days with a
daily average temperature above 83.1 °F, and the tenth percentile contains days with a
daily average temperature above 80°F. The first and fifth percentiles are particularly
ttnportant for the SmartAC program because it is on hot days such as these when
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electricity demand for cooling skyrockets and peak demand reductions are especially
important.
The historical weather data allow us to characterize the summer of 2007 in relation to
past weather. Based on counts of days above the three thresholds, 2007 was a typical
summer compared to the ten previous summers. Figure 6-2 shows the count of days in
each temperature percentile and Figure 6-3 just shows the number of days each year in
the first percentile (with a daily average temperature equal to or greater than 87.5°F).
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Figure 6-3. Number of days per summer in the t8' daily average temperature
percentile

Figures 6-4 and 6-5 show that the summer of 2006, along with the summer of 1998, had
the highest number of days in the first percentile (with daily average temperature equal to
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or above 87.5°F). The summer of 2007 only had half as many of these most extreme hot
days compared with 2006 and only two thirds of the 5th percentile days compared to

2006.

1997-2007 2007 1997-2007 2007 1997-2007 2007
1st Percentile

5th Percentile

I 0th Percentile

Figure 6-4. Average temperature in the 1"1, 5th, and 10th percentiles, 1997-2007 vs.
2007
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There were 25 days during the summer of 2007 where the daily average temperature
exceeded 80°F in the Stockton area. Figure 6-5 shows the daily average temperature on
the hottest days of the summer. Figure 6-6 overlays the 4pm humidity for each of those
days. Interestingly, the hottest days of 2007 were not particularly humid. The average
4pm humidity over the course of the summer is 69.3% while the average 4pm humidity
for the 25 hottest days is 48.8%.
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6.4 Analysis of PG&E SmartAC TM Peak Demand Reductions
This section describes the method used to estimate peak demand reductions under the
quantity-based SmartAC program. This process proceeds in three steps. First, we estimate
the parameters of the demand relationship at the individual level. Then, we compare
estimated peak demand to observed peak demand on "curtailment days" in order to
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determine the reduction in peak demand resulting from the thermostat re-set. Finally we
use the relationship between energy demand and temperature to forecast energy demand
for cooling under different climate scenarios. This allows us to project potential peak
demand reductions from quantity-based policies.
Now each of these steps will be described in detail.

6.4.1 Specify the demand relationship
The weather-based regression model used in this case estimates air conditioner electricity
demand as a function of dry bulb temperature in the form of average daily cooling
degree-days. Each of the 24 hourly demand indicator variables is regressed against an
hour-specific intercept term and degree-day terms. The resulting parameters, though
based on only a single daily temperature measure, provide an hourly estimate of demand
as a function of weather.

Equation 6.3.1 shows the model in equation form. The model is fit separately for each
participating air conditioner in order to account for differences in building characteristics,
personal preferences, and customer behavior.
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(6.3.1)

where
=

sum of 15-minute interval electricity consumption at hour h of day d for unit};
cooling degree-days at the cooling base temperature •q for unit}, on day d,
hour h based on daily average temperature;
cooling degree-days at the cooling base temperature •Vi for unit}, on day d,
hour h based on daily average temperature, where • c; <•Vi< DAT;

&Jdh

regression residual;

a1h, /3CJh,/3Vih = coefficients determined by the regression; and,
•c;, •Vi

cooling base temperatures determined by choice of optimal regression

The degree day variables are calculated as:

= max(Td -Tq ), O)
Vd(Tv; ) = max(Td -Tv;),O)

(6.3.2)

CATq)

Tdis the daily average temperature, calculated as the mean of the daily minimum and daily
maximum temperatures for day d. As indicated above, because of thermal lags in the
house, this form of daily temperature tends to be a better predictor of cooling demand
than the current hourly temperature, or an average for particular hours of the day.
The model is fit separately for each participating air conditioner across a range of cooling
degree day base temperatures. As discussed above, the ideal cooling base temperature is
the minimum ambient temperature at which air conditioning use begins and below which
there tends to be no demand for electricity for cooling. It is important to note that this
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model uses two cooling degree-day variables. Originally, the model only had one cooling
degree-day base temperature, '!q . However, this model specification systematically
underestimated the per-air conditioner demand reduction at extremely hot daily average
temperatures, specifically daily averages exceeding 85°F. It is likely that the underestimate
arises due to non-linearity of air conditioner use with respect to degree days. At low
degree days, few people might use air conditioning. As temperature rises, more people
use air conditioning and more energy is used per unit. For example, one could imagine
that more electricity would be used for cooling in one day with a daily average
temperature of 85°F than in 5 days at 69°F. While the model estimates indicate that
demand reductions level off at approximately 0.40 kW per air conditioner at 85°F, the
meter readings captured by the data loggers show that the average demand reduction at
88.5°F was 0.90 kW per air conditioner. Several explanations were considered, including
that the thermostats were overzealous in their control and this had a greater effect at
higher temperatures. Another explanation was that daily average temperatures this high
are rare and there simply are not many observations at this level, causing the model to
underestimate electricity demand at extremely high temperatures. This research
hypothesized that the relationship between electricity demand and daily average
temperature is not constant across the whole range of possible temperatures; that, in fact,
at a certain high temperature the rate at which the air conditioner draws electricity to keep
the home cool increases. Thus, raising the temperature setting would result in a bigger
demand reduction. The objective then was to determine whether a "breakpoint"
temperature truly existed, and if so, was the relationship between cooling demand and
temperature significantly different at temperatures beyond the breakpoint. This approach
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gave the model flexibility to estimate a different relationship between electricity demand
and temperature over moderate and extreme temperature ranges. Specifications that
allowed for more than two ranges were also tried, but resulted in statistically insignificant
coefficients.
The model is fit separately for each participating air conditioner across a range of cooling
degree day bases, allowing for the most accurate combination of cooling degree day base
temperatures for each customer. 'CJ. representing the minimum ambient temperature at
which cooling begins, ranged from 66°F to 84°F in increments of 2 degrees; 'VJ.
representing the "breakpoint" temperature, ranged from 78°F to 90°F, also in increments
of 2 degrees. The model was fit separately for each air conditioner across every
combination of ' CJ and ' VJ· Maximum likelihood was used to estimate the parameters and
estimates with the highest value for the likelihood function were selected26• Figures 6-7
and 6-8 show the distribution of selected cooling degree day base temperatures (tCJ and
'VJ ) across the sample of air conditioners. 70°F was the most frequently estimated cooling

degree day base temperature for ' CJ and 78°F and 90°F were the most frequently estimated
breakpoint temperatures.

Once the most appropriate cooling base and breakpoint temperatures are estimated for
each customer, ' CJ and ' VJ are used to calculate the two cooling degree day measures in
Equation (6-3-1 ). Suppose that a base temperature of 70°F and a breakpoint of 82°F was
the combination with the highest value for the likelihood function. If the daily average
temperature for one observation is 84°F (an extremely hot summer day), Clrq) would be
26

The Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) was used to compare the competing models. The AIC is
computed as
-21n(I} +2k where Lis the likelihood function and k is the number of free parameters.
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equal to 14 degree days and Vlrv) would be equal to 2 degree days. However, consider a
different customer for whom the most appropriate cooling degree day base temperature
is also 70°F, but the best breakpoint temperature is 86°F. In this case, if the daily average
temperature for one observation is 84°F, Clrc) is equal to 14 degree days but V JrvJ is
equal to zero.

4% 2%2%

$t 66 ir 68 :,' 70 •72 'l 74 m16 1!11)78 0 80 * 82 lil84

(degrees Fahrenheit)

Figure 6-7. Cooling degree day base temperature, tci
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Figure 6-8. Cooling degree day "breakpoint" temperature, 'tvi

The model was also estimated with no breakpoint temperature parameters. The log
likelihood ratio of the model specification with the breakpoints is compared to that with
no breakpoints and the specification with the highest value for the likelihood function is
chosen.

6.4.2 Estimate the parameters of the demand relationship
The optimal model for each participating air conditioner includes a set of estimated
parameters. Depending on the optimal model chosen, the model may or may not include
"breakpoint" cooling parameters. The most common optimal model including both the
cooling base and breakpoint parameters is provided in E quation (6.3.3).
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A

Ldh

A

A

A

A

= a 1h+ /Jc1h Cd(TCJ) + f3v1h VArVJ)

(6.3.3)

Where the hat variables on the right hand side represent estimated parameters from the
/\

regressions and

L;hd

is the estimated demand for air conditioner i in hour h on day d.

The weather-based regression model estimates a base load as well as the cooling and
breakpoint parameters. Where air conditioner demand is the only dependent variable
being modeled, the expectation is that the base load is zero unless the air conditioner is a
heat pump, or there is some ongoing low-level demand load used by the condenser. In
instances where the model produced base load parameters that were, in aggregate,
negative, the base load parameters were set to zero.

The following tables report the range of results from estimating the model across all
participating air conditioners. Table 6-1 shows the range of estimates of cxih' the base load
parameter, across all hours of the day. Table 6-2 shows the range of estimates of ~Cih' the
coefficient on the cooling degree days from the base temperature, and Table 6-3 shows
the range of estimates of ~Vih> the coefficient on the c.ooling degree days from the
breakpoint temperature. Table 6-4 reports the range of goodness-of-fit statistics,
including R2 and adjusted R2 • The mean R2 is 0.58 and the mean adjusted R 2 is 0.56, both
with a standard deviation of 0.2. The maximum R2 across all the regressions is 0.92.

As discussed in Chapter 5, humidity and lagged temperature variables are sometimes used
as explanatory variables. Humidity was not used in this analysis because Stockton, CA is
notoriously dry and humidity does not play a significant role in driving cooling load.
Lagged temperature variables were not included because of the anticipated complexity
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that lagged values would add when forecasting cooling demand under various future
climate change scenarios.

Table 6-1. Estimated coefficient txih for hour hand air conditioner i.

Minimum

Maximum

Median

0.02

Standard
Deviation
0.08

-0.13

0.61

0.00

(Xi2am

0.01

0.08

-0.10

0.64

0.00

(Xi3am

0.01

0.07

-0.08

0.58

0.00

0.01

0.07

-0.16

0.58

0.00

(XiSam

0.01

0.06

-0.16

0.58

0.00

(Xi6am

0.01

0.06

-0.12

0.57

0.00

(Xi7am

0.01

0.07

-0.12

0.54

0.00

(Xi8am

0.02

0.08

-0.10

0.91

0.00

(Xi9am

0.02

0.10

-0.09

1.31

0.00

(Xi10am

0.01

0.08

-0.19

0.72

0.00

(Xi11am

0.01

0.07

-0.19

0.56

0.00

(Xi1 2pm

0.01

0.08

-0.27

0.58

0.00

(Xilpm

0.01

0.08

-0.22

0.63

0.00

(Xi2pm

0.02

0.10

-0.11

0.76

0.00

(Xi3pm

0.04

0.12

-0.18

1.02

0.01

(Xi4pm

0.06

0.14

-0.13

1.30

0.02

(XiSpm

0.09

0.17

-0.11

1.52

0.04

(Xi6pm

0.11

0.18

-0.10

1.45

0.06

(Xi7pm

0.11

0.15

-0.12

0.88

0.06

(Xi8pm

0.08

0.11

-0.07

0.72

0.05

(Xi9pm

0.05

0.11

-0.13

1.13

0.02

(Xi10pm

0.03

0.14

-0.26

1.25

0.00

(Xi11pm

0.02

0.09

-0.29

0.63

0.00

(Xi1 2am

0.01

0.08

-0.17

0.60

0.00

Coefficient
(Xi lam

(Xi4am

Mean
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As expected, the estimated coefficients are larger for the daily peak hours between 3pm
and 7pm and lower during the morning and night.

Table 6-2. Estimated coefficient ~Cih, for cooling degree day base temperature 'tci
for hour h and air conditioner i.
Coefficient

Mean

~Cilam
~Ci2am

0.03

~Ci3am
~Ci4am
~CiSam
~Ci6am
~Ci7am
~Ci8am
~Ci9am
~Ci10am
~Cillam
~Ci12pm
~Cilpm
~Ci2pm
~Ci3pm
~Ci4pm
~CiSpm
~Ci6pm
~Ci7pm
~Ci8pm
~Ci9pm
~Ci10pm
~Cil lpm
~Ci12am

Standard
Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

Median

0.02

0.05
0.04

-0.33
-0.31

0.27
0.28

0.01
0.00

0.01

0.04

-0.30

0.37

0.00

0.01

0.04

-0.31

0.41

0.00

0.01

0.06

-0.21

0.82

0.00

0.01

0.03

-0.12

0.45

0.00

0.01

0.02

-0.05

0.13

0.00

0.00

0.02

-0.09

0.21

0.00

0.00

0.02

-0.14

0.13

0.00

0.01

0.03

-0.23

0.33

0.00

0.02

0.04

-0.09

0.28

0.00

0.03

0.06

-0.09

0.48

0.01

0.04

0.06

-0.14

0.36

0.02

0.06

0.08

-0.15

0.68

0.04

0.09

0.11

-0.21

0.84

0.07

0.13

0.12

..:0.18

0.83

0.10

0.16

0.14

-0.22

1.02

0.14

0.18

0.13

-0.22

1.00

0.16

0.18

0.15

-0.77

0.83

0.17

0.15

0.13

-0.47

0.83

0.13

0.12

0.19

-0.59

2.45

0.10

0.09

0.18

-0.34

2.60

0.06

0.06

0.10

-0.11

0.92

0.03

0.04

0.08

-0.09

0.99

0.01
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similarly, Table 6-2 shows that the estimated coefficients are greater during the late
afternoon or evening hours when electricity use is highest and temperatures are likely to
be the highest of the day.

Table 6-3. Estimated coefficient ~Vih, for cooling degree day base temperature 'tvi
for hour h and air conditioner i.
Coefficient

Mean

Standard Minimum
Deviation

Maximum

Median

~Vi1am
~Vi2am

0.04
0.05

0.24
0.24

-0.79
-0.36

2.36
2.28

0.00
0.00

~Vi3am
~Vi4am
~ViSam
~Vi6am
~Vi7am
~Vi8am
~Vi9am
~Vi10am
~Vi11am
~Vi12pm
~Vi1pm
~Vi2pm
~Vi3pm
~Vi4pm
~ViSpm
~Vi6pm
~Vi7pm
~Vi8pm
~Vi9pm
~Vi10pm
~Vi11pm

0.04

0.20

-0.48

2.22

0.00

0.03

0.1 7

-0.25

2.24

0.00

0.02

0.16

-1.19

1.55

0.00

0.02

0.12

-0.41

1.03

0.00

0.02

0.12

-0.23

1.03

0.00

0.03

0.13

-0.31

1.22

0.00

0.05

0.36

-0.53

5.39

0.00

0.08

0.56

-0.47

8.43

0.00

0.10

0.48

-0.31

6.89

0.00

0.11

0.38

-0.50

4.29

0.00

0.14

0.37

-0.62

2.50

0.01

0.14

0.38

-1.11

2.76

0.03

0.11

0.40

-2.05

2.30

0.02

0.07

0.40

-2.12

2.88

0.00

0.05

0.51

-2.77

4.81

0.00

0.01

0.61

-6.84

4.39

0.00

-0.01

0.61

-5.09

4.59

0.00

0.04

0.50

-4.32

3.56

0.00

0.04

0.64

-4.96

2.82

0.00

0.09

0.61

-6.42

4.47

0.02

0.08

0.43

-2.40

3.32

0.00

0.06

0.29

-2.13

1.62

0.00

~Vi12am
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Table 6-4. Goodness-of-Fit Statistics

- Coefficient

Mean

Standard
Deviation

I

N

Minimum

Maximum

Median

0.56

0.20

284

-0.01

0.92

0.57

0.78

1.67

284

0.00

13.76

0.31

L~Ci1am-~Ci24am

1.44

0.97

284

0.00

5.53

1.22

L~Vi1am-~Vi24am

1.43

2.89

262

0.00

27.45

0.47

71.89

4.52

284

66

84

70

77.47

22.95

284

0.00

90

82

2

Adj. R

LCXi1am-O\z4am

'tCj
'tv;

Figures 6-9 (a), (b), and (c) illustrate the results of the regression for three different air
conditioners. In each plot, the blue circles represent air conditioners' estimated electricity
demand over a range of daily average temperatures from 65°F to 80°F. In other words,
/\

the blue circles are the

L Jdh

from Equation (6-3-3). The red stars are the observations of

electricity demand over this range of temperatures, as recorded by the data loggers. This
is the actual metered electricity consumption.
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Figure 6-9. Estimated electricity demand vs. observed electricity demand for three
participating air conditioners

6.4.3 Calculating Peak Demand Reductions on "Curtailment D ays"
Having established each customer's baseline demand for air conditioning over a range of
daily average temperatures, the next step in the analysis is to calculate the peak demand
reduction from each air conditioner when the thermostat temperature setting is raised.

The SmartAC program included 15 curtailment events during the summer of 2007. Of
those, two were conducted for the entire program population and the remainder of the
events were conducted for the sample only. T he two population events occurred under
relatively mild conditions but several of the sample-only events occurred on the hottest
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days of the summer. Table 6-5 lists the curtailment events that summer, in order of
observed descending daily average temperature. The start time is the beginning of the
peak period when the thermostats' temperature settings were raised and the end time is
when utility intervention ceased.
Accounting for "Steep" Re-set vs. "Gradual" Re-set

As mentioned in Chapter 3, the utility wanted to experiment with two different
thermostat re-set strategies: a "steep" ramp and a "gradual" ramp. To test the impact of
the alternative re-set strategies, the sample group was divided into groups A and B and
the curtailment days alternated between "A" days and "B" days. On "A" days, group A
was subject to the steep ramp (raising the temperature setting by 1 degree Fahrenheit per
hour for four hours) and group B was subject to the gradual ramp (raising the
temperature setting by 1 degree Fahrenheit at the beginning of the first, third, and fifth
hours). On "B" days, group B was subject to the steep ramp and group A was subject to
the gradual ramp. This experimental design was used because it helps isolate the impact
of the ramping strategy from the effect of factors other than temperature. For example,
suppose that customers are more likely to override the utility re-set on Wednesdays than
on Fridays, but this is not known a priori. If the entire sample was subject to the steep
ramp on Wednesday and the gradual ramp on Friday, incorrect conclusions might be
reached based on observed behavior. By measuring the difference between the two
different thermostat re-set strategies, the analysis will produce estimates of demand
reduction for both strategies as well as overall. Table 6-5 indicates which curtailment days
are "A" days and which are "B" days. On the two curtailment days that involved the
entire participating population, only the steep ramping strategy was used.
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Table 6-5. Curtailment event days in descending order of observed daily average
temperature, 2007

8/30/2007

87.5

3pm

7pm

A

8/28/2007

84.5

3pm

7pm

B

8/21/2007

83.5

2pm

7pm

B

8/22/2007

83.5

2pm

7pm

A

7/23/2007

81.5

l2pm

4pm

B

8/ 10/2007

78.5

2pm

6pm

A

8/1/2007

77.5

2pm

6pm

A

7i27/2007

76.5

2pm

6pm

B

7/26/2007

75

2pm

6pm

A

8/9/2007

75

2pm

6pm

B

9/10/2007

74.5

4pm

7pm

A

9/26/2007

74.5

2pm

7pm

All

7/17/2007

73

12pm

5pm

A

7/12/2007

71.5

2:30pm

6pm

All

Peak D emand Savings E quation
The per-air conditioner reduction is calculated per Equation (6.3.4).

(6.3.4)

/\

Sihd

=L

hd - Lhd

where
sihd

is the peak demand reduction (savings) on day d, during hour h, for unit i ;

/\

L ;hd

is estimated energy demand on day d , during hour h, for unit i; and,

Lhd

is observed energy demand on day d , during hour h, for unit i.
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Adjusting for Day-Specific Events
The weather-based regression model estimates a basic, customer-specific estimate of
program savings. However, these estimates need to be taken a step further to address
systematic day-specific effects that may bias these estimates. Day-specific effects could
include wind, humidity, and cloud-cover that are out of the normal range. There are two
ways to adjust the basic model estimates for systematic, day-specific effects. One adjusts
each customer's estimated demand based on observed demand prior to the event. The
other uses a comparison group, leaving half of the sample uncontrolled during each
event.
Without using a comparison group, the simplest adjustment approach shifts or scales the
provisional baseline to align it with the actual conditions of the curtailment day.
Effectively, the regression model provides a temperature-specific load shape for the
customer and the adjustment shifts the modeled load shape up or down so that it
matches the observed customer load during an earlier time interval on the day of the
event. This approach maximizes the accuracy of the event savings estimate.

Here, the provisional baseline is adjusted to better reflect the customer's demand during
the two hours prior to the curtailment event. The adjustment factor is calculated per
Equation (6.3.5).

(6.3.5)
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Where A1 is the adjustment factor, Pis the two-hour period immediately prior to the reset, and nhis the number of 15 minute intervals in period P.
The adjusted baseline estimate is calculated as follows:

(6.3.6)

Where S ~ and S ',11 are the adjusted savings estimates. Compared to the comparison group
approach, this adjustment method provides a larger sample size of re-set air conditioners,
and corresponding smaller standard error. However, this method does not reflect
systematic effects that only occur during the curtailment period. Additionally, if the re-set
affects pre-curtailment usage (for example, pre-cooling in anticipation of a likely
curtailment period later in the day), the adjustment can introduce other error into the
estimate. The adjustment approach assumes that, on average, the two hours prior to the
re-set period are representative of the demand during the re-set period. It also assumes
that the adjustment should be applied additively to the intervals of the curtailment period,
rather than multiplicatively as a proportion. This is a standard approach for estimating
customers' baselines and is generally considered to be simpler and less prone to scaling
errors than a scalar approach.

Illustration of Peak Demand Savings
Figures 6-11 (a), (b), and (c) show the observed electricity demand, estimated demand,
and adjusted estimated demand on the three hottest curtailment days for one participating
128

air conditioner. The unadjusted savings can be interpreted as the area between the red
line and the blue line, while the adjusted savings can be interpreted as the area between
the orange line and the blue line.
As discussed above, the regression model estimated electricity demand on an hourly basis.
The meter data, however, was available on a quarter-hour basis. The demand reduction
for each quarter-hour interval was calculated analogously to the hourly equations
indicated above. For the quarter-hour estimates, the demand in each time increment was
estimated using the regression coefficients for the hour that included that increment.

The first half-hour of each curtailment event was not included in the savings calculation
because the participating air conditioners are re-set randomly throughout the first halfhour. However, the demand reductions are calculated through the official end of each
curtailment event. There is the possibility of "snap-back" following the peak period.
"Snap-back" refers to higher-than-normal electricity consumption as the air conditioner
tries to cool the room back down to its regular temperature setting. The impact of snapback on electricity demand is not included in this analysis.
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Figure 6-10. Estimated versus Observed Electricity Demand
Results

Demand savings are estimated using the difference between site-level estimated demand
and actual consumption. On mild days when there is _little cooling there may be
effectively no savings. In these cases, the per-air conditioner savings represents the model
error relative to observed demand. When this is the case, small negative savings results
are possible. Table 6-6 provides demand reduction estimates per participating air
conditioner, in order of observed descending daily average temperature. The estimated
demand reduction on the hottest curtailment day of the summer generated an average of
0.69 kW of energy savings per participating air conditioner. With repetition, in 95% of
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cases, the average demand reduction per-air conditioner will fall between the upper and
lower confidence interval bounds

Table 6-6. Average air conditioner demand reduction per curtailment day, 2007.

8/30/2007
8/2112007
8/28/2007
8/22/2007
7/23/2007
8/ 10/2007
8/1/2007
7/27/2007
7/26/2007
8/9/2007
9/10!2007
9/26/2007
7/17/2007
7/ 12/2007

87.5
86.5
84.5
83.5
81.5
78.5
77.5
76.5
75

75
74.5
74.5
73
71.5

5
5
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
3
5
3.5
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0.15
0.02
0.06
-0.15
-0.14
-0.10
-0.10
0.00
0.09
-0.08
-0.07

0.72
0.44
0.20
0.10
0.18
0.04
0.09
-0.13
-0.11
-0.08
-0.08
0.02
0.11
-0.06
-0.06

0.37
0.15
0.05
0.12
-0.01
0.04
-0.18
-0.16
-0.12
-0.11
-0.02
0.08
-0.09
-0.08

Table 6-7 provides the hourly savings estimates on the three hottest curtailment days of
the summer. As expected, the largest demand reduction occurred between 6pm and 7pm
on August 31, the last day of an extended heat wave. Savings reported at this time average
1.38 kW. Figure 6-11 shows the increase in savings across the days and the trend of
savings across the hours on each of the three curtailment days. August 29th, the day of the
system peak, had a daily average temperature of 89°F. The maximum temperature for that
day was 103°F, between 4pm and 6pm. Air conditioner use and measured savings
generally increase as heat waves extend to multiple days. This is clearly the case for this
four day period. This trend would point to a system peak reduction estimate falling
between the estimates of the 281h and the 30th.

Table 6-7. Average savings at system peak, August 2007
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1.40

3pm

4pm

5pm

6pm

7pm

.....,_8/3112007 -li-8/30}2007 ........ 8/28/2007

Figure 6-11. Trends in Average Savings at System Peak, August 2007

Comparing Peak Demand Savings: "Steep" Re-set vs. "Gradual" Re-set

As mentioned above, the analysis also looked at the effectiveness of the two different reset strategies. Participants were randomly assigned to two groups, and remained in the
same group throughout the summer. The two thermostat control strategies were applied
to the two groups alternately in order to control for µifferences in the subgroups. Table
6-8 provides the results for the tWo re-set strategies during the three hottest curtailment
days. As expected, the steep strategy generates more savings at the beginning of the
curtailment period, while the gradual strategy generates more savings towards the end of
the curtailment. Figure 6-12 also focuses on the hourly savings for the different re-set
strategies.
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Table 6-8. Comparing demand reductions from steep and gradual re-set strategies
during system peak, August 2007
Date

8/31/2007

Daily
Average
Temperature

Hour

88.5

3...E_m
4Q_m
5...E_m
<1:>_m
~m

8/ 30/ 3007

87.5

4Qm
~m

<1:>_m
~m

8/29/ 2007

84.5

~m

5..E_m
6..E_m
7..E_m

Ste~ Re-set

0.09
0.09
0.11
0.11
0.12

Gradual Re-set Strategy
Standard
Average
E rror
Demand
Reduction
0.32
0.08
0.57
0.09
0.77
0.11
1.21
0.12
1.18
0.11

0.05
0.31
0.69
0.44

0.05
0.07
0.11
0.12

-0.08
0.24
0.83
0.90

0.05
0.09
0.15
0.14

0.25
0.24
0.34
0.26

0.08
0.09
0.10
0.09

0.15
0.20
0.44
0.37

0.07
0.08
0.10
0.11

Average
Demand
Reduction
0.44
0.69
0.88
0.89
1.08
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Strat<:gy_
Standard
Error

1.60

~

1.20
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Figure 6-12. Comparison of hourly savings from steep and gradual re-set strategies
during system peak, August 2007

Part II. Forecasting Peak Demand Reductions 2010-2100
Part II of this chapter forecasts the potential reductions in peak demand in California
under different climate change scenarios. The forecasts in this section are based on the
demand relationship developed in Section 6.4.1 and projections from different global
climate models. As mentioned in the introduction, Part II concludes that programs like
SmartAC have a smaller impact on peak demand at extremely hot daily average
temperatures. This means that this type of direct control program will reduce peak
demand more effectively if the impact of climate change on daily average temperatures is
moderate. Likewise, Part II concludes that this type of program may reduce peak demand
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more effectively in regions of the country with moderate temperatures and low humidity,
such as northem California and the Pacific Northwest.

6.5 Electricity Demand and Peak Demand Reductions under Future Climate
Change Scenarios
California's electric power system is confronting several technical and regulatory
challenges. Electricity demand is growing at a rate exceeding that at which new supplies
are being added to the system. Transmission constraints are becoming increasingly costly.
And, following the electricity crisis of 2000 and 2001, the state's move toward
deregulation was suspended and there is no consensus on the appropriate path forward.
These issues are being faced in the context of an effort to increase the share of renewable
sources in the electricity system- the renewable portfolio standard. And these challenges
are magnified by the need to address the potential consequences of climate change.
Developing strategies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions has, in recent years, emerged as
a major public policy issue in California.

California is unique in its emphasis on demand-side policies and programs to meet the
state's energy challenges. Thus, California is preparing for the potential effects of climate
change on the operation of the state's power system, on both the demand and the supply
sides. This is also one of the most difficult areas for research and policy planning,
inasmuch as it involves the future interactions among the climatic system, a highly
complex engineered electrical system, socio-economic trends and human behavior, all of
which are difficult to predict. The objective of the analysis in following sections is to
forecast the potential contribution of air conditioner control programs to reducing peak
demand in a future characterized by rising temperatures and climate change.
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This analysis uses recent projections of regional climate change affecting California to
generate simple illustrative estimates of possible peak demand savings from residential air
conditioner control programs. The analysis is carried out in several steps. First, climate
change projections are used to generate a collection of possible climatic futures for the
Stockton area of California. These future scenarios are based on assumptions of different
levels of greenhouse gas emissions, and thus, different levels of future warming. Next, the
weather-based regression model described earlier is used to forecast customers' baseline
electricity demand for air conditioning under the future climate scenarios. The last part of
the analysis estimates the magnitude of the peak demand reduction and total cost savings
possible under different rates of program participation in San Joaquin County.

6.5.1 California Climate Change Scenarios Project
In May 2005, the California Energy Commission and the California Environmental

Protection Agency commissioned a report describing the potential impacts of climate
change on key state resources. The Scenarios Project was conceived of early in summer
2005 out of discussions among State administrators and scientists from various California
universities, federal and state agencies, and non-governmental organizations. The purpose
of the project was to develop a collection of potential climate scenarios, targeted
regionally on California. These scenarios are not intended to provide forecasts, but rather
are meant to explore a range of possible futures of California climate. The Scenarios
Project was directed by a team of state government staff and non-governmental scientists,
including those from the California Climate Change Center, an effort engaged to study
long-term climate issues in California. The Project builds upon previous efforts to assess
potential climate change impacts in California. In particular, it extends the work of
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Hayhoe et al. (2004), which compared the projected impact of climate change in
California under differing emissions scenarios.
The climate projections for the Scenarios Projects are from three global climate models
for three greenhouse gas emissions scenarios. The climate models chosen were among
those that were prepared and evaluated by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC). The three global climate models (GCMs) chosen were: the Parallel
Climate Model (PCM), the NOAA Geophysical Fluid Dynamic Laboratory (GFDL), and
the UK Hadley Center HadCM3 model. The choice of models was based on several
factors, including the ability of produce a realistic simulation of California's recent climate
history- particularly the distribution of monthly temperatures and seasonal cycle of
precipitation. The selection of models was also designed to include models with differing
levels of sensitivity to increases in greenhouse gas emissions27 • The GFDL model is a
medium climate sensitivity model and the PCM model has relatively low climate
sensitivity.
The scenarios were developed based on three levels of greenhouse gas emissions
described in the IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios. The "A2" emissions
scenario assumes that greenhouse gas emissions continue to climb throughout the
century, reaching almost 30 gigatons (Gt/year) per year. In this scenario, C02
concentrations reach more than triple their pre-industrial levels by the end of the twentyfirst century. The "B1" scenario is assumes that global C02 emissions peak at

27

"Sensitivity" refers to the models' predictions of the change in mean global surface temperature
from a doubling of atmospheric C0 2 concentration above the pre-industrial level. The sensitivity of the
PCM is approximately 3.2°F, the GFDL's sensitivity is approximately 5.4°F, and HadCM3's sensitivity is
approximately 5.9°F. The IPCC has stated that the likely range for this quantity is 2.7 to 8.1°F.
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approximately 1 Gt/year in the mid-twenty-first century before dropping below current
levels by 2100. This yields a doubling of C02 concentrations relative to its pre-industrial
level by the end of the century, followed by a leveling of the concentrations. The third
scenario was used in conjunction with the HadCM3 model; "A1Fi" has high emissions
until about 2080, when they finally level off by the end of the century. The A1Fi
emissions result in C02 concentrations that reach about 950 parts per million (ppm) in
2100.
The GCMs chosen for the Scenarios Projects were selected because they accurately
reflect California's recent climate history. But, GCMs generally forecast climate for large
regions, such as all of North America or perhaps the western U.S. The researchers at the
Scenarios Project had to "downscale" the GCMs to reflect the impacts of climate change
on the local level in California. There are different methods of downscaling- that is,
taking the large-scale signal from the GCM and translating it to the local scale. The
Scenarios Project used a statistical bias correction technique and downscaling technique
originally developed by Wood et al. (2002) for using global model forecast output for
long-range stream flow forecasting. This is an empirlcal technique that maps precipitation
and temperature during a historical period from the GCM to the concurrent historical
record. To do so, the Scenarios Project used a gridded National Climatic Data Center
Cooperative Observer station data set. This data set, developed at a spatial scale of 1/8°
(approximately 7 miles (12 km)), was aggregated to a 2° latitude-longitude spatial
resolution (approximately 137mi x 137 mi. (220 km x 220 km)).
Downscaling the GCMs showed potential warming that can be grouped into three
ranges- a lower warming range (3 to 5.4°F), a medium warming range (5.5 to7.9°F) , and a
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higher warming range (8 to 10.4°F). The Scenarios Project did not attach probabilities to
any of these outcomes. If greenhouse gas emissions trends follow the higher emissions
scenarios (Al Fi or A2), California can expect substantial impacts on its economy,
ecosystems, and the health of its citizens. However, if global emissions follow the lower
emissions trend (Bl), temperatures would likely not rise above the lower warming range
and many of the most severe impacts could be avoided. However, if the actual climate
sensitivity to greenhouse gas emissions reaches the level of the more sensitive GCM
models used, an even lower emissions path than the B 1 scenario may be required to avoid
the medium and higher warming ranges.

141

6.5.2 Weather Generator Simulations
Using climatic scenarios supplied by the California Climate Change Center28, new
projections of possible climatic futures were generated using a computer program called
ClimGen. The data from the California Climate Change Center can be described as
downscaled, constructed analogues data. There are six climatic scenarios specific to a 12
km square grid centered on Stockton, CA (37.9375N, 121.1875 W). There are two
scenarios for the PCM and GFDL models described above- one for the A2 emissions
scenario and one for the B 1 emissions scenario. Each scenario includes a projection of
daily minimum temperature, maximum temperature, precipitation, and wind speed from
January 1, 1950 through December 31, 2100, including leap years.
The California climatic scenarios were used as a basis to generate new climatic projections
for each GCM/ emissions scenario combination using ClimGen. ClllnGen is a weather
generator- it is a computer program that uses existing weather records to produce long
series of synthetic daily climatic data. The statistical properties of the generated data are
expected to be similar to those of the actual data. Several computer programs have been
developed that are capable of producing stochastically generated weather data from
existing daily data. Examples include WGEN (Richardson and Wright, 1984), CLIGEN
(Arnold and Elliot, 1996), CLIMAK (Danuso et al., 1997), and ClimGen (Stockle et al,
1998). The general principles of ClimGen are similar to WGEN, the first and most widely
used weather generator, but with significant modifications and additions. Given the

28

The constructed analogues data was developed by Dan Cayan, Hugo Hidalgo, Tapash Das, Mike
Dettinger, and Mary Tyree from the University of California-San Diego. Permission to use this data was
granted by Dan Cayan, Scripps Institution of Oceanography at the University of California-San Diego.
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appropriate data, ClimGen generates precipitation, daily maximum and minimum
temperature, solar radiation, air humidity, and wind speed.
For each GCM/ emissions scenario combination, ClimGen was used to stochastically
generate 300 weather scenarios based on the original California downscaled data. Each
scenario includes 365 (366 for leap years) daily projections for minimum and maximum
temperature. The daily projections for minimum and maximum temperature were
averaged over all of the ClimGen-generated scenarios, yielding one scenario for each
GCM/ emissions combination. Thus, each of the final 6 scenarios includes daily minimum
and maximum temperature from January 1, 2010 to December 31, 2100.
The figures below illustrate the climate impacts projected by the PCM and GPDL model
simulations. Due to differences in the two models' parameterizations, sensitivities, and
responses to atmospheric greenhouse gas levels, there are substantial differences between
the projections by the two models. As mentioned above, PCM has relatively low
sensitivity of regional temperature to greenhouse gas levels and the GPDL model has a
relatively high sensitivity. Northern California temperature warms significantly between
2010 and 2100, with mean temperature increases ranging from 2.5°P in the lower
emissions B1 scenario within the less responsive PCM model to 8.14°P in the higher
emissions A2 scenario within the more responsive GPDL model (see Table 6-9 and
Figures 6-12 and 6-13). Temperature changes occur rather steadily through the century,
with annual temperature increases in Northern California reaching 0.33 °P and 0.68°P,
respectively in the PCM Bl and GPDL A2 scenarios as an average over 2010 to 2050.
While the warming slows under the PCM B 1scenario to 0.3 °P during the latter half of the
century, under the GPDL A2 scenario it increases to 1.35 °P annually.
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Measuring cooling degree days helps to put this warming into perspective (see Figure 614). Using a daily average temperature of 65 °F as the cooling base temperature, the
number of annual cooling degree days was calculated for 2010 to 2100. Under the PCM
Bl scenario, between 2010 and 2019 there are projected to be about 1,261 cooling degree
days in the Stockton area. By the middle of the century this number rises to 1,495, and by
2100 the region will experience about 1,642 cooling degree days. This is roughly
equivalent to moving from Stockton to Fresno, CA or from Newark, NJ to Nashville,
TN. Under the GFDL A2 scenario, cooling degrees days increase from 1,526 in the early
part of the century to 1,959 by mid-century, and to 2,798 cooling degree days by 2100.
This warming is roughly equivalent to a move from Raleigh, NC to New Orleans, LA29•
To put this in perspective, peak electricity demand at 68°F in N orthem California is
roughly 26,000 MW. At 86°F, or 18 cooling degree days, peak electricity demand in
Northern California climbs to 37,000 MW (Barnett et al.).
In both models, beyond the first three decades of the century warming is greater under
the higher emission A2 scenario than under the lower emission B1 scenario. The warming
during the century is approximately linear in each sunulation, although there are
substantial year to year variations in temperature. Three of the simulations (all except
PCM Bl) yield more warming in the summer than in the winter. July daily average
temperatures rise from 76.3 °F to 78.8°F (+ 2.5 °F) and from 77.4 °F to 85.6°F (+8.2 °F),
in the PCM Bl and GFDL A2 scenarios, respectively. January daily average temperatures

rise from 48.0 °F to 49.4 °F (+1.4 °F) and from 46.6 °F to 53.8 °F (+7.2 °F), in the PCM Bl
29

Annual cooling degree days: Newark, NJ: 1,220; Raleigh, NC: 1,521; Nashville, TN: 1,652; New
Orleans, LA: 2,773
From the National Climatic Data Center, NOAA. Available from
http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oafclimate/on Ii ne/ccd/n rmcdd. txt
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and GFDL A2 scenarios, respectively. Recent research indicates that the accentuation of
summer warming is common to all continental areas and may be affected by earlier and
greater drying of continental land surfaces. If the projected summer amplification of
warming occurs, it has important implications for impacts such as the occurrence of heat
waves, energy demand, and peak electricity demand.

In the 30 years from 2010 to 2040, warming- even under the lower emissions scenario B 1

ranges from 0.7°F in summer and to as great as 2.2 °F in the GFDL Al scenario. Already,
this near-term warming is sufficient to increase substantially the number of warm days in
summer, effectively eliminating summers that fall into the cool third of the temperature
distribution in the GFDL projections. The occurrence of extremely warm daily average
temperatures, exceeding the 95th percentile of their historical distributions, tallied for the
PCM and GFDL Bl and A2 simulations (see Figure 6-15), increases by 3 to 500 times
from 2010 to 2100. Again, the projected increase in extremely hot days has important
implications for the impact on peak electricity demand and the role of demand
management strategies since air conditioning use tends to increase on extremely hot days.
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Table 6-9. Daily average July temperatures, Al and B2 emissions scenarios
Daily Average July Temperatures
(degrees Fahrenheit)
PCM

GFDL

High
Emissions

Low
Emissions

High
Emissions

Low
Emissions

2010-2019

76.42

76.32

77.47

77.61

2020-2029

77.04

77.34

78.20

77.45

2030-2039

77.80

77.15

79.53

79.48

2040-2049

78.87

77.34

79.68

78.41

2050-2059

79.00

78.65

80.21

78.30

2060-2069

79.21

77.97

81.01

79.37

2070-2079

80.73

78.64

82.61

78.08

2080-2089

81.29

79.59

83.55

79.23

2090-2100

81.61

78.86

85.62

80.12
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Figure 6-13. Daily average temperature, 2010-2100, PCM
Figures 6-13 (a) and (b) above show the rise in summertime daily average temperatures
between 2010 and 2100 as predicted by the P CM model. If GHG emissions are low, daily
average July temperatures are predicted to rise too just over 78°F, while if GHG
emissions are high those temperatures could rise to almost 82°F.
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Figure 6-14. Daily average maximum temperature, 2010-2100, PCM

Figures 6-14 (a) and (b) above show the rise in summertime daily maximum temperatures
between 2010 and 2100 as predicted by the PCM model. If GHG emissions are low,
tnaximum daily temperatures in July will be about 96°F, and if GHG emissions are high
tnaximum daily temperatures will be about 98°F.
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Figure 6-15. Daily average temperature 2010-2100, GFDL

Figures 6-15 (a) and (b) above show the rise in summertime daily average temperatures
between 2010 and 2100 as predicted by the GFDL model. If GHG emissions are low,
average daily temperatures in July will be about 80°F, and if GHG emissions are high
average daily temperatures will be about 86°F.

149

1

~

e ·~
e=.c~
.c
"'

·c.'IS

c.'IS

c.'IS

Q,>

100

~

:t ~
:., ~
"' "'
<~ .e

-·;

.....

Q

95

I
l

"-I

90

c.'IS

"'c.
e

I

Q,>

Q,>

85

Fo-

80

........T'......................T .................................

2020

2030

2040

-+-June ..... July

............T ........................,_....................,.....•._ .......'T...................... , .......

2050

2060

-i*:-August

2070

2080

2090

2099

~September

l

!.......................................... ·······················-··········..··············-························"···· ·············-·····························-·······-··-·································-·······-·-·-············-·······························

a. Low emissions scenario

~

e= .c
·~
e~
.c
"'

·~
c.'IS

c.'IS

:t

~

c.'IS

Q,>

100
95

~~

"' .e"'
Q,>

~

-·; "'e
.....

Q

90

c.'IS

Q,>

c.
Q,>

85

Fo-

2020

2030

2040

-+-June ..... July

2050

2060

-i*:-August

2070

2080

2090

2099

~September

b. High emissions scenario
Figure 6-16. Daily average maximum temperature 2010-2100, GFDL
Figures 6-16 (a) and (b) above show the rise in summertime daily maximum temperatures
between 2010 and 2100 as predicted by the GFDL model. If GHG emissions are low,
average maximum temperatures in July will be about 95°F, and if GHG emissions are
·
high average daily temperatures will be about 103°F.

150

/I

Ell High Emissions

lEJ Low Emissions
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Figure 6-17. Annual cooling degree days based on 65°F cooling base temperature
Figures 6-17 (a) and (b) illustrate the increase in the number of cooling degree days (from
a 65°F base temperature) predicted to occur in the Stockton area by the PCM and GFDL
models.
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Figure 6-18. Daily extreme (95th percentile) temperature occurrences

Figures 6-18 (a) and (b) illustrate the number of days in each decade where the daily
average temperature reaches 83.1°F. The graphs illustrate that those extremely hot days
will remain relatively rare until the very end of the century as predicted by the PCM
model, but will become increasingly frequent under the GFDL model, approaching more
than 600 days in the last decade of the century.
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6.6 Forecasting Electricity Demand for Air Conditioning
One of the purposes of this evaluation is to establish predicted per-air conditioner
electricity demand across a range of climate change temperature scenarios for the
Stockton area of California, assuming static air conditioning technology. These per-unit
projections multiplied by the population provide estimates of future electricity demand
for cooling. The analysis presented in this section provides illustrations of forecasted
electricity demand and shows how air conditioner re-set programs can reduce peak
demand in the future.
Forecasting electricity demand requires a model that relates changes in electricity demand
to changes in the exogenous variables that drive demand. Several issues are unique to
forecasting electricity demand in a future characterized by climate change. First, the
analysis requires developing estimates for values of key drivers that are outside the
boundaries of historical experience. For example, in the future California will experience
extremely hot days with daily average temperatures that have not occurred in the past. In
this range, the relationship betwe~n electricity demand and daily average temperature may
differ from the relationship that exists within a narrower range of temperatures. Second,
ex ante estimates are subject not only to the uncertainty associated with ex post estimates,
but also to the additional uncertainty associated with exogenous factors that drive
demand, such as uncertainty in weather, customer characteristics, etc. Lastly, customer
education and technological innovation might impact the effectiveness of air conditioner
re-set programs.
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Forecasting electricity demand under various climate change scenarios presents certain
challenges, as the functional relationship between electricity demand and temperature
may differ under extreme conditions from what it is under historical conditions. For
example, the relationship between the change in energy use associated with air
conditioning and a change in temperature is reasonably linear over some range of
temperatures, but highly non-linear at both the low and high end of the temperature
range. A change in temperature from, say, 65 to 70 degrees will produce very little, if any,
change in energy use because air conditioning typically is not running at either of those
temperatures. Similarly, a change in temperature from 100 to 105 degrees may produce
little change in air conditioning energy use if most air conditioners are already running flat
out at 100 degrees30 , so higher temperatures do not increase energy use. For the same
reasons, air conditioner re-set programs might not be effective at those temperatures,
regardless of the magnitude of the incentive provided, since thermostat adjustments at
these extremes will have little impact on energy use

With forecasting, it is important to consider not only the degree of uncertainty associated
with the ex post estimation parameters, which is largely tied to the accuracy and statistical
precision of model parameters, but also the uncertainty associated with the drivers that
underlie the forecasts. Everything is uncertain in the future, and providing point estimates
based on specific value for key variables can significantly overstate the true confidence
that underlies the estimates.

30

The threshold temperature above which most or all air conditioners will be running will vary
depending on the typical unit sizing practices for a location. It may be that many air conditioners will
still be cycling above 100 degrees in some locations but most will be on in other locations.
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Incorporating uncertainty into forecasts of electricity demand is straightforward using
Monte Carlo simulation methods or similar approaches. With Monte Carlo analysis, each
variable that drives demand can be represented by a probability distribution defined by an
explicit set of characteristics. Correlations among exogenous variables can also be
accommodated. The researcher draws a value from each input distribution and predicts
the demand associated with that set of input values. This process is repeated many times
(1,000 draws from each distribution is relatively common) in order to simulate the
distribution of impact estimates that reflects the uncertainty associated with the
exogenous variables as well as the model parameters.

6.6.1 Steps for defining uncertainty of forecast estimates
Since the parameters of the demand relationship are estimated, they are random variables,
and the resulting estimate of electricity demand is still a random variable. Researchers are
often interested in making inferences or constructing confidence intervals, but realistically
wish to incorporate the uncertainty relating to the parameters in to the confidence
intervals. However, demand is a non-linear function of the parameters, and depending on
the relationship specified, may have different or unknown distributions. In this case, the
best approach is to simulate the confidence intervals. This can be done using the KrinskyRobb procedure. Krinsky and Robb (1986) caution that researchers should be wary of
using linear approximations to get estimates of elasticities that are non-linear functions of
random variables. Instead, Krinsky and Robb suggest a simulation approach to generate
confidence intervals when the parameters are treated as random variables (Haab &
McConnell, 2003;Jeanty, 2007; I. Krinsky & Robb, 1986b; I. Krinsky & Robb, 1990).
Because parameters are correlated, one cannot generate confidence intervals simply using
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independent random draws of each of the random parameters. Rather the simulation
must use the estimated variance-covariance matrix of the regression coefficients to
accurately estimate confidence intervals for the predicted value. The Krinsky-Robb
procedure involves the following steps:
1. Obtain the regression output, recording the parameters and their respective
standard errors;
~

2. Obtain the vector of parameter estimates , /3 ,and the variance-covariance matrix

V(/3).
'
3. Calculate the Cholesky decomposition, C, of the variance-covariance matrix such
that CC'= V(/3);
4. Randomly draw a vector x with k independent elements from the standard
normal distribution;
5. Calculate a new vector of parameter estimates Z such that Z

= /3 + C 'x;

6. Use the new vector Z to calculate the demand forecasts;
7. Repeat steps 4,5, and 6 N times to obtain an empirical distribution of demand;
8. Sort the N values of the demand function in ascending order and obtain a 95%
(90%) confidence interval around the mean by dropping the top and bottom
2.5% (5%) of the observations.

The following section describes the results of forecasting electricity demand under two
global climate change models and two emissions scenarios, following the method
described by the steps listed above.

6.6.2. Obtaining Regression Output from a Random Effects Model
Typically, electricity load analysis involves both a time series and a cross-sectional
dimension. This type of data is referred to by a variety of names, including panel data.
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Panel data is often referred to as "balanced" if the dataset includes observations on every
individual in every time period and "unbalanced" if the dataset involves different
numbers of individuals in each time periods. With this type of data, researchers are able
to account for a significant share of omitted variables, including those that are
unobservable or not recorded, leading to better specified, more robust regression models.

Panel data can control for omitted and sometimes unobserved factors that vary across
individuals but are fixed over time periods within the study and for factors that are fixed
for all customers but vary over time. For example, the square footage of the home, the
inches of insulation in the walls, or the temperature at which the resident likes to keep his
or her home (e.g. some prefer cooler temperatures in their home while others prefer to
keep it warmer) are examples of factors that might be constant for a particular individual
over time. Other factors might be constant over all individuals within a single time
period, such as available technology or economic conditions. Oftentimes, there is simply
an enormous number of relatively minor factors that vary across people that are difficult
to identify, and some of the factors might change for some households in some time
periods (e.g. household size), while others might not: Models for analyzing panel data
(ANOVA, ANCOVA, MANOVA, etc.) allow each individual to act as his own control
and account for the effects of the fixed, but unmeasured characteristics of each customer.

However, the ability to control for fixed effects comes at a price. By controlling for fixed
effects, these models cannot incorporate the impact of explanatory variables that are
time-invariant (e.g. air conditioner ownership) except through interactions with timevariant variable (e.g. temperature). In other words, a fixed effects model only controls for
the variation within the individual units; it does not control for the variation across
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individual units. Some researchers feel that the variation across individual units should be
treated in a fashion similar to the general ignorance represented by the error term, and
have accordingly proposed the random effects model. In the random effects model there
is an overall intercept and an error term with two components: B;1 + u; . The
traditional error term unique to each observation. The

U;

Bu is

the

is an error term representing an

effect for the l' cross sectional unit that varies across individuals but is constant for a
given individual over time.

The random effects model is appropriate if the data are drawing observations from a
large population and one wishes to draw inferences regarding other members of that
population. This is the case here; the air conditioner load data are drawn from a sample of
300 customers among hundreds of thousands of customers in the Stockton area and the
objective is to extend the forecast to the population.

The random effects model has a major drawback, however: it assumes that the random
error associated with each cross-section unit is uncorrelated with the other regressors,
something that is not likely to be the case. The result is bias in the coefficient estimates
from the random effects model. This may explain why the slope estimates from the fixed
and random effects models are often so different. As with any dataset that includes a
large number of time series observations, even trivial differences in results can be
statistically significant when in fact the different between the two models is very minimal.
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As a result, the magnitude of difference in results may be more important than
statistically significant results, i.e., is the magnitude of the difference meaningful31 •

The random effects model estimated here can be viewed as a two-way design with
covariates:
K

Lu= int; + LPcuC/rcJ + U;
1

1

i=l, ... ,N; t=l, .... ,T

(6.6.1)

k=I

Where N is the number of cross-sections, T is the length of the time series for each
cross-section, and K is the number of exogenous variables. Here, N is equal to 300- the
number of air conditioners in the sample. T varies across cross-sections because some
cross-sections have missing observations, but T is equal to about 3,050 time-series
observations for each cross-section (hourly load observations on non-holiday weekdays
between May 12, 2007 through October 31, 2007).

The hour-specific dummy variables that are included in Equation 6.4.1 are dropped from
Equation 6.6.1. This is because the objective of the latter model is to forecast what will
happen in the future as temperatures rise. If included, the hour-specific dummy variables
might capture some of the explanatory power that should be assigned to daily average
temperature. For example, if August 8, 2015 at 5pm is predicted to be exceptionally hot,
one would not want to capture that effect with a time-specific dummy, which says for
some unknown reason a lot of electricity will be used on August 8th at 5pm. Instead, one
31

Two additional topics that are particularly relevant when working with load data are autocorrelation
and heteroskedasticity. Having both cross-sectional and time-series dimensions, there are multiple
ways in which the errors can be related. Basic panel data methods generally assume: 1) no correlation
between the error terms of units in the same time period; 2) no correlation across units in different
time periods; 3) no auto-correlations within units over time; and 4) constant variances over time
within a unit (different variances across units are allowed).
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would want a model that explains electricity use by the fact that it was unusually hot at
that time. Excluding the time-specific dummy variables allows the temperature variable to
capture more of the explanatory power. Because the temperature variable interacts with
the hour of the day, they still capture the variation in electricity use across a 24 hour span.
The model specification depends on both the cross-section and the time-series to which
each observation belongs- this is called a model with two-way effects. The specifications
for the two-way model are

Where

&i1 is

a classical error term with zero mean and a homoscedastic covariance matrix.

In the two-way case,

= o-?;E(vy) = 0 for i * j and vi
E(e = 0, E(e = o-:; E(e es) = 0 fort* s and e
2

E(vJ = O,E(v J
2

1)

1)

1

1

is uncorrelated with

&u

for all i and t;

are uncorrelated with vi for all i and t.

Thus, the model is a variance components model, with the variance components

o-;, o-:, and o-: to be estimated. The estimation method is an estimated generalized least
squares (EGLS) procedure that involves estimating the variance components in the first
stage and using the estimated variance covariance matrix thus obtained to apply
generalized least squares (GLS) to the data.

Table 6-10 contains the estimated variances and Table 6-11 lists the estimated parameters
from the random effects model.
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Table 6-10. Random Effects Model: Variance Components

Table 6-11. Random Effects Model: Estimated Parameters

6.6.3. Krinsky & Robb Procedure for Confidence Intervals
Single individual measures of energy demand from Equation 6.6.1 depend on the
covariate matrix and the parameter vector (3. Since the parameters are estimated, they are
random variables and the resulting estimate of demand is still a random variable.
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Researchers are often interested in making inferences or constructing confidence intervals
about the measures of interest, but realistically wish to incorporate the uncertainty
relating to the parameters into the confidence intervals. However, in this case (and in
many others) demand is a non-linear function of the parameters. The general nature of
the problem is that one cannot derive the distribution of the forecasts analytically when
they are non-linear functions of random variables. Depending on the algebraic
formulation of demand as a function of the parameters, mean demand may have a variety
of different and unknown distributions. In this case, the best approach is to simulate the
confidence intervals. This can be done with the Krinsky and Robb procedure (Haab &
McConnell, 2003; I. Krinsky & Robb, 1986a) .

The Krinsky and Robb procedure for estimating the variance of a function of estimated
parameters relies on the asymptotic properties of the maximum likelihood parameter
estimates to simulate the asymptotic distribution of the derived demand function. By
repeatedly drawing from the asymptotic distribution of the parameter estimates, one can
construct a Monte Carlo simulated distribution of th.e estimate of energy demand. This
method was introduced to the economic literature in the context of calculating the
variance o f estimated elasticities by Krinsky and Robb (I. Krinsky & Robb, 1986a) .

The Krinsky-Robb procedure utilizes the asymptotic normal property of the maximum
likelihood parameter estimates, and the property of a normal distribution that every kdimensional normal distribution of N (µJ) is a linear transformation of k independent
N(0,1) normals. The Krinsky-Robb procedure is based on taking random draws from an
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N(0,1) distribution. Given the information on the asymptotic mean and variance of~' the
A

A

N(0,1) variates can be transformed to N(/J,V(/3)).
The Krinsky-Robb procedure was executed here by drawing 50032 observations on the
parameter vector

~

from the estimated multivariate normal distribution of the parameters.

At each draw, electricity demand was calculated, resulting in 500 draws from the empirical
distribution. The resulting draws can be used to calculate the sample average electricity
demand. By ranking the draws in ascending order, a 90% confidence interval around the
mean electricity demand is found by dropping the top and bottom 5% of observations.
The typical confidence interval constructed this way is not symmetric, reaffirming the
absence of normality for energy demand. The first step in carrying out the Krinsky-Robb
procedure is getting the N parameter vector draws from the multivariate normal
distribution.

Let

V(/J) represent the K x K estimated covariance matrix for the estimated parameter

vector

/3

of column dimension K. Let xk be a K-dimensional column vector of

independent draws from a standard normal density function. Finally, let C be the K x K
lower diagonal matrix square root of

V(/J) such that CC'= V(/J). The matrix C is

sometimes referred to as the Cholesky decomposition matrix. A single K-vector draw
from the estimated asymptotic distribution of the parameters

32

/Jdis:

N=SOO. In most cases, N is at least equal to 1,000. Due to computational constraints, however, N
was limited to 500.
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Calculating the measure of electricity demand at each draw produces N observations
from the asymptotic distribution of the demand function.

6.7 Results
6.7.1 Range of Per-Unit Electricity Demand Over Time
The Krinsky-Robb procedure was used to forecast average electricity demand per air
conditioner across 4 future climate scenarios. As described earlier, the possible climate
futures were generated from the GFDL and PCM global climate models under high and
low emissions rates of greenhouse gas emissions. The average demand and lower and
upper bounds of a 90% confidence interval were forecasted using the vector of parameter
estimates and variance-covariance matrix from Equation (6.6.1). The analysis was limited
to forecasting hourly electricity demand and the associated confidence intervals for the
hours between 12pm and 7pm on each day of July and August in the first year of each
decade for the period between 2010 and 2099. The forecasting was limited to this period
because the afternoon and early evening hours are the most likely to be "peak hours," and
July and August are typically the hottest months of the year in California. The correlation
between hours is accounted for by drawing from the complete variance-covariance
matrix.

The projected demand estimates in the fixed scenario are derived from the unit-level kW
models. For any hour and daily average temperature, the estimated demand is determined
by Equation (6.6.2):

(6.6.2)
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If the daily average temperature is above the cooling degree day base then electricity
demand will be greater than zero. Projected demand was estimated for each hour of the
day across a range of daily average temperatures from 67°F to 95°F for all air conditioners
in the sample.
Figure 6-19 (a) through 6-19 (d) illustrate the upper and lower bounds of 90% confidence
intervals for the average base load demand per-air conditioner over the period from 20102090. Figures6-19 (a) and (b) illustrate the range of base load demand that can be
expected in scenarios based on the GFDL climate model and Figures 6-19(c) and (d)
illustrate the range of expected per-unit demand in scenarios based on the PCM climate
model.
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Figure 6-19. 90% Confidence Intervals around Mean Per-Unit Base Load Demand

Figure 6-20 (a) through (d) illustrate the upper and lower bounds of a 90% confidence
interval around the forecasted mean per-AC electricity demand at system peak. System
peak was assumed to occur at the highest daily average temperature of the summer. The
figures show that if the rate of greenhouse gas emissions is low in 2010 per-unit electricity
demand at the time of system peak is forecasted to be between 1.0 kW and 1.4 kW; in
2050, between 1.25 kW and 1.5 kW; and in 2090, between 1.18 kW and 1.51 kW. If,
however, the rate of greenhouse gas emissions is high, per-unit peak demand is forecasted
to be between 1.32 kW and 1.42 kW in 2010; between 1.3 kW and 1.7 kW in 2050; and
between 1.4 kW and 2.3 kW in 2090. Figure 6-20 (a) and (b) show the range of forecasted
per-unit peak demand based on the GFDL climate model and (c) and (d) show the range
of forecasted per-unit peak demand based on the PCM climate model.
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6. 7.2 Forecasting Mean Base Load Demand, Peak Demand, and Peak Demand
Reductions
This section presents the forecasts of base load and peak demand at the per-air
conditioner level. That is, the results are expressed as average per-unit base load demand
and average per-unit peak demand. While the Krinsky-Robb procedure was used to
forecast electricity demand as a function of time and temperature across the afternoon
and evening hours in July and August between 12pm and 7pm, the results presented here
are all for demand during the hour ending at 6pm.

Table 6-12 shows the forecasted average per-unit base load and peak demand across the
four climate and emissions scenarios. It is important to keep in mind that peak demand as
expressed in the tables below is electricity demand for cooling at the probable time of
system peak-this figure does not include electricity demand for all other customer loads
that might be operating at the time of system peak. Recall from Chapter 2, air
conditioning accounts for 15% of residential end-use loads (see Figure 2-15, page 37) and
that air conditioning accounts for between 40% and 50% of the total peak load
(Yoshimura,2009).

Table 6-12 shows the range of average per-unit electricity baseload demand and peak
demand during the beginning, middle, and later parts of the 21st century. As expected, the
range of both baseload demand and peak demand increases over time and demand is
higher in the high greenhouse gas emissions scenario than in the low emissions scenario.
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Table 6-12. Forecasted Range of Electricity Demand for Air Conditioning
Year

Emissions
Scenario

Baseload Demand _(k~
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound
1.09
0.40
1.16
0.50

l

Peak Demand _(kW)
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound
1.00
1.48
1.09
1.61

l

2010-2030

Low
High

2040-2060

Low
High

0.77
1.05

1.31
1.45

1.11
1.30

1.70
1.74

2070-2090

Low
High

0.75
0.98

1.66
2.29

1.09
1.34

1.94
2.29

Table 6-13 below lists the average per-unit baseload demand and peak demand every 10
years beginning with 2010. Peak demand is assumed to occur on the day with the highest
daily average temperature of the summer.

171

i

Table 6-13. Avera e Per-Unit Base Load and Peak Demand for Coolin

GFDL

High

2010
2015
2025
2030
2040
2050
2060
2070
2080
2090

91
91
88
88
88
89
89
94
95
95

0.71
1.00
0.99
1.13
1.22
1.42
1.34
1.32
1.81
2.26

2.74
2.74
2.32
2.32
2.32
2.46
2.46
3.17
3.30
3.31

GFDL

Low

2010
2015
2025
2030
2040
2050
2060
2070
2080
2090

85
86
87
84
91
90
92
96
91
88

0.80
0.69
0.98
0.60
1.28
1.17
0.96
1.63
1.10
1.02

1.89
2.04
2.18
1.75
2.74
2.60
2.88
3.44
2.74
2.32

PCM

High

2010
2015
2025
2030
2040
2050
2060
2070
2080
2090

84
83
84
88
88
85
. 90
85
90
89

0.70
0.52
0.79
0.76
1.12
1.07
1.29
1.00
1.29
1.25

1.75
1.61
1.75
2.32
2.32
1.89
2.60
1.89
2.61
2.50

PCM

Low

2010
2015
2025
2030
2040
2050
2060
2070
2080
2090

80
81
87
85
83
85
89
82
86
84

0.42
0.54
1.07
0.64
0.79
0.99
0.98
0.77
0.82
0.88

1.21
1.34
1.21
1.89
1.61
1.89
2.46
1.48
2.04
1.75
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Figure 6-21 (a) through (d) graphically illustrate average per-unit base load demand and
peak demand in each of the four climate and emissions scenarios.
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6. 7.3 Percent Change in Base Load and Peak Demand from Reference Year 2007
Table 6-14 and Figures 6-22 (a) through (d) show the percent change in base load and
peak demand in each year from demand in 2007. Base load demand is calculated as
average demand during the hour-ending at 6pm across all days in July and August. Peak
demand is calculated as average demand during the hour-ending at 6pm on the day with
the hottest daily average temperature of the summer. Peak demand will also depend on
the number of consecutive hot days. It is interesting to see that average per-unit base load
demand is forecasted to increase much more than peak demand- up to five times more in
some cases. The most likely explanation is the increasingly frequency of very hot (daily
average temperature greater than or equal to 78°F) days and the decreasing frequency of
mild summer days- thus, pushing up the average base load demand. Table 6-14 suggests
that, in this region of California, electricity demand would actually become less "peaky"
over time; if average per-unit base load demand increases more than average peak
demand, the gap between base load and peak load should shrink. This means that the grid
would need less total peak load generating capacity, and could also mean that peak load
capacity could sit idle for a smaller fraction of the tiffie.
This result is also interesting because it is so starkly different from Franco and Sanstad's
(2008) estimated changes in annual electricity and peak load demands for the same
climate and emissions scenarios. Franco and Sanstad's study is not directly comparable to
the analysis here because the authors estimate total annual and peak electricity demand,
not just demand for electricity for cooling. Another considerable difference is that Franco
and Sanstad look at the entire state of California, which has many different climate zones,
while this analysis is limited to a 12 km2 region in a notoriously hot area. Franco and
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Sanstad also compare their forecasts to electricity demand from 1960 to 1990, which is a
much longer reference period than is used in this analysis. Nevertheless, it is interesting to
note the difference between the analyses. Using the PCM model, Franco and Sanstad
forecast that annual electricity demand will grow between 0.8% and 1.1 % from 2005 to
2034; between 1.6% and 2.3% from 2035 to 2064; and between 2.9% and 4.8% from
2070 to 2099. Under the same conditions, the authors estimate that peak demand will
grow between 1.0% and 1.5% during the period from 2005 to 2034; between 1.6% and
2.5% from 2035 to 2064; and between 4.2% and 5.7% from 2070 to 2099. Using the
GFDL model, Franco and Sanstad estimate that annual electricity demand will increase
between 2.3% and 2.6% between 2005 and 2034; between 3.8% and 4.6% from 2035 to
2064; and between 5.3% and 9.9% from 2070 to 2099. Peak demand was estimated to
increase more in this case- between 3.8% and 4.2 % from 2005-2034; between 5.1 % and
5.2% from 2035-2064; and between 7.5% and 12.4% from 2070-2099.
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6-14. Percent Chan e in Base Load Demand and Peak Demand from Reference Year 2007

GFDL

High

2010
2015
2025
2030
2040
2050
2060
2070
2080
2090

22%
70%
69%
93%
108%
141%
128%
124%
208%
284%

41 %
41 %
19%
19%
19%
26%
26%
62%
69%
70%

GFDL

Low

2010
2015
2025
2030
2040
2050
2060
2070
2080
2090

37%
18%
67%
3%
118%
99%
64%
178%
87%
73%

-3%
4%
12%
-10%
41 %
33%
48%
77%
40%
19%

PCM

High

2010
2015
2025
2030
2040
2050
2060
2070
2080
2090

19%
-11 %
35%
30%
90%
83%
120%
71%
120%
113%

-10%
-17%
-10%
19%
19%
-3%
33%
-3%
34%
28%

PCM

Low

2010
2015
2025
2030
2040
2050
2060
2070
2080
2090

-28%
-7%
82%
9%
35%
69%
67%
31%
40%
49%

-38%
-31 %
-38%
-3%
-17%
-3%
26%
-24%
4%
-10%
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6. 7.4 Peak Demand Reductions from a 5° Thermostat Re-set
One of the purposes of this analysis is to establish predicted peak demand reductions
across the four climate and emissions scenarios. When the per-unit projections are
multiplied by the population of households with central air conditioning in the Stockton
area, these projections can inform regulators the extent to which air conditioner re-set
programs can reduce peak demand.
The demand reduction projections are derived from the demand relationship specified by
Equation 6.6.1. The model provides an estimate of average air conditioner demand as a
function of degree days. The model optimizes the choice of degree day base thereby
identifying, on average, the outdoor temperature above which the air conditioner starts to
be used. Above that temperature, the model indicates the average load used for cooling
for each temperature levels. The demand reduction forecasts use a change in outdoor
temperatures a proxy for indoor thermostat set-point increase. This means that a five
degree increase in the thermostat set-point is analogous to cooling the house at an
outdoor temperature that is lower by five degrees. The analysis assumed that participating
customers' AC thermostats would be turned up by 1° per hour for 5 hours, ending at
6pm. Then, hour-specific load differentials were estimated for various temperature
differentials.

Table 6-15 and Figure 6-23 (a) through (d) report the average per-unit peak demand
during the hour between 5pm and 6pm, the average per-unit peak demand with a 5°
thermostat re-set, and the average per-unit percentage peak demand reduction. The
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average peak demand reduction ranges from 18% to 50% of per-unit peak demand,
which is consistent with the estimated load reductions from 2007.
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Table 6-15. Potential Peak Demand Reduction from a 5° Thermostat Re-set

GFDL

High

2010
2015
2025
2030
2040
2050
2060
2070
2080
2090

2.74
2.74
2.32
2.32
2.32
2.46
2.46
3.17
3.30
3.31

2.04
2.03
1.61
1.61
1.61
1.75
1.75
2.59
2.60
2.60

26%
26%
30%
30%
30%
29%
29%
18%
21%
21%

GFDL

Low

2010
2015
2025
2030
2040
2050
2060
2070
2080
2090

1.89
2.04
2.18
1.75
2.74
2.60
2.88
3.44
2.74
2.32

1.26
1.34
1.48
1.08
2.04
1.89
2.18
2.74
2.04
1.63

34%
34%
32%
39%
26%
27%
25%
20%
25%
30%

PCM

High

2010
2015
2025
2030
2040
2050
2060
2070
2080
2090

1.75
1.61
1.75
2.32
2.32
1.89
2.60
1.89
2.61
2.50

1.08
0.95
1.08
1.64
1.61
1.21
1.89
1.21
1.89
1.75

39%
41%
39%
29%
30%
36%
27%
36%
27%
30%

PCM

Low

2010
2015
2025
2030
2040
2050
2060
2070
2080
2090

1.21
1.34
1.21
1.89
1.61
1.89
2.46
1.48
2.04
1.75

.60
.70
1.34
1.20
0.95
1.21
1.80
0.83
1.34
1.08

50%
48%
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During System Peak
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6.8 Peak Demand and Peak Demand Reductions at the Population Level

The next step in assessing potential savings from peak load reduction is to expand the
per-unit level demand reduction projections to the population level. Doing so will
provide regulators with an estimate for the magnitude of potential peak demand savings
under various climatic conditions.

6.8.1. Total Population
The population under consideration consists of the total number of households in San
Joaquin County, which is the county where Stockton is located.

Map 6-2. San Joaquin County, California
The California Department of Finance (DOF) publishes long-term population
projections. The most recent projections show that California's population is going to
grow faster in the hotter inland areas than on the coast. Based on DOF's projections, the
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number of households in San Joaquin County will increase from 265,740 in 2010 to
639,416 in 2050 (based on an average of 2.79 persons per household) (California Energy
Commission, 2007; Heim & Martindale, 2007) .

6.8.2 Determining Eligible Households
Before the per-unit level projections can be expanded to the population, the approximate
number of households with central air conditioning in Stockton must be determined. The
California Statewide Residential Appliance Saturation Survey (2004), which provides an
overview on equipment saturations throughout the state, provides key statistics on central
and room air conditioning. Used in conjunction with demographic and socio-economic
information collected by the State of California Department of Finance and the U.S.
Census Bureau, one can approximate the number of households with central air
conditioning in Stockton.
The information that was most pertinent and useful was the saturation of air conditioning
by household income level and by type of dwelling (single family, condo, etc.). Income
plays a big role in air conditioning growth (Figure 6-24) - households at lower income
levels are more likely to have room air conditioners and households at the higher end of
the income spectrum are more likely to have central air conditioning systems.
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Figure 6-24. Air Conditioning by Income
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Figure 6-25. Distribution of Household Income, San Joaquin County, CA

The distribution of household income in San Joaquin County is provided by the U.S.
Census 2005-2007American Community Survey. Multiplying the percentage of the
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population in each income group by the saturation of central air conditioning that group
gives an approximate number of households with central AC in San Joaquin County.
Using this method, there are about 91,715 households, or 44% of the total number of
households, with central air conditioning.

6.8.3 Results: Peak Demand Reductions
It is unlikely that smart thermostats will be deployed in every household in the near
future, so three scenarios are examined. In the first scenario, 15% of eligible households
(those with central air conditioning) have smart thermostats and are enrolled in a peak
demand reduction program. In the second scenario, 50% of households with central air
conditioning have a smart thermostat. And in the third scenario, 100% of households
with central air conditioning have smart thermostats. All of the scenarios are based on
population projections from 2010 to 2050 from the California Department of Finance,
and the number of households is calculated by assuming 2. 79 persons per household.
Population and number of households are held constant from 2050 to 2090. Central air
conditioning saturation is assumed to increase at a rate of 1% annually, until reaching
89% in 2060. Air conditioning saturation is held constant at 89% from 2060 to 2090.
The results from the first scenario are shown in Table 6-16. Peak demand, peak demand
with a 5°F thermostat re-set, and the peak demand reduction were calculated as follows:
Peak Demand =
Number of Households with Central AC x Average Peak Electricity Demand
Peak Demand with 5° Re-Set =
(Number of Households without Smart Thermostats x Average Peak Electricity Demand)
+ (Number of Households with Smart Thermostats x Peak Electricity Demand at 5°
Temperature Differential)
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Peak Demand Reduction=
Peak Demand - Peak Demand with 5° Re-Set
The table shows that if smart thermostats are installed in 15% of households with central
air conditioning, raising the temperature setting by 5°F during a contingency can reduce
peak demand between 4% and 15%, depending on the climatic conditions. Forecasts
based on the GFDL climate model predict more conservative demand reductions of
between 4% and 6%, while forecasts based on the PCM climate model predict greater
reductions on the order of 7% to 15% of peak demand. This is the expected result. As
mentioned earlier, the relationship between the change in energy demand for cooling and
a change is temperature is highly non-linear at the high-end of the temperature range.
This means that a change in temperature from, say, 100 to 105 degrees may produce little
change in air conditioning energy use if most air conditioners are already running flat out
at 100 degrees, so energy consumption cannot increase as the temperature climbs. For the ·
same reasons, air conditioner re-set programs might not be very effective at extremely hot
temperatures, regardless of the magnitude of the incentive provided, since the thermostat
adjustments at these extremes will have little impact on energy use. Since the
temperatures forecasted by the GFDL model are sigllificantly greater than those
forecasted by the PCM model, it is expected that raising the temperature setting by 5° on
participating air conditioners' thermostats will have less impact in the GFDL model
scenarios than in the PCM scenarios. Thus, one conclusion to draw from this analysis is
that direct control air conditioning programs will be more effective in some locations
than in others. For example, this type of program might not be particularly effective in
extremely hot places like Phoenix, AZ (or regions forecasted to get extremely hot), but
perhaps might be more effective in moderate climates, such as northern California.
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Tables 6-17 and 6-18 show a similar pattern. Table 6-17 shows the results of the analysis
of the second scenario considered. In this scenario, central air conditioning saturation
increases by 1% annually through 2050, but this scenario also assumes that 50% of
households in San Joaquin county with central AC will have smart thermostats and
participate in the re-set program. In this case, peak demand reductions between 13% and
19% are expected in scenarios based on the GFDL model and peak demand reductions
between 25% and 35% are expected in scenarios based on the PCM model. Table 6-18
shows the results of the analysis of the third. In the third scenario, 100% of households
with central air conditioning are assumed to have smart thermostats, although this is a
highly unlikely case. In the case of 100% smart thermostat deployment, peak demand
reductions between 26% and 39% are forecasted under the GFDL model and between
52% and 71 % under the PCM model.
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Table 6-16. 15% Smart Thermostat Deployment

2010
2015
2025
2030
2040
2050

265,740
269,222
345,911
431,970
529,560
639,416

116,926
169,497
233,264
312,441
441,198
505,140

17,539
25,425
34,990
46,866
66,180
75,771

GFDL

High

2010
2015
2025
2030
2040
2050

321
465
541
724
1,023
1,242

308
447
516
691
976
1,189

12
18
25
33
47
53

4%
4%
5%
5%
5%
4%

GFDL

Low

2010
2015
2025
2030
2040
2050

221
345
508
548
1,210 .
1,313

210
327
483
516
1163
1260

11
18
25
32
47
53

5%
5%
5%
6%
4%
4%

PCM

High

2010
2015
2025
2030
2040
2050

205
274
409
723
1022
957

186
250
371
646
915
866

19
24
38
77
107
91

9%
9%
9%
11%
10%
10%

PCM

Low

2010
2015
2025
2030
2040
2050

141
227
281
590
712
957

130
209
239
534
650
866

11
18
42
56
63
91

7%
8%
15%
10%
9%
10%
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Table 6-17. 50% Smart Thermostat De lo ment
----------------------------------------------r

2010
2015
2025
2030
2040
2050

GFDL

265,740.86
269,222.07
345,911.83
431,970.61
529,560.22
639,416.85

High

116,926
169,497
233,264
312,441
441,198
505,140

58,463
84,748
116,632
156,2220
220,599
252,599

2010
2015
2025
2030
2040
2050

321
465
541
724
1023
1242

279
405
459
614
868
1064

41
60
82
110
155
178

13%
13%
15%
15%
15%
14%

GFDL

Low

2010
2015
2025
2030
2040
2050

221
345
508
548
1210
1313

184
286
426
442
1054
1135

37
59
82
106
156
178

17%
17%
16%
19%
13%
14%

PCM

High

2010
2015
2025
2030
2040
2050

205
274
209
723
1022
957

142
194
283
467
666
652

63
80
125
256
356
305

31%
29%
31%
35%
35%
32%

PCM

Low

2010
2015
2030
2040
2050

141

227
590
712
957

106
168
402
504
652

35
60
188
209
305

25%
26%
32%
39%
32%
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Table 6-18. 100% Smart Thermostat De lo ment

~~~~~~~~~~~--r

2010
2015
2025
2030
2040
2050

265,740.86
269,222.07
345,911.83
431,970.61
529,560.22
639,416.85

116,926
169,497
233,264
312,441
441,198
505,140

58,463
84,748
116,632
156,2220
220,599
252,599

GFDL

High

2010
2015
2025
2030
2040
2050

321
465
541
7724
1023
1242

238
345
377
504
712
886

83
120
164
220
310
356

26%
26%
30%
305
30%
29%

GFDL

Low

2010
2015
2025
2030
2040
2050

221
345
508
548
1210
1313

147
227
344
336
898
957

74
117
163
212
312
357

34%
34%
32%
39%
26%
27%

PCM

High

2010
2015
2025
2030
2040
2050

205
274
409
723
1022
957

79
113
158
211
310
348

126
160
251
513
712
609

61%
59%
61%
71%
70%
64%

PCM

Low

2010
2015
2030
2040
2050

141
227
590
712
957

71
108
214
295
348

70
119
376
417
609

50%
52%
64%
59%
64%
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6.8.4. Generation Capacity Savings from Peak Demand Reductions
The cost of new generation capacity has increased dramatically in recent years, with
natural gas capacity costs having increased by 86% between 2000 and 2007. The capital
cost of a simple cycle gas turbine is used as the basis of the cost for peaking capacity.
Spees (2008) estimates that with the recent increases of capacity cost the price of a simple
cycle turbine is $728/kW overnight or $81/kW y annually (Spees, 2008). The capacity
needed to reliably serve the system is greater than the end-use load delivered because of
system losses and the necessary reserve margin. The analysis here adopts the 8%
transmission losses that ISO-NE assumes in its forecasting processes. This assumption
for line losses is typical throughout the U.S. A required reserve margin of 15%, which was
the requirement for the ISO-NE 2008/2009 capacity market auction, will also be used.
Based on these values of T&D losses and required reserve margin, $81/kW yin peak
capacity cost translates into a value of $89 /kW y for peak load reductions if T&D losses
are considered but the margin for reliability is not. If both reliability and T&D losses are
considered, then the cost is $94/kW (Spees, 2008) . Highlighting the distinctions among
the three numbers emphasizes that a kW of reduction in peak load is worth significantly
more than a kW of additional new capacity.
Since even 15% smart thermostat deployment is an ambitious goal for the near term, this
cost savings analysis focuses on the first scenario. Table 6-19 shows the potential
generation capacity cost savings calculated for the forecasted peak demand reductions.
Cost savings were calculated as the total capacity savings (including both reliability and
T&D losses) multiplied by $94/ kW. Table 6-19 shows that the total peak demand
reduction ranges from 13 to 130 MW, depending on the climatic scenario considered.
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The table also shows that generation capacity cost savings range from $1.4 million to $9.5
million dollars from deploying smart thermostats in 15% of households with central air
conditioning in San Joaquin County.

GFDL

High

2010
2015
2025
2030
2040
2050

12.38
17.98
24.60
32.95
46.53
53.47

15.23
22.12
30.26
40.54
57.24
65.77

$1,431,863
$1,628,851
$2,228,972
$2,985,547
$4,215,895
$4,844,057

GFDL

Low

2010
2015
2025
2030
2040
2050

11.13
17.61
24.51
31.78
46.72
53.49

13.70
21.67
30.15
39.10
57.48
65.80

$1,287,683
$1,596,145
$2,220,730
$2,879,830
$4,233,281
$4,846,116

PCM

High

2010
2015
2025
2030
2040
2050

18.87
24.04
37.64
76.88
106.86
91.37

23.21
29.58
46.30
94.57
131.44
112.39

$2,181,761
$2,178,405
$3,410,339
$6,965,145
$9,680,610
$8,277,524

PCM

Low

2010
2015
2030
2040
2050

10.52
17.89
56.46
62.59
91.37

12.95
22.02
69.45
76.99
112.39

$1,217,114
$1,621,481
$5,115,170
$5,670,354
$8,277,534

Greenhouse gas savings can also be calculated. On average, California's non-baseload
power plants emit 1,279 lb/MWh of carbon dioxide, 0.322 lb/MWh of sulfur dioxide,
and 0.534 lb/MWh of nitrogen oxides (United States Environmental Protection Agency,
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2007b) . Therefore, a 13MW reduction in peak demand avoids 8.3 tons of carbon dioxide,
4.2 pounds of sulfur dioxide, and 6.9 pounds of nitrogen oxides. A 131 MW reduction in
peak demand avoids 83. 7 tons of carbon dioxide, 42.2 pounds of sulfur dioxide, and 70
pounds of nitrogen oxides.
To put this estimate into perspective, if similar savings could be obtained throughout
California, the forecasted 2013 peak demand from the residential sector of 27,000 MW
could be reduced by 1,080 to 2,430 MW (California Energy Commission, 2007). This
would result in generation capacity savings of approximately $87 million to $196 million
(not including reliability or T&D losses), and avoid 690 to 1,553 tons of carbon dioxide,
347 to 782 pounds of sulfur dioxide, and 565 to 1,273 pounds of nitrogen oxides from
the residential sector. This would also save California between 1% and 2% of its annual
expenditure on electricity for residential end-uses. This reduction is roughly equivalent to
the amount of power produced by 2 to 4 500-MW natural gas-fired power plants, such as
the Cosumnes plant in Sacramento or the Manchester Street plant in Providence, RI.
The California Energy Commission forecasts that statewide coincident residential peak
demand in 2018 will be 31,000 MW (California Energy Commission, 2007). If a 4% to
15% peak demand reduction could be achieved statewide, the peak could be shaved by
1,240 to 4,650 MW. A reduction of this magnitude could save $100 million to $376
million in generation capacity (capital) costs and avoid between 792 and 2,973 tons of
carbon dioxide, 399 to 1,497 pounds of sulfur dioxide, and 649 to 2,436 pounds of
nitrogen oxides. A reduction of this magnitude could reduce California's expenditure on
electricity for residential end-uses by 1% to 2%. Also, a reduction of this size is roughly
equivalent to the amount of peaking power produced by 2 to 6 500-MW power plants.
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6.8.5 Costs of Demand Reductions
The EIA-861 database contains historic data on utility demand-side management
programs (Spees, 2008) . Several hundred utilities reported costs related to demandmanagement and energy efficiency as well as total coincident peak load saved for
residential, commercial, and industrial customers in 2006. Table 6-20 shows summary
numbers for the residential sector.

Table 6-20. Utilities' Reported Costs of Coincident Peak Demand Reductions
from Load Management

Clearly, achieving peak demand reductions could potentially be a much cheaper means of
satisfying peak demand than are supplying more capacity and more electric energy, until
scaled up to some percent of load_where the marginal costs of achieving more reductions
are higher and the marginal benefits much lower. Peak demand reductions are currently
being achieved at $26/kW-y, or just over one fourth of the $94/kW-y it costs to build
new capacity.
Table 6-21 shows the net savings that could be achieved if 15% of eligible households
participated in a thermostat re-set program in San Joaquin County.
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Table 6-21. Net Savings from Peak Demand Reductions

GFDL

High

2010
2015
2025
2030
2040
2050

$1,037,644 PCM
$1,056,498
$1,445,745
$1,936,471
$2,734,494
$3,141,929

High

2010
2015
2025
2030
2040
2050

$1,581,080
$1,412,946
$2,211,998
$4,517,699
$6,278,991
$5,368,928

GFDL

Low

2010
2015
2025
2030
2040
2050

$933,159 PCM
$1,035,284
$1,440,400
$1,867,902
$2,745,771
$3,143,265

Low

2010
2015
2030
2040
2050

$882,019
$1,051,717
$3,317,777
$3,677,878
$5,368,928

It is worthwhile to note that while reducing load is cheaper than building new capacity
and providing more power right now, this might not be the case forever. The reported
costs of reducing residential peak load quoted in Table 6-21 do not consider the fact that
as successively more investments are made in peak demand and average load reductions,
the low-cost opportunities will have been achieved and the marginal cost of achieving the
next kW or MWh reduction will increase. When the marginal cost of peak reductions
equals the marginal cost of providing more capacity and energy, then the market will have
reached an efficient state. This possible end state will not exist without market structures
and state regulations that create appropriate incentives for generators, utilities, and
customers.

198

Also noteworthy, is that in most cases peak demand reductions are being achieved at a
lower cost with larger customers, as expected. Peak reductions are being achieved most
inexpensively with industrial customers, followed by commercial and finally residential
customers. With large industrial customers, the administrators of a demand-management
program can examine a large quantity of energy use all under one roof, rather than
incurring the costs of interacting with many small residential customers in order to have
affected the same total load.

6. 9 Conclusions
This chapter analyzed the direct load control SmartAC program to determine its past and
future impact on reducing peak demand. The conclusion of the analysis is that direct load
control programs that limit consumers' demand for electricity for air conditioning during
critical hours are effective in reducing peak demand. This chapter also concludes that this
type of direct control program has a smaller impact on peak demand at extremely hot
daily average temperatures. This means that this type of direct control program will
reduce peak demand more effectively if the impact of climate change on daily average
temperatures is moderate. Likewise, this chapter condudes that this fype of program may
reduce peak demand more effectively in regions of the country with moderate
temperatures and low humidity, such as northern California and the Pacific Northwest.

The results of the forecasting analysis show that if 15% of households with central air
conditioning in San Joaquin County participate in a direct control air conditioning
program, a 5°F thermostat re-set at the time of peak demand could reduce peak demand
by 13 to 131 MW, depending on the climatic scenario considered. This translates into
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savings of approximately $1.3 million to $9.6 million in generation capacity costs. This
would avoid between 8.3 and 83 tons of carbon dioxide emissions, between 4.2 and 42
pounds of sulfur dioxide emissions, and between 6.9 and 70 pounds of nitrogen oxide
emissions. To put this estimate in perspective, if similar savings could be achieved
throughout the state of California it could reduce its expenditures on electricity for
residential end-uses by between 1 and 2% and eliminate the need for between 2 and 6
peaking power plants by 2018. After considering the cost of installing the necessary
advanced metering infrastructure, achievable net savings are between approximately
$800,000 and $3.3 million per year.
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Chapter 7 Recommendations and Conclusion
7 .1 Peak Demand Policy Recommendations
Direct control programs such as SmartAC are generally unpopular among economists,
who have at least a vague preference for reduce peak demand through real-time or peak
load pricing to shift demand to off-peak periods (Baumol & Oates, 1988) . However,
there is room in a well-designed policy for direct controls. The reason is that peak
demand problems do not develop smoothly and gradually. Instead, peak demand
problems are characterized by infrequent but serious crises whose timing is largely
unpredictable. Such contingencies may require rapid temporary changes in the rules of
the control mechanism, and it is here that pricing measures appear to subject some severe
practical limitations (Baumol & Oates, 1988) . I recommend that the ideal peak demand
policy package contains a mixture of tools, with real-time pricing, direct controls, and
even moral suasion each used under certain conditions to reduce peak demand and
maintain system reliability.
This section will first lay out the advantages of real-time pricing and show why real-time
pricing is an important piece of any peak demand policy. Then, I will explain why the
peak demand problem is unlike many other natural resource problerns and why direct
controls are a necessary complement to real-time pricing for maintaining system
reliability.
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Advantages ofReal-time Pricing
Regulators at state public utility commissions should consider real-time pricing tariffs as
an essential component of peak demand management programs, and should be driven by
concerns about meeting peak demand at the lowest cost, enhancing system reliability, and
creating equity among users.
Maximizing Consumer Surplus
Quantity-based programs, such as the SmartAC program analyzed here, do not provide
customers with the ability to take into consideration the value that they place on
particular end-uses when limiting their consumption. For example, the SmartAC program
targets only one end-use for the reason that it is easy to control, not because of its low
value to the customer. A customer might prefer, for example, to postpone using the
clothes dryer or dishwasher during peak hours instead of reducing his air conditioning
load. Real-time pricing allow customers to create their own "loading order" of end-uses
with which to respond.

Creating Equity Among Users
Real-time prices reflect the long run cost of avoided generation, transmission and
distribution capacity, and the short run cost of energy. Under current conditions,
customers with a flat or counter-cyclical load profile subsidize high coincident peak loads
o f others. When faced with real-time prices, customers will either choose to shift
electricity demand to low-cost hours or pay the full price of their load profile, rather than
having it subsidized the rest of the system. Further, for the customers that place a high
value on stability in price, retailers could provide any combination of hedges or flat rates;
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these rates should charge a premium above the RTP rate reflecting the higher cost of
service.

Avoiding Issues with Estimated Customer Baselines
Real-time pricing also circumvents the challenges facing the use of estimated customer
baselines for compensating customers for demand reductions in quantity-based
programs. Instead of compensating customers for energy not used, customers simply pay
for the amount of energy they consume at prices adjusted to reflect the real-time marginal
supply costs. This avoids gaming, moral hazard, and adverse selection issues from
customers who try to benefit from artificially inflating their baselines. Real-time pricing
also avoids the double-payment problem that results in paying excessive demand
reduction incentives to customers and causes customers to forego consumption whose
value exceeds the cost of producing energy.

Advantages ofDirect Controls
Those who advocate for the sole use of real-time pricing for reducing peak demand omit
an important consideration. Peak electricity demand falls into an important class of
serious resource problems: the occasional crises that call for the imposition of emergency
measures. Typically, these crises cannot be predicted much in advance or with any degree
of certainty; we can, however, be certain that at some unforeseen time they will recur. An
energy policy incapable of dealing with such contingencies is very limited.
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Consider the following analogy: the polluting effects of a given discharge of effluent into
a river will depend upon the condition of the waterway at that time- whether it has been
replenished by a rainfall or depleted by a drought. The amount of water and speed of its
flow are critical determinants of the river's assimilative capacity. Similarly, problems
within one utility service territory during peak hours quickly cascaded and escalated to
affect millions of customers across the Northeast in Canada causing the widespread
blackout in August 2003.

The point of this analogy is that electricity demand levels that are acceptable and rather
harmless under usual conditions can, under other circumstances, become catastrophic.
Moreover, these conditions depend on factors that are largely outside the control of
system planners and often are not predictable in advance. Temperature, the largest driver
of peak demand, for example, is only imperfectly foreseeable.

Despite its virtues, real-time pricing suffers from one serious drawback as a means for
regulating peak demand: it cannot guarantee a sufficient demand reduction to avoid
system failure. This is because the price elasticity for electricity demand is largely
unknown, particularly at extreme temperatures. A one-time high hourly price may not be
able to produce the necessary reduction in demand quickly (or predictably) enough to
avoid system failure. This suggests one major attraction of direct controls: if .t he control is
effective and can be deployed quickly enough, regulators can be assured of maintaining
system integrity.
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This is why a combination of real-time pricing and direct controls is the ideal peak
demand policy: under normal conditions, real-time pricing improves the economic
efficiency of the grid and maximizes consumer surplus, but during periods of severe
stress direct controls give regulators the flexibility to achieve the necessary demand
reduction and avoid catastrophic system failure. While the exact contribution of direct
control to alleviate crisis conditions will vary from case to case, clearly peak demand
reductions during such times can play significant roles in avoiding system failure. A
strong lesson from California's experience, in fact, is that a variety of policies aimed at
getting all types of customers to reduce their electricity demand can have a significant
impact on maintaining system reliability. During the California energy crisis of 2001, the
state averaged a 10% reduction in peak demand during the summer months (with a
record reduction of 14% in June). No rolling blackouts occurred in 2001, despite rather
dire forecasts that had been made prior to the onset of the spring and summer peak
demand season.
Recommendation
Based on this research, my principal recommendation for policymakers, regulators, and
utilities interested in furthering effective demand management policies is that it would be
beneficial to thoroughly test policy and program design concepts that incorporate both
direct peak demand control and real-time pricing objectives as an alternative to only
offering distinct direct control or pricing programs. Such a policy might have three levels,
as illustrated by Figure 7-1. For example, a direct control air conditioning program
designed to reduce cooling demand during peak periods might also promote real-time
pricing through the use of enabling smart meters. Additionally, having more information
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on energy prices and consumption might lead consumers to upgrade to more efficiency
appliances.

Important considerations would be: 1) should real-time pricing and direct control
programs be offered to all customers classes; 2) what level of participation is needed to
meet peak demand reduction targets; and 3) how quickly should advanced metering
infrastructure be phased in and who should pay for it? While questions (1) and (3) are
largely outside the scope of this research, this research does provide some direction with
regard to question (2). This research suggests that enrolling 15% of all households with
central air conditioning in a direct control program will achieve 4% to 7% reductions in
peak demand in the near term and 6% to 15% reductions in peak demand by the middle
of the century. If concentrations of greenhouse gases are high and temperatures rise
rapidly, air conditioner control programs are likely to become less effective in reducing
peak demand. This research also shows that direct control programs are likely to be more
effective in areas that are moderately hot and less effective in regions that are extremely
hot (e.g. a direct control air conditioning program will most likely be more effective in
northern California than in Phoenix, AZ).
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Figure 7-1. Integrated Peak Demand Policy

7.2 Recommendations for Areas of Further Research
One important area for future research is the relationship between direct control, pricing,
and energy efficiency. All three of these measures affect customer demand for energy, but
how exactly these primary objectives relate to each other is an unanswered question.
There is almost no published research on the issue of how direct control and pricing
programs affect energy use during off-peak hours and overall building energy use and
energy efficiency. There is some mostly anecdotal evidence that suggests certain types
technologies that enable direct control and RTP during peak demand periods can also
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understanding of the relationship among direct control, RTP, and efficiency investments.
Yet understanding this relationship is vitally important because there are many potential
synergies, as well as potential conflicts, between these types of programs. Potential
synergies include:
•

Energy efficiency can reduce demand permanently, at peak as well as off-peak
times;

•

Focusing on peak-demand reductions can help identify inefficient energy uses
that could be improved at other times, resulting in broader energy and demand
savmgs;

•

Technologies that enable peak demand reductions can also be used to enable
RTP;

•

Customers who participate in demand reduction programs may be good
candidates for participating in RTP and efficiency programs (or vice versa).

Perhaps the most important potential synergy is simply the fact that participating in a
demand reduction program, particularly one that features advanced metering equipment,
helps a customer better understand their energy use and associated costs.

Some proponents of combining peak demand reduction, RTP, and efficiency efforts into
integrated policies cite improved energy efficiency as one of the benefits of peak demand
reductions:

" [demand reduction programs] can also serve as a stimulus and platform for participating
customers to undertake expanded and enhanced energy efficiency programs. By gaining
access to information about their usage that was previously unavailable to them, and by
gaining the means to act upon it, users can undertake energy management and efficiency
practices that can provide embedded, more permanent benefits to the system as a whole.
(York & Kushler, 2005)"
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On the other hand, conflicts may arise between direct control programs and energy
efficiency programs in terms of their funding. There also may be difficulties in trying to
blend funds from different sources together for the sake of seeking combined energy
efficiency and peak demand reduction objectives.

Answering some of the following questions is the key to understanding the relationship
between direct control, RTP, and efficiency programs. In turn, such understanding is
important in guiding policy and funding decisions.
•

What effects, if any, do peak demand reduction program have on overall
customer energy use and energy efficiency?

•

Are direct control and energy efficiency objectives necessarily complementary? Of
can these programs have conflicting elements?

•

Are there programs that have deliberately targeted both peak demand and energy
efficiency? What has their experience shown?

•

Does direct control program participation lead to broader energy savings? If yes,
does it lead to actual energy efficiency measures or just energy savings from the
use of the controls to shift demand in off-peak hours?

•

If high peak prices encourage peak demand reductions, do the corresponding low
off-peak prices result in less motivation to save energy during off-peak periods?

•

Does providing greater information to customers on their energy use and market
conditions result in more energy efficient behavior?

•

Can direct control and energy efficiency programs sometimes work in opposition
to their respective objectives? For example, does providing an incentive based on
the amount of peak load reduction delivered from a facility's energy demand
baseline create an indirect incentive to not take energy efficiency actions that
would reduce that baseline and thereby reduce the amount of compensation for
demand reductions that could be earned?
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7.3 Conclusion
This research has focused on the relative advantages and disadvantages of using pricebased and quantity-based controls for electricity markets. It also presents a detailed
analysis of one specific approach to quantity-based controls: the SmartAC program
implemented in Stockton, California. Finally, the research forecasts electricity demand
under various climate scenarios, and estimates potential cost savings that could result
from the SmartAC program over the next 50 years in each scenario.
Perhaps the most crucial feature that distinguishes electricity from other commodities is
the need to balance supply and demand on virtually a minute-to-minute basis. Because
electricity cannot be cost-effectively stored, supply must be kept constantly equal to
demand. If more electricity is demanded than generated, brownouts or blackouts follow.
If more electricity is supplied than used, the heat from the extra energy can damage
transmission and distribution lines.
A second critical feature of electricity markets is the large variability in electricity
consumption over time, known as the peak load demand problem. In most areas of the
country, electricity demand is greatest during summer heat waves, when electricity
consumption can be almost double consumption during base load periods.
The traditional approach to dealing with these two issues is to invest in a large stock of
excess capital that is rarely used, thereby greatly increasing production costs. Because this
approach has proved so expensive, there has been a focus on identifying alternative
approaches for dealing with these two key peak load demand problems.
The two primary approaches to dealing with peak load demand are price based
approaches, such as real time pricing, and quantity based approaches, whereby the utility
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directly controls at least some elements of electricity used by consumers. Well-designed
policies for reducing peak demand might include both price and quantity controls.
In theory, sufficiently high peak prices occurring during periods of peak demand and/ or
low supply can cause the quantity of electricity demanded to decline until demand is in
balance with system capacity, potentially reducing the total amount of generation capacity
needed to meet demand and helping meet electricity demand at the lowest cost. However,
consumers need to be well informed about real-time prices for the pricing strategy to
work as well as theory suggests. While this might be an appropriate assumption for large
industrial and commercial users who have potentially large economic incentives, there is
not yet enough research on whether households will fully understand and respond to realtime prices.
Thus, while real-time pricing can be an effective tool for addressing the peak load
problems, pricing approaches are not well suited to ensure system reliability. Direct
quantity controls are better suited for avoiding catastrophic failure that results when
demand exceeds supply capacity.
There are additional advantages to real-time pricing. Unlike direct quantity controls, realtime pricing gives consumers the ability to create their own "loading order" based on the
value that they place on different end-uses for electricity. For example, when prices are
high a given customer might choose to unplug his computer and turn off the dishwasher
before turning up the temperature setting on his air conditioning system. Real-time prices
also create equity among users. Under fixed retail rates, customers with a flat or countercyclical load profile subsidize customers with high coincident peak loads. When faced
with real-time prices, customers must either shift electricity consumption to low-cost
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hours or pay the full price of their load profile, rather than having it subsidized by the rest
of the system. Thus, pricing approaches have the advantage of allowing electricity
consumers to choose how to reduce electricity demand, thereby potentially maximizing
consumer surplus.

But, consumer response to real-time prices is not reliable enough to protect against
catastrophic system failure. The reason is the distinction between higher (but wellbehaved) increases in marginal supply costs versus system failure. Peak demand problems
do not develop smoothly and gradually. Instead, peak demand problems are characterized
by infrequent but serious crises whose timing is largely unpredictable. It is the potential
for system failure that requires rapid temporary changes, and it is here that pricing
measures appear to subject some severe practical limitations. Real-time pricing cannot
guarantee a sufficient demand reduction to avoid system failure. The price elasticity for
electricity demand is largely unknown, particularly at extreme temperatures. A one-time
high hourly price may not be able to produce the necessary reduction in demand quickly
or predictably enough to avoid catastrophe. This suggests one major advantage of direct
quantity controls: if the control is effective and can be deployed quickly, regulators can be
assured of avoiding system catastrophe. For these reasons, the ideal peak demand policy
might contain a mixture of tools, with real-time pricing and direct load controls to reduce
peak demand and maintain system reliability under different climate change scenarios.

There are important drawbacks to the use of direct quantity controls, however, including
gamesmanship and estimating customer baselines. In cases where incentive payments are
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paid according to the magnitude of the demand reduction, the program is subject to
gaming, moral hazard, and adverse selection issues from customers who try to benefit
from artificially inflating their baselines. Real-time pricing circumvents these challenges
because customers simply pay for the amount of energy they consume at prices adjusted
to reflect the real-time marginal supply costs. Real-time pricing also avoids the doublepayment problem that results in paying excessive demand reduction incentives to
customers and causes customers to forego consumption whose value exceeds the cost of
producing energy.

This research analyzed the direct load control SmartAC program to determine its past and
future impact on reducing peak demand. The conclusion of the analysis is that direct load
control programs that limit consumers' demand for electricity for air conditioning during
critical hours are effective in reducing peak demand. This research also concludes that
this type of direct control program has a smaller impact on peak demand at extremely hot
daily average temperatures. This means that this type of direct control program will
reduce peak demand more effectively if the impact qf climate change on daily average
temperatures is moderate. Likewise, this research concludes that this type of program may
reduce peak demand more effectively in regions of the country with moderate
temperatures and low humidity, such as northern California and the Pacific Northwest.
The results of the forecasting analysis show that if 15% of households with central air
conditioning in San Joaquin County participate in a direct control air conditioning
program, a 5°F thermostat re-set at the time of peak demand could reduce peak demand
by 13 to 131 MW, depending on the climatic scenario considered. This translates into
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savings of approximately $1.3 million to $9.6 million in generation capacity costs. This
would avoid between 8.3 and 83 tons of carbon dioxide emissions, between 4.2 and 42
pounds of sulfur dioxide emissions, and between 6.9 and 70 pounds of nitrogen oxide
emissions. To put this estimate in perspective, if similar savings could be achieved
throughout the state of California it could reduce its expenditures on electricity for
residential end-uses by between 1 and 2% and eliminate the need for between 2 and 6
peaking power plants by 2018. After considering the cost of installing the necessary
advanced metering infrastructure, achievable net savings are between approximately
$800,000 and $3.3 million per year.

214

Bibliography
Agnew, K. (2008). Personal communication

Amato AD, R., Kirshen, P., & Horwitz, J. (2005). Regional energy demand responses to
climate change: Methodology and application to the commonwealth of
Massachusetts. Climatic Change, 71, 175-201.

Aubin, C., Fougere, D., Husson, E., & lvaldi, M. (1995). Real time pricing of electricity
for residential customers: Econometric analysis of an experiment. Journal efApplied

Econometrics, 1O(Special Issue: The Microeconometrics of Dynamic Decision
Making), 171-191.

Bailey, E. E., & White, L. J. (197 4). Reversals in peak and off-peak prices. BellJournal ef

Economics and Management Science, 5(Spring), 75-92.

Balducci, P. J., Roop,]. M., Schienbein, L.A., DeSteese,J. G., & Weimar, M. R. (2002).

Electrical power interruption cost estimatesfar individual industries, sectors, and U.S. economy No. ·
PNNL-13797). Richland, WA: Pacific Northwest National Laboratory.

Barbose, G., Goldman, C., & Neenan, B. (2004). A surory ef utili!J experience with real time

pricing No. LBNL-54238)

Barbose, G ., Goldman, C., & Neenan, B. (2006). The role of demand response in default
service pricing. The Electrici!J Journal, 19(3), 64-74.

Barker, B., & Sanna, L. (2006, Turning on energy efficiency. Electric Power Research Institute

Journal, , 4-13.

215

Baumol, W.]., & Oates, W. E. (1988). The theory of environmentalpoliry. New York:
Cambridge University Press.

Baxter, L., & Calandri, K. (1995). Global warming and electricity demand: A study of
california. Energy Poliry, 20(3), 233-244.

Bergstrom, T., & MacKie-Mason,J. K. (1991). Some simple analytics of peak-load
pricing. The Rand Journal ofEconomics, 22(2), 241-249.

Berlin, E., Cicchetti, C., & Gillen, W. (1974). Perspective on power: A stucfy of the regulation and

pricing ofelectric power No. A Report to the Energy Policy Project of the Ford
Foundation)

Bigelow, B. (2008,June 27, 2008). High court deflects reopening of power contracts. San

Diego Union-Tribune, Retrieved from
http: //w\vw.signonsandiego.com/ uniontrib / 20080627 / ne\vs 1b27power.html

Boisvert, R., Cappers, P., & Neenan, B. (2002). The benefits of customer participation in
wholesale electricity markets. The Electriciry Journal, April

Boisvert, R., Cappers, P., Neenan, B., & Scott, B. (2004). Industrial and commercial customer

response to real time electrici(y prices
Boisvert, R., & Neenan, B. (2003). Social we!fare implications of demand response programs in

competitive electrici(y markets No. LBNL-52530)
Boiteux, M. (1949). Peak load pricing. Journal ofBusiness, 33(April (1960)), 157-179.

216

Borenstein, S., & Holland, S. P. (2002). Investment efficienry in competitive electriciry markets with

and without time varying retailprices No. CSEM WP 106)

Borenstein, S.,Jaske, M., & Rosenfeld, A. (2002). Dynamic pricing, advanced metering, and

demand response in electriciry markets No. CSEM WP 105)

Braithwait, S. D. (2003). Demand response is important-but let's not oversell (or overprice) it. The Electriciry Journal, June, 52-64.

Braithwait, S. D., & Eakin, K. (2002). The role ofdemand response in electric power market design
No. Prepared for Edison Electric Institute)

Braithwait, S. D., & Faruqui, A. (2001). The choice not to buy: Energy savings and policy
alternatives for demand response. Public Utilities Fortnight/y, 139(6), 48-59.

Braithwait, S., Hansen, D. G., & Kirsch, L. D. (2006). Incentives and rate designs for efficienry

and demand response No. Collaborative Report LBNL-60132)

Braithwait, S. (2001). Demand response article drew. inaccurate distinctions against realtime pricing. The Electriciry Journal, 14(8), 2-2.

Brennan, T., Palmer, K., & Martinez, S. (2001). Implementing electriciry restmcturing: Policies,

potholes, andprospects No. Resources for the Future Discussion Paper 01-62)

Brown, G.,Jr., & Johnson, M. B. (1969). Public utility pricing and output under risk. The

American Economic Review, 59(1), 119-128.

217

Brown, G.,Jr., & Johnson, M. B. (1969). Public utility pricing and output under risk. The

American Economic Review, 59(1 ), 119-128.

Businesswire. (2008, July 8, 2008). EnerNOC surpasses $500 million in contracted
revenues. MSN Monry,

CAISO. (2005). California independent !)IStem operator. Retrieved September
2007w"vw.caiso.com

California Energy Commission. (2007). California energy demand 2008-2018: Staff revised

forecast No. CEC-200-2007-015-SF2)

California Environmental Protection Agency. (2006). Climate action team report to governor

Schwarzenegger and the Legislature Order Instituting Rulemaking regarding Policies and
Protocols for Demand Response Load Impact Estimates, Cost-Effectiveness
Methodologies, Megawatt Goals and Alignment with California Independent System
Operator Market Design Protocols, 07-01 -041, (2007).

California Public Utilities Commission. (2005). 2005 integrated energy poliry report No.
Docket# 04-IEP-1, et. al.)

Order Adopting Changes to 2007 Utility Demand Response Programs, (2006).

California Public Utilities Commission Energy Division. (2008). Load impact estimation far

demand response: Protocol and regulatory guidance
Cardell, J. B., Hitt, C. C., & Hogan, W. W. (1997). Market power and strategic interaction
in electricity networks. Resource and Energy Economics, 19(1-2), 109-137.
218

Cayan, D . R., Maurer, E., Dettinger, M. D ., Tyree, M., & Hayhoe, K. (2008). Climate
change scenarios for the California region. Climatic Change, 87(Supp/1), 21-42.

Cayan, D ., Luers, A. L., Franco, G., Hanemann, M., Croes, B., & Vine, E. (2008).
Overview of the California climate change scenarios project. Climatic Change, 87(Supp
1), S1-S6.

CBS News. (2004,June 1, 2004). Enron traders caught on tape, tapes obtained by CBS
confirm Enron role in western power crisis. CBS News,

Chao, H. (2008). Economicframework and evaluation ofprice responsive demand No. Presentation
to ISO-NE Market Committee Demand Resources Working Group)

Chao, H. (1983). Peak load pricing and capacity planning with demand and supply
uncertainty. The BellJournal ofEconomics, 14(1), 179-190.

City of Stockton, C. City of stockton, CA: Official city government website. Retrieved May, 2009,
2009, from http://www.stocktongov.com /

Connecticut Light & Power. (2005). Incentives for customer-side distributed resources: Overoiew of

connecticutpublic act 05-01

Constellation NewEnergy. Glossary. Retrieved September 27, 2007, from
W\VW

.newenergy.com/ portal/ site/ cne / menuitem.e3820ab3fd57bdae18ae18a805e4da

176a0

Costello, K. (2004). An observation on real-time pricing: Why practice lags theory. The

E lectricity Journal, January/February, 21 -25.
219

Cowart, R., & Hirst, E. (2002). Framing paper 2: Demand side resources and reliability.

Cowart, R., & Raab, J. (2003). Dimensions of demand response: Capturing consumer based resources

in new engfand's power !J!Stems and markets No. Report and recommendations of the New
England Demand Response Initiative)

Creel, M. D ., & Loomis,]. B. (1991). Confidence intervals for welfare measures with
application to a problem of truncated counts. The Review ofEconomics and Statistics,
73(2), 370-373.

Crew, M. A., & Kleindorfer, P.R. (1976). Peak load pricing with a diverse technology. The

BellJournal ofEconomics, 7(1), 207-231.

Crew, M., Fernando, C., & Kleindorfer, P. (1995). The theory of peak-load pricing: A
survey. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 8, 215-248.

Crew, M. A., & Kleindorfer, P. R. (1978). Reliability and public utility pricing. The

American Economic Review, 68(1), 31-40.

Crew, M. A., & Kleindorfer, P. R. (1978). Reliability and public utility pricing. The

American Economic Review, 68(1), 31 -40.

Darmstadter, J. (1991 ). Processes for identifying regional influences ofand responses to increasing

atmospheric C02 and climate change. the MINK project: Report VNo. Energy TR052G.
DOE/RL/01830T-H11, National technical information service. US D epartment of
Commerce. Springfield, VA.)

220

Dennis, K. (2006). The compatibility of economic theory and proactive energy efficiency
policy. The Electricity Journal, 19(7), 58-73.

Earle, R., & Faruqui, A. (2006). Toward a new paradigm for valuing demand response.

The Electricity Journal, 19(4), 21-31.

Energy Information Administration. (2005). Regional energy profiles: Household electricity reports

(energy uses)

Energy Information Administration. (2006). Form EIA-861 final data file for 2006.
Retrieved February 12, 2009, from

http: //w,vw.eia.doe.gov I cneaf/electricity / page/ eia861.html

Energy Information Administration. (2007). Annual energy outlook 2007 No. DOE/EIA0383(2007))

Energy Information Administration. (2009). Annual energy outlook 2009 No. DOE/ EIA0383(2009))

EnerNOC. (2006). Demand response: An underused capacity resource whose time is now

Environment Northeast. (2006). Climate change roadmap for new england and eastern canada

Environment Northeast. (2006). Rhode is/and· Sweeping new approach to lower energy costs, boost

economic growth, and protect the environment

Environment Northeast. (2007). Aligning utility incentives with consumer interests: Decoupling

utility safes from profits No. TEC-RI Board Meeting)

221

Environment Northeast. (2007). Connecticut house bill no. 7432: An act concerning electriciry and
enew efficienry

Environment Northeast. (2008). Massachusetts 2008 energy bill· An act relative to green
communities, senate bill no. 2768

Eto, J., Divan, D., & Brumsickle, W. (2004). Pilot evaluation ofpower qualiry and reliabiliry
monitoring in california's silicon vallry with the I-grid !)!Stem No. LBNL-52740)Emest
Orlando Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratories.

Faruqui, A. (2006). 2050: A pricing odyssey. The Electriciry Journal, 19(8), 3-11.

Faruqui, A., Hledik, R., Newell, S., & Pfeifenberger, J. (2007). The power offive percent: How
cfynamic pricing can save $35 billion in electn'ciry costs

Faruqui, A., & Sergiei, S. (2009). Household response to cfynamic pricing of electriciry: A surory of
the experiment evidence

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. (2006). Assessment of demand response and advanced
metering No. AD06-2-000)

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. (2006). Federal energy regulatory commission landmark
orders: Order888. Retrieved September 19, 2007, 2007, from
http://w\vw.ferc.gov/legal/maj-ord-reg/land-docs/order888.asp

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. (2006). Steff assessment of demand response and
advanced metering No. Item No. 5-A)

222

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. (2007). Assessment of demand response and advanced

metering 2007 No. Staff Report)

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. (2008). 2008 summer market and reliability
assessment. Paper presented at the

Franco, G., & Sanstad, A.H. (2008). Climate change and electricity demand in california.

Climatic Change, 87(Supp 1), S139-S151.

Fraser, H . (2001). The importance of an active demand side in the electricity industry. The

E lectn'ciry Journal, 14(9), 52-73.

Goldberg, M. L. (2007). Measurement and evaluation of demand response resources.
Paper presented at the

Goldberg, M., & Agnew, K. (2003). Protocol developmentfor demand response calculation: Findings

and recommendations No. CEC 400-02-017F)Prepared by KEMA-Xenergy, Inc. for the
California Energy Commission.

Goldman, C. (2002). Framingpaper 1: Price responsive load programs

Goldman, C., Barbose, G ., & Neenan, B. (2006). Real-time pricing as an optional service:
It's alive, but is it well? The Electrici(y Journal, 19(1), 18-29.

Gruenspecht, H. (2002). E mewing enew securi(y issues: Reliabili(y and critical infrastructure

protection

223

Haab, T. C., & McConnell, K. E. (2003). Valuing environmental and natural resrouces: The

econometrics of non-market valuation (illustrated ed.) Edward Elgar Publishing.

Harrington, P. (2003). The power to choose-enhancing demand response in liberalised
electricity markets. Paper presented at the

Hayhoe, K., Cayan, D., Field, C., Frumhoff, P., Maurer, E., Miller, N., et al. (2004).
Emissions pathways, climate change, and impacts on california. Proceedings ofthe

National Academy ofSciences, 101(34), 12422-12427.
Heffner, G. (2002). Configuring load as a resource for competitive electrici!J markets: Review of

demand response programs in the U.S. and around the world No. In the Proceedings of the
14th Annual Conference of the Electric Power Supply Industry)

Heim, M., & Martindale, M. (2007). P3-population projections ry race/ ethnici!J, gender, and age for

california and its counties, 2000-2050 No. San Joaquin)California Department of
Finance.

Hirsh, R. F. (1999). PURPA: The spur to competition and utility restructuring. The

Electrici!J Journal, 12(7), 60-72.
Hirshleifer, J. (1958). Peak loads and efficient pricing: Comment. Quarter/y Journal of

Economics, (72), 451-462.

Hirst, E . (2002). Barriers to price-responsive demand in wholesale electrici!J markets

Hole, A. R. (2008). Modelling heterogeneity in patients' preferences for the attributes of a
general practitioner appointment. Journal ofHealth Economics, 27(4), 1078-1094.
224

Hopper, N., Goldman, C., Bharvirkar, R., & Engel, D. (2007). The summer of 2006: A
milestone in the ongoing maturation of demand response. The Electricity Journal,

20(5), 62-75.

Hopper, N., Goldman, C., & Neenan, B. (2006). Demand response from day-ahead
hourly pricing for large customers. The Electricity Journal, 19(3), 52-63.

Independent Service Operator- New England. (2006). Standard market design: Hourfy data

Independent Service Operator- New England. (2009). Status report on the future

ofprice

responsive demand programs administered fry ISO-new england, inc. No. Draft Version 1.0)

Independent System Operator- New England. (2008). 2006 new england marginal emission

rate anafysis. Holyoke, Massachusetts: System Planning Department ISO-New
England.

Supplemental Appropriations to American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, 1113, 11 lth Congress Session 1Cong. (2009).

Isaac, M., & van Vuuren, D. P. (2009). Modeling global residential sector energy demand
for heating and air conditioning in the context of climate change. Energy Poliry, 37(2),
507-521.

ISO-New E ngland, I. (2007). ISO new england manualfor measurement and verification of demand

reduction value from demand resources No. Manual M-MVDR)

Jaffe, A., & Feldner, F. (1996). Should electricity markets have a capacity requirement? if
so, how should it be priced? The Electricity Journal, 9(10), 52.
225

Jeanty, P. W. (2007). Constructing krinsky and robb confidence intervals for mean and
median willingness to pay using stata. North American Stata Users' Group Meeting,
Boston, Massachusetts. , 6

Kahn, A. E. (2002). The adequacy of prospective returns on generation investments
under price control mechanisms. The Electricity Journal, 15(2), 37-46.

Kahn, E., Bailey, S., & Pando, L. (1997). Simulating electricity restructuring in california:
Interactions with the regional market. Resource and Enet;gy Economics, 19(1-2), 3-28.

Kaloogian, H . (2008, July 7, 2008). Who created the california energy crisis? The Providence

Journal, pp. 4.

"

Keith, G., Biewald, B., & White, D. E . (2004). Designing demand response programs in
new england to achieve air quality benefits. The Electricity Journal, 17(4), 79-87.

KEMA. (2008). The U.S. smart grid revolution: KEMA's perspectivesfarjob creation

Keohane, N., & Olmstead, S. (2007). Markets and the environment Island Press.

King, C., & Delurey, D. (2005). Efficiency and demand response: Twins, siblings, or
cousins? Public Utilities Fortnight/y, 143(3), 54.

King, M. J., King, K., & Rosenzweig, M. B. (2007). Customer sovereignty: Why customer
choice trumps administrative capacity mechanisms. The Electricity Journal, 20(1), 3852.

226

Koomey, J., & Brown, R. E. (2002). The role ef building technologies in reducing and controlling

peak electrici!J demand No. LBNL-49947). Berkeley, CA: Ernest Orlando Lawrence
Berkeley National Laboratory.

Krinsky, I., & Robb, A. L. (1986). On approximating the statistical properties of
elasticities. The Review <ifEconomics and Statistics, 68(4), 715-719.

Krinsky, I., & Robb, A. L. (1986). On approximating the statistical properties of
elasticities. The Review efEconomics and Statistics, 68(4), 715-719.

,1

Krinsky, I., & Robb, A. L. (1990). On approximating the statistical properties of
elasticities: A correction. The Review efEconomics and Statistics, 72(1), 189-190.

Lam, J. C. (1998). Climatic and economic influences on residential electricity
consumption. Energy Conservation and Management, 39(7), 623-629.

Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. (2005). Recent advances in regional climate .[JStem

modeling and climate change anajyses efextreme heat No. CEC 500-2005-016)

Lawton, L., Sullivan, M., Van Liere, K., Katz, A., & Eto,J. (2003). A framework and review

ofcustomer outage costs: Integration and ana/ysis ofelectric utili!J outage cost survrys No. LBNL54365). Berkeley, CA: Ernest Orland Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory.

Levy, R. (2006). A vision of demand response: 2016. The Electriciry Journal, 19(8), 12-23.

I

Li, H., & Maddala, G. S. (1999). Bootstrap variance estimation of nonlinear functions of
parameters: An application to long-run elasticities of energy demand. The Review of

Economics and Statistics, 81(4), 728-733.

I

11 ,
I

I

227

Lijesen, M. (2007). The real-time price elasticity of electricity. Energy Economics, 29, 249258.

McDonough, C., & Kraus, R. (2007). Does dynamic pricing make sense for mass market
customers? The Electricity Journal, 20(7), 26.

McNamara, W. (2007). KEMA anafysis find ma'!Y utilities starting to develop AMI and utility-of

thefuture strategies.
http: I / '>vww.kema.com/ consulting services/ cross sector/INC /Automation Insigh
t/May 2007 /May 2007.asp#O:

Mendelsohn, R. (2003). The impact of climate change on energy expenditures in
california. In T. Wilson, L. Williams, J. Smith & R. Medelsohn (Eds.), Global climate

change and california: Potential implicationsfor eco.rystems, health, and the economy (Consultant
report 500-03-058CF to the Public Interest Energy Research Program ed., )
California Energy Commission.

Mitchell, B., Manning, W. G. J ., & Acton, J. P. (1978).. Peak load pricing: European lessons for

U.S. energy poliry. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company.
MostafaBaladi, S., Herriges, J. A., & Sweeney, T . J. (1998). Residential response to
voluntary time-of-use electricity rates. Resources and Energy Economics, 20(3), 225-244.

Munasinghe, M., & Warford, J. J. (1982). Electricity pricing: Theory and case studies. Baltimore,
Maryland: The John Hopkins University Press.

228

National Climatic Data Center. (2009). Heating and cooling degree dqy data (state, regional, and

national). Retrieved March 31, 2009, 2009, from
http://\,VW\V.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/ online/ccd/nrmcdd.txt

Neenan, B., Boisvert, R., & Cappers, P. (2002). What makes a customer price responsive.

The Electrici!J Journal, 15(3)

Neenan, B., Pratt, D., Cappers, P., Anderson, J., Scholle-Cotton, L., & Butkins, K. (2005).
2004 NYISO demand response program evaluation

Nemtzow, D ., Delurey, D., & King, C. (2007). The green effect. Public Utilities Fortnightjy,
145(3), 40.

Neumann, S., Sioshansi, F., Vojdani, A., & Yee, G. (2006). How to get more response
from demand response. The Electrici!J Journal, 19(8), 24-31.

Nichols, D., & Stutz, J. (2001). Load response: New, or deja vu? The Electrici!J Journal,
14(4), 73-79.

Nieto, A. D ., & Fraser, H . (2007). Locational electricity capacity markets: Alternatives to
restore the missing signals. The Electrici!J Journal, 20(2), 10-26.

O'Sheasy, M. T. (2002). Is real-time pricing a panacea? if so, why isn't it more
widespread? The Electrici!J Journal, 15(10), 24-34.

Obama, B., & Biden, J. (2009). New enew for America. Retrieved February 2, 2009, from
http: I / my.barackobama.com/page/ content/ newenergy

229

American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, H.R.1, 11th Congress 1st
SessionCong. (2009).

O'Sheasy, M. (2003). Demand response: Not just rhetoric, it can truly be the silver bullet.

The Electricity Journal, December, 48-60.

Ott, A. (2006). Though demand response faces hurdles, restructuring has displayed
benefits. The Electricity Journal, 19(5), 3-4.

Palmer, K., & Burtraw, D. (2005). The environmental impacts of electricity restructuring: Looking

back and lookingfonvardNo. RFF DP-05-07)

Panzar,]. C. (1976). A neoclassical approach to peak load pricing. The BellJournal of

Economics, 7(2), 521-530.

Parmesano, H. (2007). Rate design is the no. 1 energy efficiency tool. The Electricity Journal,
20(6), 18-25.

Philipson, L., & Willis, H. L. (1999). Understanding electric utilities and de-regulation. New
York, New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc.

Pizer, W. (1996). Modeling long-term poliry under uncertainty. Unpublished Ph.D, Harvard
University,

Pizer, W. (1997). Prices vs. quantities revisited: The case ofclimate change No. Discussion Paper
98-02). Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future.

230

Pizer, W. (2003). Climate change catastrophes No. Discussion Paper 03-31). Washington,
D.C.: Resources for the Future.

Pizer, W. A. (2002). Combining price and quantity controls to mitigate global climate
change. Journal ofPublic Economics, 85(3), 409-434.

PLANYC 2030. (2009). Enew initatives: Expandpeak load management. Retrieved March 4,
2009, 2009, fromhttp: //www.nyc.gov / html/ planyc2030/ html/ plan/ energy peakload-management.shtml

PR Newswire. (2008, July 8, 2008). University of maryland reduces load by 20 million
kWh in 2 years using comverge demand response solutions. MSN Monry,

Prather, D. (2008). Air condztioning contractors association

Puckett, C. D., Hennessy, T. P., Heffner, G. C., & Goldman, C. (2008). Regional
approaches to measurement and verification of load management programs. IEEE

Transactions on Power Systems, 23(1)

Risser, R. (2006). Decoupling in california: More than two decades of broad support and success No.
Workshop on Aligning Regulatory Incentives with Demand-Side Resources)

Rosenfield, A.,Jaske, M., & Borenstein, S. (2002). Dynamic pricing, advanced metering, and

demand response in electriciry markets No. CSEM WP 105)

Rosenthal, D. H., Gruenspecht, H.K., & Moran, E. A. (1995). Effects of global warming
on energy use for space heating and cooling in the united states. Enew Journal, 16(2),
77-96.

231

Rosenzweig, M. B., Fraser, H., Falk, J., & Voll, S. P. (2003). Market power and demand
responsiveness: Letting customers protect themselves. The Electriciry Journal, 16(4),
11 -23.

Ruff, L. (2002). Demand response: Reality versus "resource". The Electriciry Journal,

December, 10-23.

Ruff, L. (2002). Economic principles ef demand response in electriciry
Sailor, D. J., & Pavlova, A. A. (2003). Air conditioning market saturation and long-term
reponse of residential cooling energy demand to climate change. Energy, 28, 941-951.
Sailor, D. J. (2001). Relating residential and commercial sector electricity loads to
climate-evaluating state level sensitivities and vulnerabilities. Energy, 26(7), 645-657.
Sailor, D. J., & Muiioz, J. R. (1997). Sensitivity of electricity and natural gas consumption
to climate in the U.S.A.-Methodology and results for eight states. Energy, 22(1 0),
987-998.

Schewe, P. F. (2007). The grid: Ajournry through the heart efour electrified world. Washington,
D.C.: The Joseph Henry Press.

Schlegel, J. (2002). Framing paper 4: Energy efficiency.
Sezgen, 0., Goldman, C., & Krishnarao, P. (2005). Option value ef electriciry demand response
No. LBNL-56170)

232

Sheffrin, A., Yoshimura, H., LaPlante, D., & Neenan, B. (2008). Harnessing the power of
demand. The Electririry Journal, 21 (2), 39-50.

Sherman, R., & Visscher, M. (1978). Second best pricing with stochastic demand. The

American Economic Review, 68(1), 41-53.

Sherman, R., & Visscher, M. (1978). Second best pricing with stochastic demand. The

American Economic Review, 68(1), 41-53.

Sierra Club. (2009). Coal plant tracker. Retrieved February, 2009, 2009, from
http: I I \V\vw.sierraclub.org/ environmentallaw I coal/plantlist.asp

Sioshansi, F. P. (2006). Electricity market reform: What have we learned? what have we
gained? The Electn"riry Journal, 19(9), 70-83.

Sioshansi, F., & Vojdani, A. (2001). What could possibly be better than real-time pricing?
demand response. The Electririry Journal, 14(5), 39-50.
Smith, J. B., & Tirpak, D. (1989). The potential effects ofglobal climate change on the united states
No. Report to Congress)Uriited States Environmental Protection Agency, Office of
Policy, Planning and Evaluation, Office of Research and Development.

Smith, J. B., & Tirpak, D. (Eds.). (1989). The potential effects ofglobal climate change on the united

states. Congress, United States Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Policy,
Planning, and Evaluation, Office of Reserach and Development.

Smith, V. (2005, August 12, 2005). Power to the people. The Wall Street Journal, pp. 8.

233

Spees, K. (2008). Meeting electn·cpeak on the demand side: Wholesale and retail market impacts of

real-time pricing andpeak load management poliry. Unpublished Ph.D, Carnegie Mellon
University, Pittsburg, Pennsylvania.

Spees, K., & Lave, L. Demand response and electricity market ejficienry No. Carnegie Mellon
Electricity Industry Center Working Paper CEIC-07-01)

Spine, H. N. (2002). Demand response: The future ain't what it used to be-or is it? The

Electricity Journal, 15(6), 78-86.

Spulber, D. F. (1990). Capacity-contingent nonlinearpricing lry regulatedfirms
Steiner, P. 0. (1957). Peak loads and efficient pricing. The Quarterfy Journal ofEconomics,
71(4), 585-610.
Talluri, K. T., & Van Ryzin, G. (2005). The theory andpractice of revenue management Springer.
Taylor, L. (1975). The demand for electricity: A survey. The Be//Journal ofEconomics, 6(1),
74-110.

Teuwen, E. (2008). Advances in demand response initiatives. Paper presented at the
Turvey, R. (1968). Peak-load pricing. The Journal ofPolitical Economy, 76(1), 101-113.

U.S. Census Bureau. (1998, 2007). American housing surory-metropolitan data

U.S. Department of Energy. (2006). Benefits of demand response and recommendations for

achieving them

234

U.S. Department of Energy Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability. (2009).

The smart grid: An introduction

United States Environmental Protection Agency. (2007). Air emissions. Retrieved May 20,
2009, 2009, fromhttp: //w\.vw.epa.gov/ solar/ energy-and-you/ affect/air-

emissions.hunl

United States Environmental Protection Agency. (2007). eGRID 2006 No. Version 2.1
Year 2004 Summary Tables)

Weitzman, M. L. (1974). Prices vs. quantities. The Review ofEconomic Studies, 41(4), 477-491.

Wenders,]. T. (1976). Peak load pricing in the electric utility industry. The BellJournal of

Economics, 7(1), 232-241.

Wenders,]. T., & Taylor, L. D. (1976). Experiments in seasonal-time-of-day pricing of
electricity to residential users. The BellJournal ofEconomics, 7(2), 531 -552.

Weston, F., & Lazar,]. (2002). Framing paper 3: Metering and retail pricing.

Wikipedia.org. (2006). Public utilities regulatory polices act. Retrieved September 19, 2007,
2007, from http: //en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act

Williamson, 0. E. (1966). Peak-load pricing and optimal capacity under indivisibility
constraints. The American Economic Review, 56(4, Part 1), 810-827.

Wilson, G. W. (1972). The theory of peak-load pricing: A final note. The BellJournal of

Economics and Management Science, 3(1 ), 307-310.

235

Woo, C. K., Pupp, R. L., & Glyer, D. (1991). Voluntary interruptible pricingprogram task 4

report: An integrated approach to electricity reliability pricing No. 4)

Xiao, N., Zarnikau, J., & Damien, P. (2007). Testing functional forms in energy modeling:
An application of the bayesian approach to U.S. electricity demand. Energy E conomics,
29(2), 158-166.

York, D., & Kushler, M. (2005). Exploring the relationship between demand response and energy

efficienry: A review of experience and discussion of kry issues No. U052). Washington, D.C.:
American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy.

Yoshimura, H. (2008). New england demand response resources: Present obseroations andfuture

challenges No. Presentation at ISO-New England, Inc.)

Yoshimura, H. (2008). Personal communication

Yoshimura, H . (2008). Results and implications of the first forward capacity market
auction.

Yoshimura, H. (2009). Personal communication

236

